Id . (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Bradford , 238 F.2d 395, 397 (2d Cir. 1956) (no per se Sixth Amendment violation where attorney was duly admitted to state court but had failed to seek admission to federal court); People v. Cornwall , 3 Ill. App. 3d 943, 277 N.E.2d 766, 767-68 (1971) (same where out-of-state attorney had failed to seek admission pro hac vice); State v. White , 101 N.M. 310, 681 P.2d 736, 739 (Ct. App. 1984) (same where duly admitted out-of-state attorney failed to comply with local rules requiring that he be accompanied by local counsel)). Kieser concluded the defendant had shown no "defect of constitutional dimension."

Even constitutional error may be harmless where it is clear, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to defendant's conviction (People v Almestica, 42 N.Y.2d 222, 224). We therefore concur with the view expressed by each of the County Court Judges whose decisions are before us that representation of an accused by an unlicensed counsel does not per se mandate vacating of the judgment of conviction (see People ex rel. Harrington v Martin, 263 App. Div. 922, mot for lv to app den 263 App. Div. 1025, mot for lv to app den 288 N.Y. 740, cert den 316 U.S. 678; People v Cox, 12 Ill.2d 265). The test of due process in such an instance is not whether the defendant had an attorney, licensed or unlicensed, but whether under all of the circumstances his conviction was obtained in such a manner as to be offensive to the common and fundamental idea of what is fair and right (see People v Cornwall, 3 Ill. App.3d 943). An in-depth review of the entire record in each of the three cases on appeal reveals the following:

Even constitutional error may be harmless where it is clear, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to defendant's conviction ( People v Almestica, 42 N Y 2d 222, 224 [ 397 N.Y.S.2d 709; 366 N.E.2d 799 (1977)]). . . . The test of due process in such an instance is not whether the defendant had an attorney, licensed or unlicensed, but whether under all of the circumstances his conviction was obtained in such a manner as to be offensive to the common and fundamental idea of what is fair and right (see People v Cornwall, 3 Ill. App.3d 943 [ 277 N.E.2d 766 (1971)]). The dissent in Felder, supra at 318, replied as follows:

See, e.g., People v. Medler, 177 Cal.App.3d 927, 930-31, 223 Cal.Rptr. 401, 402-03 (1986); Johnson v. State, 225 Kan. 458, 590 P.2d 1082, 1086-87 (1979); Hill v. State, 393 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex.Crim.App. 1965). Where the attorney has duly qualified and been admitted to practice in another jurisdiction but fails either to seek admission pro hac vice or to follow local court rules, the violation is a technical defect that does not represent a Sixth Amendment violation. See, e.g., United States v. Bradford, 238 F.2d 395, 397 (2d Cir. 1956) (no per se Sixth Amendment violation where attorney was duly admitted to state court but had failed to seek admission to federal court), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002, 77 S.Ct. 558, 1 L.Ed.2d 546 (1957); People v. Cornwall, 3 Ill. App.3d 943, 277 N.E.2d 766, 767-68 (1971) (same where out-of-state attorney had failed to seek admission pro hac vice); State v. White, 101 N.M. 310, 681 P.2d 736, 739 (Ct.App. 1984) (same where duly admitted out-of-state attorney failed to comply with local rules requiring that he be accompanied by local counsel). Kieser has not shown a defect of constitutional dimension.

As examples of cases in which mere technical flaws in licensure had not been deemed sufficient to deprive the accused of the right to counsel, Solina cited, inter alia, Wilson v. People, 652 P.2d 595 (Colo. 1982) (counsel had graduated from an accredited law school and passed the bar examination and the requisite moral scrutiny but had simply failed to take the oath, which the state, upon discovery of that fact, allowed him to do), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1218, 103 S.Ct. 1221, 75 L.Ed.2d 457 (1983); and People v. Cornwall, 3 Ill.App.3d 943, 277 N.E.2d 766 (1971) (out-of-state-attorney had failed to seek admission pro hac vice). See also United States v. Bradford, 238 F.2d 395, 397 (2d Cir. 1956) (no per se Sixth Amendment violation where attorney was duly admitted to state court but had failed to seek admission to federal court), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002, 77 S.Ct. 558, 1 L.Ed.2d 546 (1957); State v. White, 101 N.M. 310, 681 P.2d 736, 739 (Ct.App. 1984) (same where duly admitted out-of-state attorney merely failed to comply with local rules requiring that he be accompanied by local counsel).

For example, in United States v. Bradford, 238 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002, 77 S.Ct. 558, 1 L.Ed.2d 546 (1957) 356 U.S. 927 (1958), the Second Circuit declined to follow a per se rule and held that the defendant's right to counsel was not violated because he was represented in federal district court in New York by a member of the New York State Bar who had failed to make a formal application for admission to practice before the federal court or to obtain leave to represent the defendant. Accord Derringer v. United States, 441 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); People v. Cornwall, 3 Ill. App.3d 943, 277 N.E.2d 766 (1971); State v. Deruy, 143 Kan. 590, 56 P.2d 57 (1936). In Wilson v. People, ___ Colo. ___, 652 P.2d 595 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1218, 103 S.Ct. 1221, 75 L.Ed.2d 457 (1983), the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a defendant represented at trial by a person who was graduated from an accredited law school and had passed the Colorado bar examination, but who had not yet taken the oath for bar admission was not per se denied effective assistance of counsel.

We limit our decision in this case to situations where, unbeknown to the defendant, his representative was not authorized to practice law in any state, and the lack of such authorization stemmed from failure to seek it or from its denial for a reason going to legal ability, such as failure to pass a bar examination, or want of moral character, e.g., Huckelbury v. State, 337 So.2d 400 (Fla.App. 1976). Thus we put aside such cases as where the representative was a member of the bar of another state but had failed to seek admission pro hac vice, e.g., People v. Cornwall, 3 Ill. App.3d 943, 277 N.E.2d 766 (1971); where he had met all qualifications of learning and character but had failed to take the oath, e.g., Wilson v. People, 652 P.2d 595 (Colo. 1982); where he had begun representation before the formal admission ceremony took place, e.g., Ex parte Engle, 418 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.Cr.App. 1967); or where dues requisite to his continued standing had lapsed, e.g., Johnson v. State, 225 Kan. 458, 590 P.2d 1082 (1979).

As examples of cases in which mere technical flaws in licensure had not been deemed sufficient to deprive the accused of the right to counsel, the Second Circuit in Solina citedWilson v. People, 652 P.2d 595 (Colo. 1982) (counsel had graduated from an accredited law school and passed the bar examination and the requisite moral scrutiny but had simply failed to take the oath, which the state, upon discovery of that fact, allowed him to do), and People v. Cornwall, 3 Ill. App.3d 943, 277 N.E.2d 766 (1971) (out-of-state attorney had failed to seek admission pro hac vice). IV.

See United States v. Bradford, 238 F.2d 395, 397 (2d Cir. 1956) (attorney licensed in state court who failed to seek admission to federal court); Wilson v. People, 652 P.2d 595 (Colo. 1982) (counsel who had graduated from law school, passed the bar exam, but had not yet taken the oath); People v. Cornwall, 277 N.E.2d 766 (III. App. 1971) (out of state attorney who failed to seek admission pro hac vice). As the Third Circuit stated in United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1984),

Here, defendant's attorney had attended law school and had been duly licensed to practice law in New Jersey until he was temporarily suspended from practice for nonpayment of Bar dues. We conclude that his temporary administrative suspension and his failure to be admitted pro hac vice in New York are "technical" defects which, under the circumstances here, cannot serve to support defendant's right to counsel claim (see, e.g., United States v Bradford, 238 F.2d 395 [2d Cir], cert denied 352 U.S. 1002; People v Medler, 177 Cal.App.3d 927, 223 Cal.Rptr. 401; Commonwealth v Thomas, 399 Mass. 165, 503 N.E.2d 456, supra; Dolan v State, 469 So.2d 142 [Fla], supra; People v Cornwall, 3 Ill. App.3d 943, 277 N.E.2d 766). Defendant's remaining arguments are without merit.