"This presumption derives from the fact that when a circuit court declares a statute unconstitutional, such a holding destabilizes the area of law within which the statute is invalidated until that ruling is reviewed by this court." People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004). "To rebut the presumption, a party challenging a statute must establish clearly that it violates the constitution."
"This presumption derives from the fact that when a circuit court declares a statute unconstitutional, such a holding destabilizes the area of law within which the statute is invalidated until that ruling is reviewed by this court." People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d 178, 189 (2004). "To rebut the presumption, a party challenging a statute must establish clearly that it violates the constitution."
Id. ¶ 49 Our supreme court also addressed the widespread dissemination of sex offenders' information on the Internet in People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d 178, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004). There, the court addressed the 2002 versions of Illinois's SORA (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2002)) and Notification Law (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2002)).
He argues that if the provisions are classified as punitive, this triggers a panoply of constitutional rights associated with criminal prosecution. ¶ 28 Our supreme court has determined that the SORA does not constitute punishment. See People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 386-90 (1991); (registration requirement did not impose punishment and even if it did, it was not cruel or unusual); People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 421-24 (2000) (in defendant's ex post facto challenge, the court found the community notification provisions were not punitive under the Mendoza-Martinez test); In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 75 (2003) (holding that the SORA is not punitive as applied to juveniles and does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 206-07 (2004) (in the defendant's ex post facto challenge to the provision providing for dissemination of offenders' information on the Internet, the court held this provision was not punitive under Mendoza-Martinez test); People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 207 (2009) (registration requirement did not constitute punishment for purposes of proportionate penalties clause, eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment, and amendments to the SORA reclassifying the respondent as a "sexual predator" and increasing the length of the period of registration did not violate ex post facto protections); People v. Cardona, 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 24 (observing that sex offender registration requirement was not punishment). ¶ 29 Although defendant recognizes these prior holdings, he urges this court to re-evaluate the current SORA statutory scheme under the Mendoza-Martinez test in light of recent amendments. Under the Mendoza-Martinez test, we examine seven factors to determine
¶ 5 “The Registration Act was passed by the General Assembly ‘in response to concern over the proliferation of sex offenses against children.’ ” People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d 178, 194, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004) (quoting People v. Adams, 144 Ill.2d 381, 386, 163 Ill.Dec. 483, 581 N.E.2d 637 (1991) ). “By requiring sex offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies, ‘the legislature sought to create an additional method of protection for children from the increasing incidence of sexual assault and sexual abuse.’ ” Id. (quoting Adams, 144 Ill.2d at 387, 163 Ill.Dec. 483, 581 N.E.2d 637 ). “The Registration Act was designed to aid law enforcement agencies in allowing them to ‘monitor the movements of the perpetrators by allowing ready access to crucial information.’ ”
When confronted with a claim that a statute violates constitutional guarantees of due process, the court must first determine the nature of the right upon which the statute allegedly infringes. People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d 178, 203, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288, 304 (2004). Where the right infringed upon is a constitutionally protected fundamental right, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny analysis.
¶ 36 Both the federal and state constitutions provide that no individual shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without the due process of law. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. “[W]here the right infringed upon is among those rights considered ‘fundamental’ constitutional rights, the challenged statute is subject to strict scrutiny analysis.” People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d 178, 204, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004). “To survive strict scrutiny, the means employed by the legislature must be necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and the statute must be narrowly tailored to accomplish this goal, i.e., the legislature must employ the least restrictive means consistent with the attainment of the intended goal.”
These are the cases that amicus ACLU describes as having created "a false dichotomy between search and seizure claims and privacy claims." The first group of cases includes King v. Ryan, 153 Ill. 2d 449 (1992), Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302 (1996), Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519 (1997), Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997), Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21 (2001), and People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178 (2004). In King, this court declared unconstitutional a statute authorizing the chemical testing of the blood, breath, or urine of an individual who had been in control of a vehicle involved in an accident causing personal injury or death.
See People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 386-90 (1991); (registration requirement did not impose punishment and even if it did, it was not cruel or unusual); People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 421-24 (2000) (in defendant's ex post factochallenge, the court found the community notification provisions were not punitive under the Mendoza-Martinez test); In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 75 (2003) (holding that the SORA is not punitive as applied to juveniles and does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 206-07 (2004) (in the defendant's ex post facto challenge to the SORA provision providing for dissemination of offenders' information on the Internet, the court held this provision was not punitive under Mendoza-Martinez test); People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 207 (2009) (registration requirement did not constitute punishment for purposes of proportionate penalties clause, eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment, and amendments to the SORA reclassifying the respondent as a "sexual predator" and increasing the length of the period of registration did not violate ex post facto protections); People v. Cardona, 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 24 (observing that sex offender registration requirement was not punishment).¶ 25 Analyzing the current 2013 version of the SORA under the Mendoza-Martinez test, this court has held in People v. Fredericks, 2014 IL App (1st) 122122, ¶¶ 58-61, that in the context of an ex post facto challenge to an amendment retroactively requiring li
¶ 59 SORA "was passed by the General Assembly ‘in response to concern over the proliferation of sex offenses against children.’ " People v. Cornelius , 213 Ill.2d 178, 194, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004) (quoting People v. Adams , 144 Ill.2d 381, 386, 163 Ill.Dec. 483, 581 N.E.2d 637 (1991) ). "By requiring sex offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies, ‘the legislature sought to create an additional method of protection for children from the increasing incidence of sexual assault and sexual abuse.’ " Id. (quoting Adams , 144 Ill.2d at 387, 163 Ill.Dec. 483, 581 N.E.2d 637 ).