Opinion
570099/04.
Decided February 23, 2006.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court, New York County (Raymond Guzman, J.), rendered October 13, 2003, convicting him, upon a plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, and imposing sentence.
Judgment of conviction (Raymond Guzman, J.), rendered October 13, 2003, affirmed.
PRESENT: SUAREZ, P.J., DAVIS, GANGEL-JACOB, JJ
Defendant's present challenge to the sufficiency of his plea allocution is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v. Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 665), and we decline to review in the interest of justice. Were we to review this claim, we would find that the record of the plea allocution establishes that defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered the plea. While a court has a duty to advise a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea ( People v. Catu, 4 NY3d 242, 244; People v. Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 404), the impact, if any, of the judgment on defendant's driving record is a collateral, not direct, consequence of his plea since it is "peculiar" to defendant and would "generally result from the actions taken by agencies the court does not control" ( People v. Ford, 86 NY2d at 403).
On the existing record, which defendant has not sought to amplify by way of a CPL 440.10 motion, we find that defendant received effective assistance of counsel under both the state and federal standards ( see People v. Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 713-714; Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668). The failure to advise a defendant of a collateral consequence of a plea does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel ( People v. Avila, 177 AD2d 426, 427).
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.