Opinion
G054856
10-19-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID ANTONIO COREAS, Defendant and Appellant.
Steven A. Brody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Randall Einhorn and Minh U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 15HF0842) OPINION Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Thomas M. Goethals, Judge. Affirmed. Steven A. Brody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Randall Einhorn and Minh U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
David Antonio Coreas was convicted of three counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age and sentenced to prison. In this appeal, Coreas solely challenges the protective order imposed by the trial court at his sentencing hearing. He argues the protective order, which requires him to refrain from initiating any contact with the two victims and to otherwise stay away from them, was without any statutory authority.
We affirm. The trial court properly issued the protective order as authorized by the former version of Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) (Stats. 2016, ch. 86, § 220), which was in effect at the time of the sentencing hearing in April 2017 (section 136.2(i)(1)). (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.)
BACKGROUND
Given the limited issue raised on appeal, we need not discuss the facts underlying Coreas's convictions. --------
Coreas was charged in an information with three counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age in violation of section 288, subdivision (a). Two of the charged counts were alleged to have been committed against "Jane Doe #1," and one of the charged counts was alleged to have been committed against "Jane Doe #2." The jury found Coreas guilty on all three counts as charged.
The trial court sentenced Coreas to a total prison term of three years. In addition to ordering Coreas to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290, the trial court issued a protective order directing Coreas to refrain from initiating any contact with, and to otherwise stay away from, both victims. The trial court provided Coreas a copy of the protective order and thereafter ordered it sealed. Coreas appealed.
DISCUSSION
Coreas's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by issuing the protective order barring Coreas from contacting either of the minor victims because no legal authority supported its issuance. In his appellate opening brief, Coreas argues the scope of the protective order exceeds the authority provided under section 1201.3, subdivision (a). Coreas contends that statute does not provide for the issuance of an order that prohibits all contact with victims. He also argues section 1203.1, subdivision (i)(2) does not provide authority for the court's protective order because that statute only applies if the defendant is placed on probation; in the instant case, Coreas was sentenced to serve a prison term.
In the appellate respondent's brief, the Attorney General agrees with Coreas that neither section 1201.3, subdivision (a) nor section 1203.1, subdivision (i)(2) supports the protective order issued in this case, but asserts that the order was, however, properly issued under section 136.2(i)(1).
Section 136.2(i)(1) provides: "In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim. The order may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. This protective order may be issued by the court regardless of whether the defendant is sentenced to the state prison or a county jail or subject to mandatory supervision, or whether imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this subdivision that the duration of any restraining order issued by the court be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of the victim and his or her immediate family." (Italics added.)
Coreas, having been convicted of three counts of violating section 288, subdivision (a), was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290, subdivision (c) at the time of sentencing. Section 136.2(i)(1) expressly authorizes the protective order's requirement that Coreas avoid all contact with the victims in this case.
Coreas does not challenge the application of section 136.2(i)(1) to authorize the trial court's protective order. Coreas did not refer to section 136.2(i)(1) in his appellate opening brief, and Coreas did not file a reply brief.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
FYBEL, J. WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. MOORE, J.