Opinion
D042741.
10-14-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SANDRA JEAN CORDOBA, Defendant and Appellant.
Sandra Jean Cordoba was on parole when she was arrested for credit card fraud. The court revoked her parole and she was returned to prison. While in prison, new criminal charges were filed based on the credit card fraud. In accordance with the courts order to produce, Cordoba was delivered into local custody from the Department of Corrections to answer the criminal charges. She pleaded guilty in exchange for a stipulated two-year prison term concurrent with the parole revocation time.
At sentencing, the court refused to award Cordoba presentence custody and conduct credits for the period of time between her arrest on the parole violation and her delivery into local custody. The court found the parole revocation was attributable solely to the facts underlying the current offense, but believed it could only award credits for the time Cordoba was under its process and the Department of Corrections would calculate and award credits for the period of parole revocation custody before she was delivered to the court. Thus, the court awarded presentence credit for 52 days actual time between arrival in local custody and sentencing plus 26 days of conduct credit.
Cordoba appeals, contending the court erred by not awarding custody and conduct credits for the time she was in prison before being delivered to the court to answer to new criminal charges. The People concede the error and we agree. Accordingly, we modify the judgment to give Cordoba presentence custody credit of 199 actual days and 98 days of conduct credit for a total of 297 days.
DISCUSSION
Under Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (a), the time spent in confinement before sentencing shall be credited against any prison term ultimately imposed. Subdivision (b) limits such credit to situations "where the custody to be credited is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted." (People v. Purvis (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1196.) The court imposing the sentence has the duty "to determine the date or dates of any admission to, and release from, custody prior to sentencing and the total number of days to be credited pursuant to this section. The total number of days to be credited shall be contained in the abstract of judgment . . . ." (§ 2900.5, subd. (d).)
Here, Cordoba was arrested for the parole violation on December 9, 2002, and delivered into local custody on May 5, 2003. At sentencing on June 25, 2003, the court found Cordobas parole revocation custody was based solely on the credit card fraud which was the same conduct for which she was convicted and thus, she was entitled to credit against her new prison term for the time spent in custody on the parole revocation. (People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178, 1183.) However, the court failed to calculate and award credits for the time between Cordobas arrest and her delivery into local custody. Its belief the Department of Corrections would perform that task was error.
Under section 2900.5, the court should have awarded Cordoba 199 days actual credit (December 9, 2002 through June 25, 2003) and 98 days conduct credit under section 4019, for a total of 297 days. (See People v. Bravo (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 729, 735.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to give Cordoba presentence custody credit of 199 days actual credit and 98 days conduct credit for a total of 297 days. The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment and forward a copy to the Department of Corrections. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: NARES, J. and OROURKE, J. --------------- Notes: Statutory references are to the Penal Code.