Opinion
D072889
07-05-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JORDAN CORCHON, Defendant and Appellant.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Pulos and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCD268564) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Runston G. Maino, Judge. Affirmed. John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Pulos and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
A jury found Jordan Corchon guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))(count 1) and hit and run resulting in injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)) (count 2). With respect to count 1, the jury also found that Corchon used a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon and personally inflicted great bodily injury.
Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Corchon also admitted having suffered a prior conviction that constituted a serious felony (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)) and a strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 668). The trial court sentenced Corchon to a total term of 12 years in state prison.
On appeal, Corchon contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the mental state required to commit an assault. Corchon concedes that his claim is foreclosed by binding California Supreme Court precedent and states that he raises the claim in this court in order to preserve his right to file a petition for review in the Supreme Court. We affirm the judgment.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 27, 2014, Corchon participated in a physical altercation outside of a grocery store. After a man tried to break up the altercation, Corchon ran to his car. Corchon proceeded to drive his car into the man before driving away. The man suffered injuries to his back, a broken tibia, fibula, and a damaged rotator cuff.
III.
DISCUSSION
Corchon concedes that binding California Supreme Court precedent precludes him
from prevailing on his claim, in this court, that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury regarding the mental state required to commit an assault
The trial court instructed the jury regarding the mental state required to commit an assault pursuant to a version of CALCRIM No. 875, a standard jury instruction concerning assault and assault with a deadly weapon. Corchon acknowledges that CALCRIM No. 875 is premised on the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779 (Williams), but argues that Williams "erroneously defined the mental state required for assault . . . ."
Corchon concedes that this court is bound by Williams pursuant to Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455-456, but states that he raises the claim in this court in order "to preserve his right to petition the Supreme Court to reconsider [Williams]."
We accept Corchon's concession that binding Supreme Court precedent precludes him from prevailing on his instructional claim in this court. Thus, we need not address the merits of Corchon's criticisms of the Williams decision in this opinion.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding the mental state required to commit an assault.
The People argue, "As [Corchon] concedes . . . , this court is bound by the decisions of the California Supreme Court and, thus, it is not necessary to address appellant's arguments challenging the definition of assault." As stated in the text, we agree.
In light of our conclusion, we need not address the People's alternative contention that Corchon forfeited his claim by failing to object to the instruction in the trial court.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
AARON, J. WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. IRION, J.