Opinion
A167805
08-12-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AARON LYNDALL COOPER, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 125227A
We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1(2).
HUMES, P.J.
Defendant Aaron Cooper appeals from a trial court order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Because it is unclear which theory the court relied on to conclude that Cooper remains guilty of murder under current law, we decline to resolve his substantive challenges to the court's ruling. Instead, we vacate the order at issue and remand for the court to clarify the basis on which it denied relief.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
This is Cooper's second appeal from the denial of resentencing under section 1172.6. In 2004, a jury convicted Cooper of first degree felony murder and kidnapping for his role in the 1995 shooting death of William Highsmith, but it acquitted him of being a felon in possession of a firearm. After issuing an order to show cause, the trial court originally denied the resentencing petition on the basis that Cooper remained guilty of felony murder under current law as a major participant in the kidnapping who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See § 189, subd. (e)(3).) In doing so, the court relied on its belief, which was contrary to the jury's verdict, that he had and fired a gun. Cooper appealed, and we reversed, holding that "a trial court cannot deny relief in a section 1170.95 proceeding based on findings that are inconsistent with a previous acquittal when no evidence other than that introduced at trial is presented." (People v. Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 393, 398.) We remanded the matter "for the court to hold a new hearing to consider whether the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Cooper was ineligible for relief . . . for reasons other than having used or possessed a firearm." (Ibid.)
In 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered to section 1172.6 without substantive change. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3.)
On remand, the resentencing judge recused himself, and a different judge conducted the new hearing. As was true at the original hearing, no additional evidence was presented, and the resentencing petition was decided based primarily on testimony from Cooper's 2004 trial. Consistent with the parties' briefing below, their arguments at the hearing focused on whether Cooper was guilty of felony murder as a major participant in the kidnapping who acted with reckless indifference to human life. After discussing certain evidence suggesting Cooper was "aware of the potential for violence," the trial court ruled as follows:
For purposes of this appeal, it is unnecessary to detail the underlying facts, which are set forth in People v. Cooper, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 393.
"It's hard to imagine that somebody would engage in this behavior and not be aware of the reckless endangerment to human life under all these circumstances.
"I think Mr. Cooper's role as a major participant is the easier of the two questions. But I think on the entirety of the record[,] and clearly without consideration of his having had a weapon on him on the date of these events[,] that his conduct demonstrated what we call implied malice. That is a personal subjective understanding of the extreme danger. [¶] . . . [¶] So the motion is denied."
This record leaves us unable to determine which theory of murder the trial court relied on to deny the resentencing petition. Under the relevant felony-murder theory, a person who commits a specified felony, including kidnapping, during which a death occurs is liable for first degree murder if "[t]he person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described subdivision (d) of Section 190.2." (§ 189, subds. (a), (e)(3).) Reckless indifference "encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of [the defendant's] actions." (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 616-617.) It includes both a subjective element, a "conscious disregard of risks known to [the defendant]," and an objective element, whether the disregard" 'involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person in the actor's situation would observe.'" (Id. at p. 617.)
Separately, a person may be convicted of second degree murder for directly perpetrating or aiding and abetting an implied malice murder. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988-990.) To be liable as a direct perpetrator, the person must have committed" '" 'an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life,'" '" that" 'proximately caused' [the] death," with the knowledge that the act was life-endangering and with " '" 'conscious disregard for life.'" '" (Id. at pp. 988-989.) And to be liable as an aider and abettor, the person" 'must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act,'" with" 'knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and . . . conscious disregard for human life.'" (Id. at p. 991, italics omitted.)
Here, we cannot determine which of these theories of murder the trial court relied on to deny the resentencing petition. On one hand, the court specifically found that Cooper's conduct demonstrated "implied malice," but the parties' arguments did not address that concept. Moreover, implied malice murder is a poor fit for the facts here, given the dearth of evidence that Cooper was actually present when Highsmith was killed. At oral argument, the Attorney General argued that the court used the phrase "implied malice" to mean reckless indifference to human life, but we decline to presume such an intent.
On the other hand, while the trial court alluded to the felony-murder elements of being a major participant in the underlying felony and acting with reckless indifference to human life, it did not clearly find that these elements were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. There is undoubtedly overlap between the mind states required for implied malice murder and the type of felony murder at issue, but we cannot conclude that the court effectively found that Cooper acted with reckless indifference by concluding that he had "a personal subjective understanding of the extreme danger" of his conduct. (See People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 616-617.)
Because we are unsure of the basis for the trial court's ruling, we find it appropriate to remand the matter for clarification. (§ 1260 [appellate court may remand for further proceedings as may be just]; see, e.g., People v. Garcia (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 834, 838-839 [remanding for court to clarify intended sentence].) At oral argument, Cooper argued that remand was unnecessary because there is insufficient evidence to support either theory of murder on which the trial court might have relied. Although his position is persuasive with regard to the implied-malice theory, there is more record support for the felony-murder theory. Rather than speculate about what factual findings the court could have made in support of the latter theory, we will remand for the court to explain its rationale in the first instance. In doing so, we express no opinion about whether the court properly relied on evidence that Cooper was involved in disposing of a firearm.
The April 14, 2023 order denying Cooper's petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is vacated. The matter is remanded for the trial court to clarify which theory of murder it relied on to conclude that Cooper is not entitled to relief.
WE CONCUR: Langhorne Wilson, J., Siggins, J. [*]
[*]Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.