Although no single factor is dispositive, equal weight need not be given to all the factors. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 305; People v. Cooks, 271 Ill. App.3d 25, 39, 648 N.E.2d 190 (1995). The State must only present evidence sufficient to persuade the juvenile court, in its discretion, that transfer is justified in light of the statute.

In support of that statement, the Delaware Supreme Court in Wallace v. State, supra, 2008 WL 295064, *8 n. 41, relied on the following authority as cited by the state: Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1160, 119 S. Ct. 2052, 144 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1999); Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583-85 (9th Cir. 1996); Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1995); Foster v. Withrow, 159 F. Sup. 2d 629, 645-46 (E.D. Mich. 2001), aff'd, 42 Fed. Appx. 701 (6th Cir. 2002); Valenzuela v. People, 856 P.2d 805, 810 (Colo. 1993); Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 54 (Fla.App. 2003); Phillips v. State, 807 So. 2d 713, 716-17 (Fla.App.), review denied, 823 So. 2d 125 (2002), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1161, 123 S. Ct. 966, 154 L. Ed. 2d 896 (2003); People v. Cooks, 271 III. App. 3d 25, 40-41, 648 N.E.2d 190, appeal denied, 162 Ill. 2d 571, 652 N.E.2d 344 (1995); State v. Pilcher, 655 So. 2d 636, 643-44 (La.App.), cert. denied, 662 So. 2d 466 (La. 1995); People v. Bentley, 2000 WL 33519653, *2 (Mich.App. 2000); People v. Launsbury, 217 Mich. App. 358, 363, 551 N.W.2d 460 (1996), appeal denied, 454 Mich. 883, 562 N.W.2d 203 (1997); State v. Garcia, 561 N.W.2d 599, 609 (N.D.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 874, 118 S. Ct. 198, 139 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1997); Commonwealth v. Carter, 855 A.2d 885, 892 (Pa.Super.), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 670, 863 A.2d 1142 (2004); State v. Jensen, 579 N.W.2d 613, 624-25 (S.D. 1998); State v. Powell, 34 S.W.3d 484, 494 (Tenn.Crim.App.), appeal denied, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 539 (2000); Laird v. State, 933 S.W.2d 707, 714 (Tex.App. 1996); Speer v. State, 890 S.W.2d 87, 92-93 (Tex.App. 1994); State v. Loukaitis, 97 Wash. App. 1090, 1999 WL 1044203, *13 (1999); State v. Massey, 60 Wash. App. 131, 145-46, 803 P.2d 340, review denied, 115 Wash. 2d 1021, 802 P.2d 126 (1990), cert. deni

In support of that contention, the State cites the following cases: Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 1998); Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583-85 (9th Cir. 1996); Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1995); Foster v. Withrow, 159 F.Supp.2d 629, 645-46 (E.D.Mich. 2001), aff'd, 42 Fed.Appx. 701 (6th Cir. 2002); Valenzuela v. People, 856 P.2d 805, 810 (Colo. 1993); Tate v. State, 864 So.2d 44, 54 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2003); Phillips v. State, 807 So.2d 713, 716-17 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2002); People v. Cooks, 271 Ill.App.3d 25, 207 Ill.Dec. 734, 648 N.E.2d 190, 200 (1995); State v. Pilcher, 655 So.2d 636, 643-44 (La.Ct.App. 1995); People v. Bentley, 2000 WL 33519653, at *2 (Mich.Ct.App.); People v. Launsburry, 217 Mich.App. 358, 551 N.W.2d 460, 463 (1996); State v. Garcia, 561 N.W.2d 599, 609 (N.D. 1997); Commonwealth v. Carter, 855 A.2d 885, 892 (Pa.Super.Ct. 2004); State v. Jensen, 579 N.W.2d 613, 624-25 (S.D. 1998); State v. Howell, 34 S.W.3d 484, 494 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2000); Laird v. State, 933 S.W.2d 707, 714 (Tex.Ct.App. 1996); Speer v. State, 890 S.W.2d 87, 92-3 (Tex.Ct.App. 1994); State v. Loukaitis, 97 Wash.App. 1090, 1999 WL 1044203, at 13; State v. Massey, 60 Wash.App. 131, 803 P.2d 340, 348 (1990); State v. Stevenson, 55 Wash.App. 725, 780 P.2d 873, 880 (1989).

The State further argues that Illinois courts have previously upheld the constitutionality of the multiple-murder sentencing statute as applied to juveniles against proportionate penalty challenges. See Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 204-05; see also People v. Cooks, 271 Ill. App. 3d 25, 35-42 (1995) (holding that the multiple-murder sentencing statute did not violate the United States or Illinois Constitutions as applied to a 14-year-old principal offender); People v. Wages, 261 Ill. App. 3d 576, 589 (1994) (holding that the "fact that defendant was 15 years old at the time that he committed the two murders is irrelevant" because "regardless of age, a defendant found guilty of murdering more than one victim must be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment"); People v. Rice, 257 Ill. App. 3d 220, 228-29 (1993) (holding that the multiple-murder sentencing statute as applied to a mentally retarded 16-year-old offender does not violate the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution); People v. Rodriguez, 134 Ill. App. 3d 582, 593 (1985) (holding that defendant's youth did not require special consideration and that the application of the multiple-murder sentencing statute to the 16-year-old principal offender was consistent with the Illinois Constitution's due process

This determination, moreover, "present[s] individual fact patterns that are virtually unique," id., requiring the court to weigh a variety of factors with each transfer decision. See supra notes 3 and 4. Because the trial court enjoys both a superior adjudicatory vantage point and must consider a variety of factors when making the decision, we adopt the standard applied in most other jurisdictions and reverse only for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 317 Ark. 289, 877 S.W.2d 579, 581 (1994); People v. Cooks, 271 Ill. App.3d 25, 207 Ill.Dec. 734, 742, 648 N.E.2d 190, 198 (1995); Commonwealth v. Austin, 444 Pa. Super. 601, 664 A.2d 597 (1995); C.M. v. State, 884 S.W.2d 562, 563 (Tex.Ct.App. 1994); Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 824 (Wyo. 1995). B.

Because Cooks killed two men, the court sentenced Cooks to life in prison. People v. Cooks, 271 Ill. App. 3d 25, 35 (1995). ¶ 5 Cooks filed a postconviction petition in 2011, seeking resentencing based on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

¶ 5 This court affirmed that judgment on direct appeal, rejecting defendant's challenges to his transfer from the juvenile court and to the constitutionality of his sentence. People v. Cooks, 271 Ill. App. 3d 25 (1995). In doing so, we noted that defendant's challenge to the mandatory life sentence provision had been previously rejected on the grounds that no constitutional provision precludes the legislature from fixing mandatory minimum penalties where it has determined that no set of mitigating circumstances would allow a sentence of less than natural life.

"It is not necessary that all factors be resolved against the juvenile in order to allow transfer." People v. Cooks, 271 Ill. App.3d 25, 39, 648 N.E.2d 190 (1995). A reviewing court's function is not to reweigh all of the factors, but to determine whether the juvenile court abused its discretion.

All factors need not be resolved against the juvenile for a trial court to find that such a transfer is warranted. People v. Cooks, 271 Ill. App.3d 25, 39 (1995). Finally, our function is not to reweigh all of the factors, but to determine whether an abuse of the trial court's discretion occurred.

However, the salient feature of the transfer hearing is that, analogous to the preliminary or detention hearing, it does not result in a determination of guilt or innocence. People v. Taylor, 76 Ill.2d 289, 302, 391 N.E.2d 366 (1979); see also People v. P.H., 145 Ill.2d 209, 227-28, 582 N.E.2d 700 (1991); People v. Cooks, 271 Ill. App.3d 25, 39, 648 N.E.2d 190 (1995). As such, the requisite due process safeguards need not rise to the level mandated in a criminal or adjudicatory proceeding.