( People v. Holloway (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 1014, 1022, 457 N.E.2d 466.) At the same time, however, fundamental fairness and respect for the law require that defendants similarly situated should not receive grossly disparate sentences. ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 623, 445 N.E.2d 824.) "Similarly situated" refers to rehabilitation potential or the nature and extent of participation. ( People v. Earullo (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 774, 792, 447 N.E.2d 925.) However, a disparity in sentencing may be supported by a more serious criminal record or greater participation in the offense than the individual with whom the defendant's conduct is compared.

( People v. Kline (1982), 92 Ill.2d 490, 508, 442 N.E.2d 154; People v. Godinez (1982), 91 Ill.2d 47, 55-56, 434 N.E.2d 1121.) A disparity in sentences between codefendants will not be disturbed where it is warranted by differences in the nature and extent of the concerned defendants' participation in the offense ( People v. Godinez (1982), 91 Ill.2d 47, 55-56, 434 N.E.2d 1121), by differences in the criminal records of the participants ( People v. Kline (1982), 92 Ill.2d 490, 508, 442 N.E.2d 154; People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 623, 445 N.E.2d 824), by a defendant's greater relative maturity ( People v. DeWaele (1981), 98 Ill. App.3d 636, 637, 424 N.E.2d 876; People v. Dimmick (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 136, 139, 412 N.E.2d 1150), or by a defendant's greater rehabilitative potential. See People v. Godinez (1982), 91 Ill.2d 47, 54, 434 N.E.2d 1121; People v. Jackson (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 698, 708, 398 N.E.2d 959.

In general, similarly situated defendants should not receive grossly disparate sentences. ( People v. Bergman (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 100, 105; People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 623.) However, the mere fact that one defendant receives a substantially longer sentence than a codefendant is not, by itself, a violation of fundamental fairness.

Defendant is correct that fundamental fairness and respect for the law require that defendants similarly situated not receive grossly disparate sentences. ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 623, 445 N.E.2d 824, 826.) Thus, defendants similarly situated ought to receive similar treatment in sentencing.

Even considering defendant's argument, it has no merit. Defendant cites People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 445 N.E.2d 824, and People v. Steg (1966), 69 Ill. App.2d 188, 215 N.E.2d 854, for the proposition that fundamental fairness and respect for the law require that defendants similarly situated not receive grossly disparate sentences. In those cases, however, the defendants challenging their sentences had not had any greater participation in the crime than their codefendants who received lighter sentences.

Fundamental fairness and respect for the law require that defendants similarly situated not receive grossly disparate sentences, but a disparity in sentencing may be supported by a more serious criminal record or greater participation in the offense than the individual with whom the defendant's conduct is compared. ( People v. Godinez (1982), 91 Ill.2d 47; People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621; People v. Patterson (1981), 100 Ill. App.3d 207.) An accused may not be punished for exercising his right to trial ( People v. Sivels (1975), 60 Ill.2d 102; People v. Peddicord (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 414), but if a disparity in sentencing is attributable to a codefendant's plea of guilty to a lesser offense, the negotiated plea does not provide a valid basis of comparison. People v. Bennett (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 64; People v. Wagner (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 965.

Disparity in sentencing may, however, be proper where the defendant receiving the greater sentence has a more serious criminal record. ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 623.) And, where the defendant receiving the lighter sentence has received that sentence pursuant to a plea agreement, that sentence is no basis for comparison.

We agree with the defendant's assertion that fundamental fairness and respect for the law require that similarly situated defendants do not receive grossly disparate sentences. ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 445 N.E.2d 824.) However, disparate sentences are permissible under numerous circumstances, e.g., where one defendant participates in the offense to a greater extent ( People v. Bennett (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 64, 412 N.E.2d 1001), where one defendant has a more serious criminal record ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 445 N.E.2d 824), or where one sentence is pursuant to a plea agreement ( People v. White (1984), 122 Ill. App.3d 24, 460 N.E.2d 802).

( People v. Holloway (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 1014, 1022, 457 N.E.2d 466.) At the same time, however, fundamental fairness and respect for the law require that defendants similarly situated should not receive grossly disparate sentences. ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 623, 445 N.E.2d 824.) "Similarly situated" refers to rehabilitation potential or the nature and extent of participation. ( People v. Earullo (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 774, 792, 447 N.E.2d 925.) A disparity in sentencing may be supported, however, by a more serious criminal record or a greater participation in the offense than the individual with whom the defendant's conduct is compared. People v. Maxwell (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 212, 219, 474 N.E.2d 46.

Fundamental fairness and respect for the law, however, require that defendants similarly situated should not receive grossly disparate sentences. ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 445 N.E.2d 824.) In determining whether a sentence is excessive in light of a lesser sentence imposed on a codefendant, consideration is to be given to the differences in criminal background and the degree of participation by each defendant in the commission of the offense.