Even considering defendant's argument, it has no merit. Defendant cites People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 445 N.E.2d 824, and People v. Steg (1966), 69 Ill. App.2d 188, 215 N.E.2d 854, for the proposition that fundamental fairness and respect for the law require that defendants similarly situated not receive grossly disparate sentences. In those cases, however, the defendants challenging their sentences had not had any greater participation in the crime than their codefendants who received lighter sentences.

Defendant is correct that fundamental fairness and respect for the law require that defendants similarly situated not receive grossly disparate sentences. ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 623, 445 N.E.2d 824, 826.) Thus, defendants similarly situated ought to receive similar treatment in sentencing.

We agree with the defendant's assertion that fundamental fairness and respect for the law require that similarly situated defendants do not receive grossly disparate sentences. ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 445 N.E.2d 824.) However, disparate sentences are permissible under numerous circumstances, e.g., where one defendant participates in the offense to a greater extent ( People v. Bennett (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 64, 412 N.E.2d 1001), where one defendant has a more serious criminal record ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 445 N.E.2d 824), or where one sentence is pursuant to a plea agreement ( People v. White (1984), 122 Ill. App.3d 24, 460 N.E.2d 802).

Thus, a disparate sentence may be warranted by differences in the codefendants' criminal records, levels of participation in the crime, or lack of character and potential for rehabilitation. People v. McCann, 348 Ill. App. 3d 328, 339 (2004); see People v. Cook, 112 Ill. App. 3d 621, 623 (1983). A "mere disparity of sentences does not, by itself, establish a violation of fundamental fairness."

We are presented with cases where disparate sentences of equally culpable defendants who possess comparable criminal histories are modified to ensure that similarly situated defendants are punished alike. See People v. Gildon, 239 Ill. App. 3d 984, 607 N.E.2d 290 (1993); People v. Cook, 112 Ill. App. 3d 621, 445 N.E.2d 824 (1983). Corn argues that if equally culpable defendants who have like backgrounds, ages, and criminal propensities should receive like punishments, defendants who are not equally culpable and who do not possess like criminal histories should receive disparate punishments.

In general, similarly situated defendants should not receive grossly disparate sentences. ( People v. Bergman (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 100, 105; People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 623.) However, the mere fact that one defendant receives a substantially longer sentence than a codefendant is not, by itself, a violation of fundamental fairness.

The crimes for which defendant and Bowen were convicted are not equivalent; consequently, no rational comparison of their sentences can be made. Only when codefendants convicted of the same crime receive disparate sentences is remandment warranted. (See People v. Bailey (1989), 188 Ill. App.3d 278, 289, 543 N.E.2d 1338, 1344; People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 623, 445 N.E.2d 824, 826.) Additionally, disparate sentences may be supported by the nature and extent of participation in the offense.

Fundamental fairness and respect for the law, however, require that defendants similarly situated should not receive grossly disparate sentences. ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 445 N.E.2d 824.) In determining whether a sentence is excessive in light of a lesser sentence imposed on a codefendant, consideration is to be given to the differences in criminal background and the degree of participation by each defendant in the commission of the offense.

Disparity in sentencing may, however, be proper where the defendant receiving the greater sentence has a more serious criminal record. ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 623.) And, where the defendant receiving the lighter sentence has received that sentence pursuant to a plea agreement, that sentence is no basis for comparison.

In People v. Hall (1973), 17 Ill. App.3d 1, 307 N.E.2d 664, one defendant was originally sentenced to 100 to 150 years for murder, whereas a codefendant received a sentence of 20 to 50 years. In People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 445 N.E.2d 824, the defendant was sentenced to seven years for escape from the county jail, while a codefendant was sentenced to three years for committing the same offense. A review of the reported Illinois cases wherein an appellate court has reduced a sentence based upon disparity of two codefendants' sentences reveals that a gross disparity must be shown in order to invoke the relief now sought by defendant on appeal. It is well settled that a mere disparity in sentencing between defendants, without more, does not warrant a reduction of the punishment imposed by the trial court.