Even considering defendant's argument, it has no merit. Defendant cites People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 445 N.E.2d 824, and People v. Steg (1966), 69 Ill. App.2d 188, 215 N.E.2d 854, for the proposition that fundamental fairness and respect for the law require that defendants similarly situated not receive grossly disparate sentences. In those cases, however, the defendants challenging their sentences had not had any greater participation in the crime than their codefendants who received lighter sentences.

Thus, a disparate sentence may be warranted by differences in the codefendants' criminal records, levels of participation in the crime, or lack of character and potential for rehabilitation. People v. McCann, 348 Ill. App. 3d 328, 339 (2004); see People v. Cook, 112 Ill. App. 3d 621, 623 (1983). A "mere disparity of sentences does not, by itself, establish a violation of fundamental fairness."

In general, similarly situated defendants should not receive grossly disparate sentences. ( People v. Bergman (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 100, 105; People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 623.) However, the mere fact that one defendant receives a substantially longer sentence than a codefendant is not, by itself, a violation of fundamental fairness.