Defendant is correct that fundamental fairness and respect for the law require that defendants similarly situated not receive grossly disparate sentences. ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 623, 445 N.E.2d 824, 826.) Thus, defendants similarly situated ought to receive similar treatment in sentencing.

Thus, a disparate sentence may be warranted by differences in the codefendants' criminal records, levels of participation in the crime, or lack of character and potential for rehabilitation. People v. McCann, 348 Ill. App. 3d 328, 339 (2004); see People v. Cook, 112 Ill. App. 3d 621, 623 (1983). A "mere disparity of sentences does not, by itself, establish a violation of fundamental fairness."

Fundamental fairness and respect for the law, however, require that defendants similarly situated should not receive grossly disparate sentences. ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 445 N.E.2d 824.) In determining whether a sentence is excessive in light of a lesser sentence imposed on a codefendant, consideration is to be given to the differences in criminal background and the degree of participation by each defendant in the commission of the offense.

( People v. Holloway (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 1014, 1022, 457 N.E.2d 466.) At the same time, however, fundamental fairness and respect for the law require that defendants similarly situated should not receive grossly disparate sentences. ( People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 623, 445 N.E.2d 824.) "Similarly situated" refers to rehabilitation potential or the nature and extent of participation. ( People v. Earullo (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 774, 792, 447 N.E.2d 925.) However, a disparity in sentencing may be supported by a more serious criminal record or greater participation in the offense than the individual with whom the defendant's conduct is compared.

Fundamental fairness and respect for the law require that defendants similarly situated not receive grossly disparate sentences, but a disparity in sentencing may be supported by a more serious criminal record or greater participation in the offense than the individual with whom the defendant's conduct is compared. ( People v. Godinez (1982), 91 Ill.2d 47; People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621; People v. Patterson (1981), 100 Ill. App.3d 207.) An accused may not be punished for exercising his right to trial ( People v. Sivels (1975), 60 Ill.2d 102; People v. Peddicord (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 414), but if a disparity in sentencing is attributable to a codefendant's plea of guilty to a lesser offense, the negotiated plea does not provide a valid basis of comparison. People v. Bennett (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 64; People v. Wagner (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 965.

( People v. Kline (1982), 92 Ill.2d 490, 508, 442 N.E.2d 154; People v. Godinez (1982), 91 Ill.2d 47, 55-56, 434 N.E.2d 1121.) A disparity in sentences between codefendants will not be disturbed where it is warranted by differences in the nature and extent of the concerned defendants' participation in the offense ( People v. Godinez (1982), 91 Ill.2d 47, 55-56, 434 N.E.2d 1121), by differences in the criminal records of the participants ( People v. Kline (1982), 92 Ill.2d 490, 508, 442 N.E.2d 154; People v. Cook (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 621, 623, 445 N.E.2d 824), by a defendant's greater relative maturity ( People v. DeWaele (1981), 98 Ill. App.3d 636, 637, 424 N.E.2d 876; People v. Dimmick (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 136, 139, 412 N.E.2d 1150), or by a defendant's greater rehabilitative potential. See People v. Godinez (1982), 91 Ill.2d 47, 54, 434 N.E.2d 1121; People v. Jackson (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 698, 708, 398 N.E.2d 959.