Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BA336265, John Fisher, Norm Shapiro, Judges.
Alan Stern, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WILLHITE, Acting P.J.
Harold W. Cook appeals from the judgment entered following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 and his no contest plea to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) Pursuant to his negotiated plea, he was sentenced to prison for the low term of 16 months and three counts of selling or transporting a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) were dismissed. He was given credit for 547 days.
On April 7, 2008, appellant’s motion to represent himself was granted as was his request for standby counsel and his request for pro. per. funds.
On May 7, 2008, appellant filed a motion to set aside the information pursuant to Penal Code section 995. He claimed he should have been granted a continuance of his preliminary hearing which was heard March 21, 2008, in that he had had his investigator less than 30 days and that his request for additional funds had not been granted until March 17, 2008.
On May 7, 2008, appellant’s request for $40 in additional pro. per. funds was granted.
On June 3, 2008, appellant’s motion to set aside the information was denied.
The evidence at the suppression hearing established that on January 25, 2008, at approximately 8:50 p.m., Los Angeles Police Officer Greg Atteberry was on patrol in the area of Western and Exposition in Los Angeles when appellant made a left-hand turn in front of the officer, causing the officer to apply his brakes and stop abruptly. Officer Atteberry observed that appellant’s vehicle had no license plates, and the officer and his partner initiated a traffic stop. The officers “ran” appellant on the mobile data computer to check “for wants and warrants and the status of his driver’s license” and learned appellant was on parole and probation. Officer Atteberry searched appellant and the officer’s partner searched appellant’s vehicle, finding an off-white rock substance in the rear seat of the vehicle. Appellant was taken into custody, and upon a further search of the vehicle, bindles of heroin and a substance resembling cocaine were found in addition to hypodermic syringes. Officer Atteberry recovered $113 from appellant’s left rear pants pocket and $2,372 from appellant’s left sock. Following waiver of his Miranda rights, appellant stated he was a heroin user.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
In defense, appellant testified he had sold the subject vehicle and was driving it because the purchasers claimed it would not start. He presented the police officer with a lien of sale, indicating appellant had purchased the vehicle in September of 2007. When Officer Atteberry’s partner showed appellant what she had found in the car, appellant said, “Oh, God, I don’t know anything about that.” Appellant explained that maybe he “was set up.”
In denying the suppression motion, the court indicated it believed the officer’s testimony regarding the justification for the traffic stop and that it then led to a series of circumstances which justified the search and recovery of the items.
After review of the record, appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed an opening brief requesting this court to independently review the record pursuant to the holding of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.
On July 28, 2009, we advised appellant that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues which he wished us to consider. On August 21, 2009, he filed a supplemental brief challenging the sufficiency of evidence to support the court’s finding that the officers were justified in making a traffic stop and conducting a search based on appellant’s probation and parole status. Additionally, relying on People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, appellant claimed the prosecution should have filed a written opposition to the suppression motion. Appellant asserted, based on the lack of an opposition by the prosecution, he was not prepared for the hearing. He also claimed he did not have an investigator to subpoena witnesses and records to support his position the search and seizure was illegal.
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied that no arguable issues exist. The court was aware of the discrepancies in the testimony at the hearing and believed Officer Atteberry’s version of the events. “‘An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] “The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.” [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law,... is also subject to independent review.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182, quoting People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301; accord, People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255.) Measured against this legal standard, we find the trial court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence.
Additionally, contrary to appellant’s claim, People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119 involves a defendant’s obligations “with respect to raising and preserving search and seizure issues for appellate review. [Citation.] The case does not require the prosecution to file written opposition to a suppression motion.” (In re Justin K. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 695, 697-698; see also People v. Britton (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1117.) Further, contrary to appellant’s contention, the record indicates he had the services of an investigator months before the suppression hearing.
Appellant has, by virtue of counsel’s compliance with the Wende procedure and our review of the record, received adequate and effective appellate review of the judgment entered against him in this case. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MANELLA, J., SUZUKAWA, J.