¶ 45 We begin our analysis by highlighting that, "[u]nder many circumstances, the waiver of closing argument is a matter of trial strategy." People v. Wilson , 392 Ill. App. 3d 189, 198, 331 Ill.Dec. 592, 911 N.E.2d 413 (2009) (citing People v. Conley , 118 Ill. App. 3d 122, 127, 73 Ill.Dec. 858, 454 N.E.2d 1107 (1983) ); see also People v. Shoemaker , 358 Ill. App. 3d 257, 260-62, 294 Ill.Dec. 876, 831 N.E.2d 1201 (2005) ; People v. Carter , 132 Ill. App. 3d 523, 530, 87 Ill.Dec. 779, 477 N.E.2d 1307 (1985). In fact, "waiving argument may have the advantage of preventing an impassioned rebuttal argument by the prosecutor."
not speculate as to whether the admission of evidence was plain error.' " People v. Conley, 118 Ill. App. 3d 122, 131 (1983) (quoting People v. Calderon, 101 Ill. App. 3d 469, 476 (1981)).¶ 18 Here, the record is devoid of factual information on numerous points pertinent to defendant's claim that his oral statement should have been suppressed because he was not given Miranda warnings. Whether Miranda warnings must be given depends on a range of factors, including the time and place of the confrontation, the number of police officers present, the presence or absence of family or friends, indicia of formal arrest such as physical restraint or show of weapons, the manner by which the individual arrived at the place of questioning, the length and mode of the questioning, and the focus of the police investigation.
As a threshold matter, we observe that the decision to waive opening or closing argument is one that has been long been considered a matter a trial strategy that is generally immune from ineffective assistance of counsel claims. People v. Conley, 118 Ill. App. 3d 122, 127-28 (1983). This is particularly true in the context of a bench trial.
¶ 48 Defendant next asserts that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing because the court improperly relied on conduct that was inherent in the offense, and a prior offense for which he had been acquitted, in sentencing him. ¶ 49 Although the imposition of sentence is generally a matter of judicial discretion (People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill.2d 149, 154, 11 Ill.Dec. 274, 368 N.E.2d 882 (1977) ), “the question of whether a court relied on an improper factor in imposing a sentence ultimately presents a question of law to be reviewed de novo ” (People v. Abdelhadi, 2012 IL App (2d) 111053, ¶ 8, 362 Ill.Dec. 359, 973 N.E.2d 459 ). It is the defendant's burden to affirmatively establish that the sentence was based on improper considerations (People v. Conley, 118 Ill.App.3d 122, 133, 73 Ill.Dec. 858, 454 N.E.2d 1107 (1983) ), and we will not reverse a sentence imposed by a trial court unless it is clearly evident the sentence was improperly imposed (People v. Ward, 113 Ill.2d 516, 526, 101 Ill.Dec. 834, 499 N.E.2d 422 (1986) ). ¶ 50 We consider the record as a whole when determining whether the trial court improperly imposed a sentence, and will not focus on isolated statements.
( People v. Willingham (1982), 89 Ill.2d 352, 358-59, 432 N.E.2d 861.) It is not necessary that the independent evidence prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime occurred; it need only tend to prove that an offense occurred and corroborate the facts contained in the confession. If these two requisites are satisfied, the independent evidence together with the confession is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti. People v. Conley (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 122, 132, 454 N.E.2d 1107. • 8 In the present case, the independent evidence elicited from both Oswald and Brady at trial not only tended to show that the offenses occurred, but also corroborated defendant's confessions.
In such a case, a reviewing court should not normally speculate about what would have been the result of the motion to suppress. See People v. Conley, 118 Ill. App. 3d 122, 131-32 (1983). We also note that the issue identified sua sponte by the appellate court did not amount to obvious error controlled by clear precedent, and for that additional reason, the appellate court erred in addressing the issue.
Unlike the claim of error in the instant case, such allegations clearly implicated constitutional rights possessed by the defendants, yet the errors were not found to be of such magnitude that they clearly deprived the defendants of fair trials. Similarly, courts of this state have declined to review as plain error allegations that a defendant's confession was involuntary ( People v. Byrd (1986), 139 Ill. App.3d 859, 864; People v. Conley (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 122, 131), as well as a claim that a defendant's confession was "not the product of a rational mind or a free will" ( People v. Gacy (1984), 103 Ill.2d 1, 28). Finally, several Federal courts have found that an allegation that statements were obtained in violation of Miranda was not saved by the plain error rule. (See, e.g., United States v. Colon (2d Cir. 1990), 905 F.2d 580, 588.)
Id. (citing People v. Conley, 118 Ill.App.3d 122, 133 (1983)).
The burden is on the defendant to affirmatively establish that the sentence was based on improper considerations. People v. Conley, 118 Ill.App.3d 122, 133 (1983). "In determining whether the trial court based the sentence on proper aggravating and mitigating factors, a court of review should consider the record as a whole, rather than focusing on a few words or statements by the trial court."
People v. Conley, 118 Ill.App.3d 122, 133 (1983). "In determining whether the trial court based the sentence on proper aggravating and mitigating factors, a court of review should consider the record as a