Opinion
2013-03-7
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Felipe CONCEPCION, Defendant–Appellant.
Steven Banks, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Ellen Dille of counsel), for appellant. Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Justin J. Braun of counsel), for respondent.
Steven Banks, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Ellen Dille of counsel), for appellant. Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Justin J. Braun of counsel), for respondent.
ANDRIAS, J.P., FRIEDMAN, ACOSTA, FREEDMAN, CLARK, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (John N. Byrne, J.), entered on or about October 14, 2005, which denied defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.30(1–a) for DNA testing, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly denied defendant's motion for DNA testing of a hair found in the apartment where he, his codefendant, and an unidentified man shot three women after kidnapping them. Defendant's argument that the verdict would have been more favorable to him if the results of DNA testing of the hair had been admitted is unavailing ( see generally People v. Pitts, 4 N.Y.3d 303, 311, 795 N.Y.S.2d 151, 828 N.E.2d 67 [2005] ).
The hair has little or no value because there is no indication that it was left at the time of the crime, and it could have been left by anyone who had ever been in that apartment. Assuming that DNA testing of the hair would have revealed that it did not belong to defendant or the codefendant, this would have merely confirmed testimony the jury had already heard: that the hair was scientifically tested and was not found to belong to either of them ( see People v. Workman, 72 A.D.3d 1640, 900 N.Y.S.2d 216 [4th Dept. 2010], lv. denied15 N.Y.3d 925, 913 N.Y.S.2d 652, 939 N.E.2d 818 [2010],lv. denied16 N.Y.3d 838, 921 N.Y.S.2d 203, 946 N.E.2d 191 [2011] ).
Defendant argues that DNA testing of the hair might support a third-party culpability defense. He argues that testing might lead to a match with someone in a DNA database, and that this previously unidentified person, in turn, might be a person linked to circumstances that allegedly provided a possible alternative motive for the underlying homicide. This highly speculative theory does not serve as a basis for DNA testing ( see People v. Figueroa, 36 A.D.3d 458, 459, 826 N.Y.S.2d 256 [1st Dept. 2007],lv. denied9 N.Y.3d 843, 840 N.Y.S.2d 770, 872 N.E.2d 883 [2007];cf. People v. Gamble, 18 N.Y.3d 386, 398–399, 941 N.Y.S.2d 1, 964 N.E.2d 372 [2012] [upholding exclusion of speculative third-party culpability evidence] ). Finally, we note that on defendant's direct appeal this Court found the trial evidence to be overwhelming (187 A.D.2d 316, 317, 590 N.Y.S.2d 695 [1st Dept. 1992],lv. denied81 N.Y.2d 787, 594 N.Y.S.2d 733, 610 N.E.2d 406 [1993] ).