Opinion
Argued October 12, 1999
January 24, 2000
Appeal by the People from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mullen, J.), dated November 9, 1998, which granted the defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence.
James M. Catterson, Jr., District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Glenn Green of counsel), for appellant.
Robert C. Mitchell, Riverhead, N.Y. (George Grun of counsel), for respondent.
LAWRENCE J. BRACKEN, J.P., DANIEL W. JOY, GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the facts and on the law, and the motion is denied.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the officers who stopped the defendant's vehicle prior to his arrest had a reasonable suspicion to do so based on the detailed information which had been received during a face-to-face interview with an informant, many of the details of which were confirmed before the stop (see, People v. Legette, 244 A.D.2d 505 ; People v. Jones, 230 A.D.2d 752 ; People v. Maye, 206 A.D.2d 755 ; People v. Batash, 163 A.D.2d 399 ; People v. Ball, 121 A.D.2d 551 ; People v. Olsen, 93 A.D.2d 824 ). The officers' subsequent observation of gambling records in the vehicle, and their verification of the fact that the defendant's license to drive had been suspended, provided probable cause for the defendant's arrest.
Because the officers needed only a reasonable suspicion and not probable cause to justify the initial stop of the defendant's vehicle, it was not necessary to meet the test for probable cause defined in People v. Elwell ( 50 N.Y.2d 231 ; see, People v. Legette, supra). "[S]ince the standard of reasonable suspicion to stop is lower than the standard of probable cause for an arrest, a less stringent standard should apply for screening tips in the stop context — i.e., an officer may stop on less or different information than probable cause would require" (People v. Moore, 32 N.Y.2d 67, 70, cert denied 414 U.S. 1011). In this case, the Supreme Court erred to the extent that it applied the Aguilar-Spinelli test (see, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 ; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 ) as defined in People v. Elwell (supra). The Supreme Court, in effect, required the People to establish probable cause that the defendant had committed a crime, even though the People needed to establish only the existence of reasonable suspicion in order to justify the stop, a significantly lower burden (see, People v. Moore, supra), and one which we find the People have satisfied.
BRACKEN, J.P., JOY, GOLDSTEIN, and LUCIANO, JJ., concur.