Opinion
1056 KA 19-00896
01-28-2022
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v. DANIEL COLON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
THE SAGE LAW FIRM GROUP PLLC, BUFFALO (KATHRYN FRIEDMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. JOHN J. FLYNN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (DANIEL J. PUNCH OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
THE SAGE LAW FIRM GROUP PLLC, BUFFALO (KATHRYN FRIEDMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
JOHN J. FLYNN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (DANIEL J. PUNCH OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., LINDLEY, NEMOYER, AND BANNISTER, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (M. William Boller, A.J.), rendered October 1, 2018. The judgment convicted defendant after a nonjury trial of burglary in the second degree and menacing in the third degree.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a nonjury verdict of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]) and menacing in the third degree (§ 120.15). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621 [1983]), we reject defendant's contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the burglary conviction. The victim's testimony that defendant forced his way into her apartment without her permission is legally sufficient to establish that he unlawfully entered the apartment (see People v Hernandez, 193 A.D.3d 1413, 1414 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 972 [2021]; People v Cotton, 184 A.D.3d 1145, 1147 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1112 [2020]). Defendant's intent to commit a crime inside the apartment "may be inferred from the 'circumstances of the entry'" (Hernandez, 193 A.D.3d at 1414). Contrary to defendant's further contention, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the menacing conviction. Defendant's criminal intent may be inferred from the totality of his conduct (see People v Ferguson, 177 A.D.3d 1247, 1248 [4th Dept 2019]; People v Bryant, 13 A.D.3d 1170, 1171 [4th Dept 2004], lv denied 4 N.Y.3d 884 [2005]). Thus, there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational factfinder could have found that defendant intentionally placed or attempted to place the victim in fear of physical injury (see § 120.15; see generally People v Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495 [1987]).
We have considered defendant's remaining contention and conclude that it is without merit.