Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. NA077143, James Otto and Jesse I. Rodriguez, Judges.
Joan Wolff, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
EPSTEIN, P. J.
Appellant Jeremy Micah Coln appeals from his conviction of theft of access card account information (Pen. Code, § 484e, subd. (d)). He argues that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the prosecutor to amend the information to add a charge not supported by evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, and by allowing the prosecutor to introduce irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial evidence at trial. He also contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction.
All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We find no prejudicial error, and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Appellant was charged by information with theft of access card account information (§ 484e, subd. (d), Count 1), and forgery or counterfeiting of a seal (§ 472, Count 2). The information subsequently was amended to add grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a), Count 3). It was further alleged that appellant had suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony for purposes of the “Three Strikes law” (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)), prior convictions for which prison terms were served (§ 667.5), and prior felony convictions affecting probation eligibility (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)). Appellant pled not guilty.
The evidence at trial showed that on December 19, 2007, an online computer and electronics retailer, NewEgg.com (NewEgg), received an order for an Apple Mac Pro notebook computer and case with expedited shipping. The total cost of the order was $2,204.23. NewEgg considers orders for expensive items with expedited shipping to be at high risk of fraud. It had a fraud prevention specialist, Anna Hernandez, call the buyer’s credit card company, Capital One, to ensure the shipping address matched the credit card billing address. Hernandez learned that the shipping address, 839 South Gramercy Place in Los Angeles, did not match the address on file with Capital One. She sent a message to the email address provided by the purported customer (Richard.Carroll27@yahoo.com) requesting that he update his information. The customer resubmitted the order, apparently the same day. Hernandez again contacted Capital One to compare the addresses, and learned that the address in Capital One’s file matched the Gramercy Place address in NewEgg’s file. NewEgg shipped the order to the Gramercy Place address the next day.
On December 26, 2007, NewEgg received an order from the same customer for another Apple Mac Pro notebook computer, with a total cost of $2,813.71, to be shipped to the same Gramercy Place address. On or about January 1, 2008, NewEgg received a further order from the same customer for an Apple Mac Pro notebook computer, with a total cost of $2,760.88, to be shipped to the Gramercy Place address. And on January 16, 2008, NewEgg received still another order from the same customer, this time for a Sony Vaio notebook computer, with a cost of $2,785.38, to be shipped to the Gramercy Place address. After all four orders had been shipped, NewEgg learned that the payment information provided by the purchaser was fraudulent. The company was unable to recover its merchandise or the money owed for the merchandise.
During the afternoon of January 18, 2008, law enforcement officers, including Sergeant Charles Blomeley of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), were engaged in surveillance of a San Pedro residence. Blomeley saw appellant drive up to the residence in a small black Toyota car and park by the front curb. The yard around the residence was surrounded by a large corrugated metal fence. Blomeley saw appellant enter the yard, but the fence prevented him from seeing whether appellant entered the residence. A few minutes later, appellant emerged, accompanied by two other people. One of them was the target of the surveillance operation. Appellant and his companions got into the Toyota and drove away, followed by officers in plain clothes.
Detective Scott Padin was one of the officers following the Toyota. When appellant stopped the car, Padin approached and identified himself as a detective. Appellant placed both of his hands outside the driver’s side window and said, “I know who you are. I don’t want any trouble.” Padin asked appellant for his driver’s license, but appellant stated that he only had a California identification (ID) card.
Blomeley performed a search of appellant. In appellant’s wallet he found appellant’s ID card and bank card, a California ID card bearing the name Richard Carroll, and a piece of paper that appeared to be a receipt for computers. The receipt purported to show that Piel Skin Care on Linden Drive in Beverly Hills had ordered five Apple Mac Book Pro computers from NewEgg, at a cost of exactly $2,000 each.
In appellant’s pocket, Blomeley found a piece of paper, one side of which appeared to be a receipt for prepaid phone service from T-Mobile. On the other side of the paper was what Blomeley described as a “personal profile” of a Richard Carroll. The handwritten profile consisted of the name “Richard G. Carroll,” a Social Security number, a date of birth, a business name, an address on Gramercy Place in Los Angeles, a phone number with a 213 prefix, the email address Richard.Carroll27@yahoo.com, a credit card number, an expiration date, a security code, an address in Maryland, and the notations “Apple Mac Pro,” “2813.71,” “UPS, 105 2nd day,” and an order number. The Gramercy Place address on the personal profile matched the address on the ID card in Carroll’s name.
Blomeley asked appellant why he had someone else’s ID card. Appellant told Blomeley he believed the wallet and ID belonged to a Russian spy, and he was planning to pass the information along to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate. He also claimed he already had tried to call the FBI, and said that Blomeley could check his phone for the FBI number. Blomeley tried calling the recently used phone numbers in appellant’s cell phone, and found none of them connected to the FBI.
After appellant was arrested and transported to the police station, he gave a statement to Detective Padin. He claimed he was a bouncer at a club and had found a man passed out on the sidewalk there approximately three days before his arrest. Appellant offered to drive the man home when he got off work, and he let the man wait in his car. When appellant returned to his car at the end of his shift, the man was gone, but the man’s briefcase was in the back seat. The man did not return to the club to claim the briefcase, so appellant kept it. Inside, he found a laptop computer, which he pawned, and a phone and an ID card bearing the name Richard Carroll, which he kept. Appellant declined Padin’s request to put his statement in writing.
Based on appellant’s statement, police located a pawn shop in Echo Park where appellant had pawned a Sony laptop on January 14, 2008. A user name and password were written on a note affixed to the computer, but they did not work.
A detective from the LAPD contacted Richard Carroll, who resided and operated a business in Maryland. At trial, Carroll testified that the Social Security number and birth date in the personal profile were his. The credit card number, expiration date, and security code in the personal profile came from a Capital One credit card he used for his business, and the Maryland address in the profile matched his business address, except that an extra “7” appeared in the street number. The Yahoo email address and 213 phone number in the profile did not belong to Carroll. Carroll had not given anyone permission to use his credit card, and prior to receiving a call from the detective, he was unaware of the unauthorized use. When he contacted Capital One, he learned that 12 unauthorized charges had been made on his account, including four purchases from NewEgg.com, three purchases from T-Mobile, and one purchase from American Airlines. He also learned that the billing address for the credit card had been changed to 839 South Gramercy Place in Los Angeles. Prior to the trial, Carroll had never been anywhere in Los Angeles other than the airport.
The parties stipulated that if the occupant of the Gramercy Place address were called as a witness, he would testify that he had never ordered or received any packages addressed to Carroll. He also would testify that in late December to early January, he saw packages addressed to a Richard Carroll outside his apartment door and moved them to the apartment building mailboxes. The packages were later gone.
At trial, Blomeley testified as an expert witness on fraudulent identification and identity theft. He opined that the California ID card bearing the name Richard Carroll was not authentic, based on a number of physical irregularities. Department of Motor Vehicles records showed that the identification number on the fake ID card belonged to a Martha Moyeda, but the Gramercy Place address on the card was not Moyeda’s address. Blomeley also testified that, based on his experience and expertise, he believed the personal profile found in appellant’s pocket contained all of the necessary information to order items, have identification created, open a checking account or charge account, or possibly change the address on an existing credit card account. He also testified that it is common in cases of identity theft for a perpetrator to order items with expedited shipping to a stranger’s address, because expedited shipping provides a narrow time window for delivery, allowing the perpetrator to watch the address and pick up the package as soon as it is delivered.
With respect to his investigation into the receipt for five computers, Blomeley testified that he located a Beverly Hills business named Piel Skin Care, but it had never been located on Linden Drive and it had not ordered computers from NewEgg. In Blomeley’s opinion, a false receipt would enable a person to sell an item by making it appear the item had been obtained legally.
A jury found appellant guilty of theft of access card account information (Count 1), but acquitted him of forgery or counterfeiting of a seal and grand theft (Counts 2 & 3). In a bifurcated proceeding, the same jury returned true findings on all prior conviction allegations. Appellant was sentenced to prison for the high term of three years on Count 1, doubled to six years by reason of the Three Strikes law, to which three one-year enhancements were added for prior prison terms, amounting to a sentence of nine years. He timely appeals from the judgment of conviction.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the prosecutor to amend the information to add Count 3, charging grand theft. Appellant argues that this charge was unsupported by evidence offered at the preliminary hearing. Though he was acquitted of this charge, appellant argues the amendment was prejudicial because the prosecution relied on the theft charged in Count 3 to show the necessary fraudulent intent for the count of which he was convicted.
On the first day of trial, shortly before jury selection commenced, the prosecutor moved to amend the information to add a charge of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)) based on the theft of computers from NewEgg. Defense counsel objected on the ground that the charge was not supported by the evidence elicited in the preliminary hearing. After hearing argument, the trial court granted the motion to amend. Defense counsel then moved for either a continuance or severance of Count 3 from the other two counts, and expressed his opinion that he could not, without further preparation, effectively represent appellant as to that charge. Both defense motions were denied.
Section 1009 provides, in relevant part, “The court in which an action is pending may order or permit an amendment of an indictment, accusation or information... at any stage of the proceedings.... [T]he trial or other proceeding shall continue as if the pleading had been originally filed as amended, unless the substantial rights of the defendant would be prejudiced thereby, in which event a reasonable postponement, not longer than the ends of justice require, may be granted. An indictment or accusation cannot be amended so as to change the offense charged, nor an information so as to charge an offense not shown by the evidence taken at the preliminary examination.” (Italics added.) The quantum of evidence necessary to support a prosecution is substantially lower than that necessary to sustain a conviction. (Rayyis v. Superior Court (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 138, 150.) The test is whether the evidence at the preliminary hearing would lead a person “‘“‘of ordinary caution or prudence... to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.’”’” (Ibid.) “‘“[A]lthough there must be some showing as to the existence of each element of the charged crime [citation] such a showing may be made by means of circumstantial evidence supportive of reasonable inferences.”’” (Ibid.) A reviewing court will not disturb the trial court’s decision to permit an amendment in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. (People v. Bolden (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 707, 716.)
Officer Blomeley was the sole witness at the preliminary hearing. He testified that he searched appellant on January 18, 2008, and recovered from appellant’s wallet a fraudulent California ID card in Carroll’s name and a computer generated sales receipt for five Apple computers. The receipt purported to show that the Apple computers had been purchased for a skin care clinic in Beverly Hills. In appellant’s pocket, Blomeley found a T-Mobile receipt with notes regarding an order for an Apple computer and Carroll’s personal information and credit card number handwritten on it. He further testified to contacting Carroll and ascertaining that the personal information written on the T-Mobile receipt was correct, and that unauthorized purchases, including four computers, had been charged to Carroll’s credit card from the middle of December to the middle of January. The fraudulent ID card and the T-Mobile receipt were admitted into evidence.
A charge of grand theft may be supported by evidence that the defendant fraudulently took the personal property of another or knowingly defrauded any other person of money or personal property, and that the property in question was of a value exceeding $400. (§§ 484, 487.) An ordinarily cautious person could, on the basis of Blomeley’s testimony, entertain a strong suspicion that appellant fraudulently obtained at least one computer using Carroll’s credit card number. Appellant argues there was no evidence presented at the preliminary hearing that he “ordered the computers..., ever received the computers, or profited from the scam or even knew about it.” To the contrary, Blomeley’s testimony that he found a receipt for the purchase of computers in appellant’s wallet and found notes regarding an order for an Apple computer and Carroll’s credit card information in appellant’s pocket is evidence that appellant ordered the computers and knew about the scam. A showing that he personally had possession of any of the computers or profited from their theft is not necessary to the charge. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding the amendment was supported by evidence offered at the preliminary hearing.
Even were we to assume for sake of argument that the trial court erred in allowing the amendment, appellant has not shown that he suffered prejudice as a result. The jury acquitted him of the grand theft charge. Even so, appellant argues he was prejudiced by the prosecution’s reliance on the charged theft to show the requisite fraudulent intent in connection with Count 1, theft of access card account information. This argument seems to be based on the premise that information about the computer orders placed with NewEgg would not have been admissible if appellant had not been charged with the theft of the computers. In connection with his argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, appellant acknowledges that “intent to defraud can be inferred when the accused, in fact, defrauded the victim.” (See People v. Smith (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1469; People v. Swenson (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 658, 662-663.) That being the case, evidence tending to show appellant had defrauded NewEgg of the computers would have been admissible with respect to Count 1, even if appellant had not been separately charged with the theft. Accordingly, any error in allowing the amendment was harmless. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818; & see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.)
II
Appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence about his visit to a residence where personal profile data and a template for the creation of identification cards were found. He argues that the testimony on this subject was irrelevant (Evid. Code, § 350) and unfairly prejudicial (Evid. Code, § 352).
Some 13 days after appellant’s arrest, on or about January 31, 2008, police conducted a search of the San Pedro residence appellant had visited immediately before his arrest. The search turned up more than three dozen personal profiles and a computer containing templates for the creation of California ID cards or driver’s licenses. No information or other evidence linked to appellant or to Carroll was found in the residence.
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved “to exclude all mention of defendant visiting the residence searched by the police on 1-31-2008 as irrelevant and extremely prejudicial.” The defense argued that the evidence was irrelevant because the search took place 13 days after appellant was arrested and because nothing located during the search showed a connection to appellant or Carroll. The defense further argued that appellant would be prejudiced by “guilt by association” if the evidence was admitted. In response, the prosecutor argued that there was a connection between appellant and the residence because the residence contained the software to create fraudulent ID cards of the type found in appellant’s wallet. The court overruled defense counsel’s objection in part, ruling that the search of the residence and the discovery of the software were substantially more probative than prejudicial, but the presence of a number of unrelated personal profiles was not.
The portion of the trial court’s ruling excluding testimony about the personal profiles found in the San Pedro residence was ignored in practice by both the prosecution and the defense. Each party referenced the fact that such information was located during the search, and neither party objected when the other did so. Appellant does not make any claim of error in this respect.
We review the trial court’s rulings on relevance and admissibility of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1195.) “Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.’ (Evid. Code, § 210; [citation].) ‘“The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends ‘“logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference” to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive.’”’” (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1058.) Even evidence which is relevant may be excluded if it is substantially more prejudicial than probative. (Evid. Code, § 352; see also Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1058-1059.) The court’s ruling “will not be disturbed except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.)
Evidence of the items found during the search of the San Pedro residence was offered to show appellant’s fraudulent intent, a material and disputed element of the charged crimes. The question, then, is whether appellant’s presence at a location later found to contain personal profiles, including account information, and a computer with software for creating forged ID cards tends “logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference” to establish that appellant intended to commit fraud.
Officer Blomeley testified on direct examination that the search of the San Pedro residence led to more than three dozen personal profiles and a computer containing templates for the creation of California ID cards or driver’s licenses. He also noted that the physical materials necessary for producing false identification, such as card stock or laminate, were not found in the search. He testified that the personal profile information found at the residence could be used for identity theft, and that some victims of identity theft from the profiles had been located. On cross-examination, Blomeley conceded that nothing found at the San Pedro residence was linked to Carroll or appellant and that he had no way of knowing whether the forged ID card found in appellant’s wallet was created using the software found in the search.
The testimony regarding the San Pedro residence has some tendency to show appellant’s fraudulent intent. Intent often must be proven by circumstantial evidence. (People v. Smith, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 1469.) Appellant’s association with an apparent identity theft operation at the San Pedro residence is a circumstance which—though not dispositive by itself—supports the reasonable inference that his intent with respect to Carroll’s account information was fraudulent. (See People v. Massie (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 365, 374 [“It is the province of the trier of fact to decide whether an inference should be drawn and the weight to be accorded the inference.”].)
Although the high fence prevented Blomeley from seeing whether appellant entered the San Pedro residence, the fact that appellant emerged from the property with two other people leads to the reasonable inference that he met up with the two people inside the residence. The jury also could infer that appellant knew the people at the residence, since they joined him in his car. The jury’s evaluation of appellant’s claim that he obtained Carroll’s account information and the fraudulent ID card from a stranger outside a bar could reasonably be informed by evidence that there was another source from which appellant obtained those items. The search of the San Pedro residence is therefore relevant as circumstantial evidence that appellant intentionally obtained Carroll’s account information from an identity theft operation, rather than accidentally obtaining it from a stranger. From this it may be inferred that appellant intended to use the information fraudulently.
Even if the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the search, appellant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by its admission. “[T]he application of ordinary rules of evidence does not implicate the federal Constitution, and thus we review allegations of error under the ‘reasonable probability’ standard of People v. Watson[, supra,] 46 Cal.2d [at p.] 836.” (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 336.) Reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable that a more favorable result would have occurred but for the erroneous admission of evidence.
Since appellant was convicted only of Count 1, theft of access card account information, he could not have suffered prejudice unless the evidentiary error affected the jury’s verdict on that count. The contested issue with respect to that count was whether appellant had the specific intent to use the account information fraudulently. There is abundant evidence, apart from the evidence found at the San Pedro residence, from which the jury could have concluded that appellant had the requisite fraudulent intent, as we discuss below in connection with appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Furthermore, defense counsel highlighted the fact that no information about Carroll or appellant was found in the San Pedro residence in his opening statement, cross-examination of Blomeley, and closing argument. Counsel also elicited testimony from Blomeley that it was not possible to tell if the fake ID card in Carroll’s name had been created by the software located during the search. Thus, the jury had sufficient information to evaluate the weight to be given evidence regarding the search. In light of the totality of the evidence against appellant, any evidentiary error was harmless.
III
Finally, appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction of theft of access card account information. “It is the prosecution’s burden in a criminal case to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] To determine whether the prosecution has introduced sufficient evidence to meet this burden, courts apply the ‘substantial evidence’ test. Under this standard, the court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 260.) “The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘“Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”’” (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 11.)
Appellant was convicted under section 484e, subdivision (d), which provides, “Every person who acquires or retains possession of access card account information with respect to an access card validly issued to another person, without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent, with the intent to use it fraudulently, is guilty of grand theft.” Thus, appellant’s conviction requires proof of a specific intent to use the account information fraudulently. (See People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 686 [specific intent crime “not only specifies a proscribed act but also refers to an ‘intent to... achieve some additional consequence’”].) Appellant contends there is no substantial evidence from which the jury could have found he had the requisite specific intent.
Section 484d defines “access card” as “any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access card, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds, other than a transfer originated solely by a paper instrument.” Access card account information “includes the name of the cardholder, the account number, the expiration date and the magnetic stripe on the back of the card.” (People v. Molina (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 507, 518.)
“‘“[I]ntent is inherently difficult to prove by direct evidence. Therefore, the act itself together with its surrounding circumstances must generally form the basis from which the intent of the actor may legitimately be inferred.”’” (People v. Smith, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 1469 [attempt to make purchase with counterfeit credit card substantial evidence of intent to defraud]; see also People v. Castellanos (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1493-1494 [possession of counterfeit resident alien card bearing defendant’s photograph substantial evidence of intent to defraud]; People v. Norwood (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 148, 159 [possession of multiple stolen or forged instruments for the payment of money and a driver’s license in another’s name substantial evidence of fraudulent intent].)
The circumstances surrounding appellant’s possession of the access card account information provide substantial evidence of his intent to use the information fraudulently. First, appellant not only was in possession of the access card account information, including the account number, expiration date, and security code, he also possessed Carroll’s Social Security number, date of birth, and business name and address, as well as a counterfeit ID card in Carroll’s name. As a matter of common sense, the jury could have concluded that the most likely if not the only purpose for which a person would have this combination of information is for the commission of fraud. (See People v. Carter (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 865, 870 [defendant’s possession of forged checks and an identification card bearing defendant’s photo and one of the names from the checks “leaves no doubt about his fraudulent intent”].) At trial, defense counsel argued that appellant could not have used the ID card because he did not bear any resemblance to the photograph on the card, but the accuracy of that assertion is left to the evaluation of the jury, which viewed both the photograph and appellant. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403 [“[I]t is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.”].) Finally, Carroll’s identification information was repeatedly and fraudulently used to purchase computer equipment.
Blomeley’s expert testimony established that the foregoing combination of information would enable appellant to make purchases and open accounts in Carroll’s name. And the circumstantial evidence demonstrates that he already had done so. The billing address for Carroll’s Capital One account had been changed to the Gramercy Place address appearing on the fake ID card and the handwritten note found in appellant’s possession. The handwritten order number and cost of an Apple Mac Pro computer found in appellant’s pocket matched the second NewEgg order charged to Carroll’s credit card without his authorization. Thus, contrary to appellant’s assertion, the jury’s finding of fraudulent intent is not based solely on appellant’s possession of the access card account information.
A further circumstance supporting the jury’s finding regarding intent is the explanation given to the police by appellant for his possession of the ID card in Carroll’s name. If the jurors concluded appellant was not telling the truth when he claimed to have obtained the ID card and personal profile from a drunk stranger or a Russian spy (or perhaps a drunk who was a Russian spy), they could have inferred that such a lie betrayed consciousness of guilt. (See People v. Norwood, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d at p. 159 [defendant’s denial that he had touched forged warrant for payment on which his fingerprint was found supported finding of fraudulent intent by disclosing consciousness of guilt].) Notably, the final NewEgg order was placed on January 16, two days after appellant pawned the computer allegedly left in his car by the drunk. “Even if the evidence could be reconciled with a different finding, that does not justify a conclusion that the jury’s verdict was not supported by the evidence, nor does it warrant a reversal.” (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 400.)
Appellant’s conviction is supported by substantial evidence of fraudulent intent.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MANELLA, J., SUZUKAWA, J.