Opinion
364966
08-08-2023
LC No. 06-008379-01-FC
Thomas C. Cameron Presiding Judge Kirsten Frank Kelly Noah P. Hood Judges
ORDER
Pursuant to MCR 7.205(E)(2), in lieu of granting the application for leave to appeal, we VACATE the Wayne Circuit Court's February 1, 2023 order and REMAND this matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this order.
In ruling as it did, the trial court erred by relying on its own unilateral credibility determinations concerning William Shane Allen's new testimony. Instead, the trial court should have applied the "reasonable juror" standard set forth in People v Johnson, 502 Mich. 541, 567-568; 918 N.W.2d 676 (2018) ("A trial court's function is limited when reviewing newly discovered evidence, as it is not the ultimate fact-finder; should a trial court grant a motion for relief from judgment, the case would be remanded for retrial, not dismissal. In other words, a trial court's credibility determination is concerned with whether a reasonable juror could find the testimony credible on retrial.").
The trial court compounded that error by holding that it was precluded entirely from considering the affidavits that defendant had previously presented in support of his first motion for relief from judgment. The trial court was correct that it could not grant relief from judgment solely on the basis of "grounds for relief which were decided against the defendant in" his prior motion for relief from judgment because defendant had not "establishe[d] that a retroactive change in the law ha[d] undermined the prior decision[.]" See MCR 6.508(D)(2). But MCR 6.508(D)(2) further provides that, for purposes of that provision, "a court is not precluded from considering previously decided claims in the context of a new claim for relief, such as in determining whether new evidence would make a different result probable on retrial[.]" (Emphasis added.) And doing so is a necessary part of the inquiry under Johnson, 502 Mich. at 571 ("the evidence that must be taken into consideration when assessing a claim of newly discovered evidence is not simply the evidence presented at the original trial, but also the evidence that would be presented at a new trial").
On remand, the trial court should reconsider this matter on the merits in light of this order.
This order is to have immediate effect. MCR 7.215(F)(2). We do not retain jurisdiction.