Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Super. Ct. Nos. RIF136411, RIF134590 & SWF024890, Mark E. Petersen, Judge.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Gaut J.
Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of seven years eight months, a stipulated sentence, after entering a plea bargain to dispose of three separate criminal cases. She appeals from the sentence and denial of a suppression motion, and challenges the validity of her plea.
BACKGROUND
In case No. RIF134590, defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen.Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and a misdemeanor charge of being under the influence of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a).) It was further alleged that she had suffered four prior convictions for which she had served prison terms (prison priors), (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)), and one alleged prior conviction for a serious or violent felony (Strike). (Pen.Code, § 667, subd. (e)(1).) In another case, No. RIF136411, defendant was charged with possession of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), along with the same enhancement allegations regarding her four prison priors and prior Strike.
After being bound over and arraigned in the superior court on case Nos. RIF134590 and RIF136411, a third complaint was filed, case No. SWF024890, alleging she had committed petty theft after being previously convicted of a theft-related offense (Pen. Code, §§ 484, 666), along with the four prison prior allegations and one Strike.
The People proposed a package deal, disposing of all three cases, which defendant accepted. The plea agreement required defendant to plead guilty to the petty theft with a prior charge, and admit the four prison priors, for a stipulated sentence of seven years in state prison, in case No. SWF024890. In return for the plea, the People agreed to dismiss the Strike allegation. In case No. RIF134590, defendant agreed to plead guilty to count 1, being a felon in possession of a firearm, in return for dismissal of count 2, the charge of being under the influence of controlled substances, dismissal of all prison prior and Strike allegations, and a stipulated sentence of two years in prison, to run concurrent with case No. SWF024890. In case No. RIF136411, defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine base in return for a stipulated consecutive term of eight months (1/3 the middle term), and dismissal of the remaining allegations.
Defendant waived her right to a probation report after pleading guilty, and the court sentenced defendant in accordance with the terms of the plea agreements. She then appealed. The court denied her request for a certificate of probable cause. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5.)
DISCUSSION
At her request, this court appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493], setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues, and requesting that we undertake an independent review of the entire record. We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, but she has not done so. Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have independently reviewed the record for potential error.
First, we note that the amended notice of appeal indicates defendant challenges the sentence, denial of a suppression motion, and the validity of the plea. A defendant cannot challenge the sentence following a guilty plea where the length of the sentence is an integral part of the plea bargain, unless he or she first obtains a certificate of probable cause. (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 79, 84.) Here, the trial court denied the request for a certificate of probable cause. Therefore, the sentence cannot be challenged on appeal.
Second, we note that no motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) was filed in this action. A motion to test the validity of a search or seizure must be raised in the superior court to preserve the point for review on appeal. (People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 80; see also, People v. Garrido (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 359, 363-365 [motion made at or before preliminary hearing must be renewed in superior court in order to preserve the issue for appellate review].) Thus, no search or seizure issue is properly before us to review.
Finally, the lack of a certificate of probable cause bars us from reviewing the guilty plea for jurisdictional or constitutional deficiencies. When a defendant raises an attack on the validity of the plea, a certificate of probable cause is required. (People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1220; People v. Emery (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 560, 562.)
In her request for a certificate of probable cause, defendant raises claims that (1) she was unable to have a witness testify at the preliminary hearing; (2) her trial attorney in one of the three cases refused to “bound” her back to Riverside where she was in the process of a jury trial; (3) she was never arrested for rock base cocaine; and (4) her two applications for bail reduction were denied.
However, none of those issues are cognizable on appeal after a guilty plea. Issues going to guilt or innocence of a defendant are removed from consideration by the entry of a guilty plea. (People v. Marlin (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 559, 566-567.) Denial of an application to reduce bail is reviewed by way of petition for writ of habeas corpus. (In re McSherry (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 856, 859-860.) Irregularities in the preliminary hearing are not a basis for reversal on appeal unless the defendant can demonstrate a resulting unfairness in the subsequent trial (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1192), so the waiver of trial rights in a guilty plea waives any irregularities occurring at the preliminary hearing. (People v. Hollins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 567, 571.)
We have completed our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ramirez P. J. Miller J.