People v. Coleman

8 Citing cases

  1. People v. Otis

    479 N.E.2d 40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 5 times
    In People v. Otis (1985), 135 Ill. App.3d 718, the court decided the issue whether a defendant who has not pleaded guilty to the offense could be placed on TASC. After considering the statutory language and case law, the Otis court concluded that a defendant who has been convicted of an offense after a trial may elect treatment under TASC. Otis, 135 Ill. App.3d at 720-21.

    Since defendant never challenged the constitutionality of these statutes in the trial court, we conclude that he has waived this issue. ( People v. Coleman (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 851, 853, 459 N.E.2d 5, 6.) While we may decline to apply the waiver rule where a substantial question of constitutionality is raised, which, if sustained, would make void the statute under which a defendant was charged and convicted ( People v. McNeal (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 625, 627, 458 N.E.2d 630, 631), the determinant factor is "the nature of the claimed constitutional question" ( People v. Coleman (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 851, 854, 459 N.E.2d 5, 7 (see also supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing).) In this regard, we note that we rejected the same arguments raised by the defendant in People v. Sturlic (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 120, 126-30, 474 N.E.2d 1, 6-8, and thus no substantial question of constitutionality has been raised.

  2. People v. Moorhead

    128 Ill. App. 3d 137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 7 times

    • 1 Preliminarily, we consider the State's contention that the constitutional issue has been waived by defendant's failure to raise it in the trial court. While the general rule is that the failure to raise the issue of a statute's constitutionality in the trial court is a waiver of that issue on review ( People v. Amerman (1971), 50 Ill.2d 196, 279 N.E.2d 353; People v. Luckey (1969), 42 Ill.2d 115, 245 N.E.2d 769; People v. Coleman (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 851, 459 N.E.2d 5), it has been held that where the conviction was under an unconstitutional statute, it is a nullity, and there is no need for a defendant to preserve the error by post-trial motion since the conviction is void and can be attacked at any time. ( People v. Wagner (1982), 89 Ill.2d 308, 311, 433 N.E.2d 267.)

  3. People v. Hominick

    177 Ill. App. 3d 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 14 times

    Defendant has waived the issue. It is well settled that the question of the constitutionality of the statute is properly preserved for review only when it has been raised and passed upon by the trial court ( People v. Myers (1981), 85 Ill.2d 281; People v. Amerman (1971), 50 Ill.2d 196; People v. Coleman (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 851), and the issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal ( People v. Shaw (1975), 31 Ill. App.3d 555). It is only where the unconstitutionality of the statute has first been established that it becomes a matter of fundamental justice to apply the ruling to subsequent cases on appeal even though the issue was not raised in the trial court. People v. Gully (1986), 151 Ill. App.3d 795, 798; People v. Koppen (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 29.

  4. People v. Leonard

    171 Ill. App. 3d 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 37 times
    Holding it was unnecessary to instruct the jury on mental state, despite the indictment charging that defendant knowingly committed the crime, because the crime charged was a general intent crime

    Nor from our review of defendant's brief argument and authority cited in support of this contention in the reply brief do we believe a substantial question of constitutionality is raised to warrant relaxation of the waiver rule. See People v. Coleman (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 851, 854, 459 N.E.2d 5. • 8 Defendant next contends that certain comments by the prosecutor during closing argument were part of a theme designed to inferentially remind the jurors that defendant failed to testify.

  5. In re J.M

    170 Ill. App. 3d 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 13 times

    We find it is waived for that reason (107 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7)), and for the reason that this particular challenge to the statute was not raised in the trial court. People v. Coleman (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 851. For the reasons expressed above, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County finding J.M.

  6. People v. Treece

    159 Ill. App. 3d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that an order requiring an accused to submit, pursuant to Rule 413, to the taking of blood, hair, and other materials of the body is appropriate where probable cause is shown to justify such an order

    It is fundamental that the failure to raise the issue of a statute's constitutionality in the trial court is ordinarily a waiver of that issue on review. ( People v. Amerman (1971), 50 Ill.2d 196, 197, 279 N.E.2d 353; People v. Hope (1986), 142 Ill. App.3d 171, 173, 491 N.E.2d 785; People v. Coleman (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 851, 853, 459 N.E.2d 5; see also People v. Dale (1986), 112 Ill.2d 460, 466-67, 493 N.E.2d 1060.) However, where a substantial question of constitutionality is raised which, if sustained, would make void the statute under which the accused was charged and convicted, a reviewing court will decline to apply the waiver rule.

  7. People v. Gully

    151 Ill. App. 3d 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 26 times
    In People v. Gully, 151 Ill. App.3d 795, 800, 502 N.E.2d 1091 (1986), the court found that the kidnapping was a separate offense based on the Smith test.

    We need not address defendant's contentions in this instance. Defendant did not raise the issue of the constitutionality of the criminal-sexual-assault statute before the trial court and therefore has waived the issue for purposes of appeal. See, e.g., People v. Coleman (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 851, 853, 459 N.E.2d 5, 6; People v. Koppen (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 29, 31-32, 329 N.E.2d 421, 423. See also People v. Myers (1981), 85 Ill.2d 281, 290-91, 426 N.E.2d 535, 539.

  8. People v. Nester

    123 Ill. App. 3d 501 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 22 times
    Finding of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty upheld in case of cold-blooded attack upon a person already beaten in a fight

    • 2 Defendant, however, failed to raise the present constitutional challenge to the sentencing statute in the trial court either at the sentencing hearing or by post-trial motion and his failure to do so constitutes a waiver of that issue on review. ( People v. Amerman (1971), 50 Ill.2d 196; People v. Coleman (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 851, 853.) We note the same issue was recently considered and rejected in People v. Cartalino (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 578.