People v. Cole

41 Citing cases

  1. People v. Miller

    890 P.2d 84 (Colo. 1995)   Cited 30 times
    Allowing the prosecution to introduce other crimes evidence where defense counsel had "questioned [a witness] in a manner that took selective advantage of evidence regarding [the witness's] relationship with [the defendant] and sought to exclude the inadmissible [other crimes] evidence that would place that relationship in its proper context"

    As a preliminary matter, our review of this issue is guided by the principle that "`[t]he admission of rebuttal testimony is largely discretionary with the trial court.'" People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 834 (Colo. 1982) (quoting People v. Miller, 37 Colo. App. 294, 297, 549 P.2d 1092, 1096 (1976), aff'd 193 Colo. 415, 566 P.2d 1059 (1977), and citing Wertz v. People, 160 Colo. 260, 418 P.2d 169 (1966)). With this precept in mind, we turn to an analysis of the law applicable to the issue now before us.

  2. People v. Clark

    370 P.3d 197 (Colo. App. 2015)   Cited 27 times
    Reviewing evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion

    Accordingly, a trial court should not permit broad inquiry into the details of prior acts where such inquiry has little probative force, it may direct the jury's attention away from the case under consideration, and it constitutes a direct attack on the general character of the witness. People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 834 (Colo. 1982). c. Application

  3. People v. Knight

    167 P.3d 147 (Colo. App. 2007)   Cited 29 times
    Upholding the trial court's consolidation where the court “instructed the jury not to let its decision on one count influence its decision on any other, and there is no indication that the jury was unable to separate the facts and legal principles applicable to each offense”

    Effective cross-examination does not mean unlimited cross-examination. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 833 (Colo. 1982). A trial court has wide latitude to place reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about prejudice, confusion of the issues, undue delay or waste of time, and marginal relevance.

  4. People v. Haider

    829 P.2d 455 (Colo. App. 1991)   Cited 2 times

    People v. Roy, supra. Absent a clear abuse of that discretion, a trial court's ruling regarding admissibility will not be disturbed on review. People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1982). Courts have long recognized the need to use transcripts of tape recorded conversations to assist the jury where portions of a tape are inaudible.

  5. Walton v. Falk

    Civil Action No. 13-cv-00403-RM-BNB (D. Colo. May. 1, 2014)   Cited 1 times
    Finding that a photo array was not unduly suggestive where "there [was] a noticeable variance in age of the men depicted" but three men in the photo array were "certainly within [the age range identified by the witness], and all the men depicted have similar facial features, facial hair, hair styles, and hair color and are of the same race"

    We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under CRE 401, 403, and 611 in precluding defendant from relating irrelevant information which likely would have opened the door to a mini-trial on collateral matters. See People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 831-34 (Colo. 1982) (trial court abused it[s] discretion in permitting witnesses to testify to irrelevant and collateral matters); People v. Taylor, 190 Colo. 210, 214, 545 P.2d 703, 706 (1976) (inquiries into details of prior arrests, admitted for impeachment, lead to impermissible mini-trials in which "the sideshow could indeed 'take over the circus'").Similarly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under CRE 611 by requiring defendant to respond simply in terms of "yes" or "no" to questions posited by the prosecution during cross-examination.

  6. People v. Montoya

    546 P.3d 605 (Colo. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    People v. McLaughlin, 2023 CO 38, ¶ 22, 530 P.3d 1206, 1211; People v. Owens, 2024 CO 10, ¶ 137, 544 P.3d 1202 (" ‘Trial courts have broad discretion in controlling the mode and extent of the presentation of evidence,’ and we will not disturb a trial court’s evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 832 (Colo. 1982))). An appellate court must conclude that the trial court’s CRE 106 ruling was manifestly unfair to reverse it, because the rule turns on "fairness."

  7. People v. Owens

    544 P.3d 1202 (Colo. 2024)   Cited 5 times

    1. Standard of Review [60] ¶137 "[T]rial courts have broad discretion in controlling the mode and extent of the presentation of evidence," People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830,832 (Colo. 1982), and we will not disturb a trial court’s evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion, Davis v. People, 2013 CO 57, 113, 310 P.3d 58, 61-62. Again, a court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or based on an incorrect understanding of the law.

  8. People v. Owens

    2024 CO 10 (Colo. 2024)

    1. Standard of Review ¶137 "[T]rial courts have broad discretion in controlling the mode and extent of the presentation of evidence," People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 832 (Colo. 1982), and we will not disturb a trial court's evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion, Davis v. People, 2013 CO 57, ¶ 13, 310 P.3d 58, 61-62. Again, a court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or based on an incorrect understanding of the law.

  9. People v. Segovia

    196 P.3d 1126 (Colo. 2008)   Cited 33 times
    Holding that, under CRE 608, inquiry on cross-examination into a witness' prior shoplifting was admissible to impeach that witness' testimony that she was "honest"

    Specific instances of conduct intended to impeach the credibility of a witness may not be proved by extrinsic evidence, but may be inquired into on cross-examination of a witness. CRE 608(b); People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 832 (Colo. 1982). The rule provides:

  10. People v. Saiz

    32 P.3d 441 (Colo. 2001)   Cited 40 times
    Concluding that the trial court properly excluded videotaped statement where the offer of proof was relatively limited in nature, solely for impeachment, and not alleged to be different or more probative than other related testimony

    A trial court retains the discretion to assess the incremental probative value of evidence offered by a criminal defendant and to exclude even logically relevant evidence that would be more wasteful of time, confusing, or misleading than helpful to the jury. Id. While a trial court must be particularly mindful to insure that a criminal defendant not be denied any meaningful opportunity to challenge evidence of his guilt, and that any decision to exclude defense evidence be well-supported in the record, it may not abdicate its responsibility to guard against prejudice and promote judicial efficiency by excluding evidence that is insufficiently probative to assist in the search for truth. Cf. People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 833 n. 4 (Colo. 1982) (emphasizing balance between defendant's rights and court's responsibilities in the context of limiting cross-examination). The defendant was given ample opportunities, see Van Arsdall, 473 U.S. at 679; Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284, 296-97 (1973), to present his theory and to challenge Anthony's statements and capacity.