As a preliminary matter, our review of this issue is guided by the principle that "`[t]he admission of rebuttal testimony is largely discretionary with the trial court.'" People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 834 (Colo. 1982) (quoting People v. Miller, 37 Colo. App. 294, 297, 549 P.2d 1092, 1096 (1976), aff'd 193 Colo. 415, 566 P.2d 1059 (1977), and citing Wertz v. People, 160 Colo. 260, 418 P.2d 169 (1966)). With this precept in mind, we turn to an analysis of the law applicable to the issue now before us.
Accordingly, a trial court should not permit broad inquiry into the details of prior acts where such inquiry has little probative force, it may direct the jury's attention away from the case under consideration, and it constitutes a direct attack on the general character of the witness. People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 834 (Colo. 1982). c. Application
Effective cross-examination does not mean unlimited cross-examination. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 833 (Colo. 1982). A trial court has wide latitude to place reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about prejudice, confusion of the issues, undue delay or waste of time, and marginal relevance.
People v. Roy, supra. Absent a clear abuse of that discretion, a trial court's ruling regarding admissibility will not be disturbed on review. People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1982). Courts have long recognized the need to use transcripts of tape recorded conversations to assist the jury where portions of a tape are inaudible.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under CRE 401, 403, and 611 in precluding defendant from relating irrelevant information which likely would have opened the door to a mini-trial on collateral matters. See People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 831-34 (Colo. 1982) (trial court abused it[s] discretion in permitting witnesses to testify to irrelevant and collateral matters); People v. Taylor, 190 Colo. 210, 214, 545 P.2d 703, 706 (1976) (inquiries into details of prior arrests, admitted for impeachment, lead to impermissible mini-trials in which "the sideshow could indeed 'take over the circus'").Similarly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under CRE 611 by requiring defendant to respond simply in terms of "yes" or "no" to questions posited by the prosecution during cross-examination.
People v. McLaughlin, 2023 CO 38, ¶ 22, 530 P.3d 1206, 1211; People v. Owens, 2024 CO 10, ¶ 137, 544 P.3d 1202 (" ‘Trial courts have broad discretion in controlling the mode and extent of the presentation of evidence,’ and we will not disturb a trial court’s evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 832 (Colo. 1982))). An appellate court must conclude that the trial court’s CRE 106 ruling was manifestly unfair to reverse it, because the rule turns on "fairness."
1. Standard of Review [60] ¶137 "[T]rial courts have broad discretion in controlling the mode and extent of the presentation of evidence," People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830,832 (Colo. 1982), and we will not disturb a trial court’s evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion, Davis v. People, 2013 CO 57, 113, 310 P.3d 58, 61-62. Again, a court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or based on an incorrect understanding of the law.
1. Standard of Review ¶137 "[T]rial courts have broad discretion in controlling the mode and extent of the presentation of evidence," People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 832 (Colo. 1982), and we will not disturb a trial court's evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion, Davis v. People, 2013 CO 57, ¶ 13, 310 P.3d 58, 61-62. Again, a court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or based on an incorrect understanding of the law.
Specific instances of conduct intended to impeach the credibility of a witness may not be proved by extrinsic evidence, but may be inquired into on cross-examination of a witness. CRE 608(b); People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 832 (Colo. 1982). The rule provides:
A trial court retains the discretion to assess the incremental probative value of evidence offered by a criminal defendant and to exclude even logically relevant evidence that would be more wasteful of time, confusing, or misleading than helpful to the jury. Id. While a trial court must be particularly mindful to insure that a criminal defendant not be denied any meaningful opportunity to challenge evidence of his guilt, and that any decision to exclude defense evidence be well-supported in the record, it may not abdicate its responsibility to guard against prejudice and promote judicial efficiency by excluding evidence that is insufficiently probative to assist in the search for truth. Cf. People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 833 n. 4 (Colo. 1982) (emphasizing balance between defendant's rights and court's responsibilities in the context of limiting cross-examination). The defendant was given ample opportunities, see Van Arsdall, 473 U.S. at 679; Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284, 296-97 (1973), to present his theory and to challenge Anthony's statements and capacity.