Opinion
March 11, 1994
Appeal from the Monroe County Court, Egan, J.
Present — Green, J.P., Balio, Lawton, Doerr and Boehm, JJ.
Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: We find no merit to the contention of defendant that her absence from the initial Sandoval hearing (see, People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371) deprived her of the right to be present at a critical stage of the trial (see, People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656). Assuming, arguendo, that defendant was not present during the initial Sandoval conference, the subsequent colloquy conducted in defendant's presence constituted a de novo hearing (see, People v. Lanaux, 197 A.D.2d 908; People v. Berger, 188 A.D.2d 1073, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 881; People v. Smith, 186 A.D.2d 976, affd 82 N.Y.2d 254).
Defendant also contends that her conviction must be reversed because Penal Law § 125.25 (4) is unconstitutionally vague. Because the depraved mind murder statute is sufficiently definite to notify an individual of the conduct forbidden and provides specific standards for the jury to apply, it passes constitutional muster (see, People v. Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d 85, 89; see also, People v. Nelson, 69 N.Y.2d 302, 307; People v Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270, 276-279, cert denied 466 U.S. 953; see also, People v. Fardan, 82 N.Y.2d 638).
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.