Opinion
D074631
03-13-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONALD COCOVA, Defendant and Appellant.
Patrick Dudley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Mary Katherine Strickland, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCS302042) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Francis M. Devaney, Judge. Appeal dismissed. Patrick Dudley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Mary Katherine Strickland, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In July 2018, Ronald Cocova pleaded guilty to one felony count of possession of a billy club (Pen. Code, § 22210). The following month the trial court sentenced Cocova to 180 days in county jail and placed him on three years of formal probation with conditions, including that he submit his "person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, . . . recordable media, [and] cellphones to search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by [his probation officer] or law enforcement officer"; obtain his probation officer's approval to his residence; and report to the probation department in writing any law enforcement contact within seven days of such contact.
Cocova challenges imposition of these probation conditions on grounds (1) the electronics search condition (condition 6n) is unreasonable under People v Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (2) the residence approval condition (condition 10g) is overbroad and violates his constitutional rights to travel and free association; and (3) the law enforcement contact reporting requirement (condition 6k) is vague and overbroad and violates his First Amendment rights to free speech and free association. He asks that we order the trial court to delete conditions 6n, 10g, 6k. Alternatively, he asks that we order the electronics search condition narrowed so as to exclude his computers or other electronic devices and limit the condition to text messages and call logs on his phone.
We asked the parties to brief the impact, if any, of In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 on these issues. The People now inform us that Cocova's probation was formally revoked on January 2, 2020, and he was sentenced to 16 months in custody with credit of 366 days, rendering this appeal moot. We grant the People's request that we take judicial notice of the trial court's minute order reflecting these events. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
Generally, expiration or revocation of probation renders a challenge to probation conditions moot. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 879; People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120, fn. 5 [probation expired]; In re R.V. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239, 245.) An exception to that rule permits reviewing courts to consider the challenge where there is a matter of broad public interest that is likely to recur, or the same controversy is likely to recur between the parties. (See Carbajal, at p. 1120, fn. 5; In re R.V., supra, at p. 245; In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498-1499.) No such circumstances appear in this case. Since Cocova is no longer on probation, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
O'ROURKE, J. WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. DATO, J.