The trial judge listened to the witnesses and tapes, and it was proper for him to draw inferences therefrom. (See People v. Clemons (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 26, 29, 358 N.E.2d 20, 23.) He could have reasonably deduced that defendant could commit an act to advance a case that would remain undetected by Judge Hunter because of the extreme volume of his call.

In addition, the defendant argues that employment records establish that he was working when the crimes for which he was charged occurred. • 1-3 It is well established in rape cases that reviewing courts are charged with carefully examining the evidence, and where that evidence does not remove all reasonable doubt and create an abiding conviction that the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged, his conviction must be reversed. ( People v. Anderson (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 840, 314 N.E.2d 651.) Although the testimony of the complaining witness alone is sufficient to support a conviction for rape, that testimony must be found to be clear and convincing. ( People v. Reaves (1962), 24 Ill.2d 380, 183 N.E.2d 169; People v. Clemons (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 26, 358 N.E.2d 20.) Moreover, uncertain identification testimony is not sufficient to convict where there is uncontradicted alibi testimony. People v. Jefferson (1962), 24 Ill.2d 398, 182 N.E.2d 1.