Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo, Super. Ct. No. F449885 Jacquelyn H. Duffy, Judge
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
PERREN, J.
Robert Claster appeals from an order declaring him to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO), and committing him to the Department of Mental Health for treatment. (Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.) He contends the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that he represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others by reason of his mental disorder (§ 2962, subd. (d)(1)). We affirm.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2008, appellant was convicted of felony stalking in violation of a restraining order (§ 646.9, subd. (b)) and was sentenced to state prison. After the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) determined that appellant was an MDO subject to involuntary treatment as a condition of his parole, he petitioned for a hearing and waived his right to a jury trial.
Dr. Joe Debruin, a forensic psychologist at Atascadero State Hospital (ASH), testified at the hearing on behalf of the prosecution. Dr. Debruin conducted a forensic evaluation of appellant on September 9, 2009. He also spoke with appellant's treating psychiatrist and reviewed appellant's medical chart, which included prior MDO evaluations. Based on this information, Dr. Debruin opined that appellant met the criteria for MDO treatment.
Appellant suffers from delusional disorder/unspecified type, and obsessive compulsive disorder, both of which qualify as severe mental disorders under the MDO law. Appellant began exhibiting symptoms of these disorders in 1987 when he first saw the victim of his stalking on a television program. The victim, an attorney who represented children in abuse cases, claimed that she had been the victim of sexual abuse as a child. Appellant, who was also an attorney, became obsessed with the victim and began a "campaign of threats, phone calls and letters" that were "highly violent and sexual." As a result of this conduct, appellant was convicted of misdemeanor annoying telephone calls in 1987, 1991 and 1993, misdemeanor stalking in 1991 and 1993, felony stalking in 2004, and the 2008 commitment offense of felony stalking in violation of a protective order. At one point the victim had a total of five restraining orders against appellant.
Appellant had been taking psychiatric medication for his mental disorders since the 1980's, and had previously been hospitalized from April 1994 to January 1995. His reported delusions included the desire to stab the victim in her vagina and stick a funnel in her vagina and pour acid or Drano into it. He also referred to biting off the victim's clitoris, and expressed a desire to "sexually aggress[]" against children as a way of expressing his rage at women or the child's mother.
Dr. Debruin concluded that appellant's commitment offense was a crime in which the perpetrator expressly or impliedly threatened another with the use of force or violence as contemplated in subdivision (e)(2)(Q) of section 2962, because it involved sexually violent telephone calls and letters to the victim. Appellant's mental disorders had either caused or aggravated the offense because his obsession with the victim was plainly irrational and had been ongoing for several years. The doctor further opined that appellant's mental disorders were not in remission because appellant was manipulative and "glib" during his interview and did not appear to have "a sense of any kind of remorse with regards to the victim." Appellant had also admitted that he still has recurring thoughts about using a knife and Drano on the victim.
On February 9, 2010, appellant referred to having the "soul of a rapist" and said that he did not feel remorse for the victim because he "sense[d] a hate in her, wanting to get revenge for what had been done to her." On March 1, 2010, appellant said he would consider molesting children in order to align with the fact that he had been required to register as a sex offender. On March 22, appellant stated, "I want to stab [the victim] in the cunt if I'm going to be classified as a sex offender." As a result of that statement, a Tarasoff warning was issued to the victim. The fact that such a warning was issued indicated that the doctor to whom the statement was conveyed construed it as an actual threat against the victim. During an interview on March 29, 2010, appellant said that he had considered contacting "Dr. Phil" to see if he would televise appellant's sexual fantasies. He also expressed envy after reading about men in Africa who sexually mutilate women as a form of racial warfare.
A Tarasoff warning refers to the notice that a mental health professional must give to an intended victim, the police, or others if he or she determines that a patient presents a serious danger of violence to another. (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 431.)
Appellant also continued to rationalize his behavior against the victim because he believed that she wanted him to suffer. During the court proceedings for appellant's commitment offense, appellant stated, "Women like you would like to see someone like me castrated because I... appreciate the sweet womanly woman, but not vicious ball-busting harpies like you who would like to see me castrated for the hostilities that I bury. If I felt like cutting your genitals open, why is that wrong if you would like to see me castrated?" On April 14, 2010, appellant admitted that he was still fantasizing about mutilating and pouring Drano into the victim's vagina. In March 2010, he referred to a fascination with pedophiles and serial killers and said he wanted to touch children in front of their mothers and sexually mutilate and torture women. According to Dr. Debruin, appellant's entire treating team agreed that appellant continued to experience "profound sexual and violent fantasies." Appellant's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Parvizi, had stated that appellant suffered from a "profound" obsessive compulsive disorder for which he continued to require "a lot" of treatment. Dr. Parvizi reported that appellant was "still very dangerous" and expressed concerns regarding "his articulations about his fears of wanting to aggress against a child."
All of this information led Dr. Debruin to conclude that appellant's severe mental disorder was not in remission and could not be kept in remission without treatment as of the date of the BPT hearing. The severity of appellant's mental illness, the fact that he was not in remission, and his lack of insight regarding his condition led the doctor to also conclude that appellant represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others by reason of his mental disorder, as contemplated under subdivision (d)(1) of section 2962. Appellant had told Dr. Debruin that he knew where the victim lived, and he continued to make references to molesting children. That he represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others was further supported by the fact that he continued to relish his sexual and violent fantasies.
Appellant testified in his own behalf. He disagreed with his diagnosis of delusional disorder and explained that he only knew where the victim lived because her address had been inadvertently disclosed to him several years earlier. He claimed that he had never made any attempt to contact the victim in person, and realized that his letters and telephone calls were harmful to her. Since being sentenced to prison he had not attempted to contact the victim by telephone, mail, or any other means. He also offered that he had been regularly taking his prescribed medications, which calmed him down considerably, and had not engaged in any acts of violence while at ASH. He was angry that he had been required to register as a sex offender and was appealing the matter; in the meantime, he intended to comply with all reporting and notification requirements. He understood that he has mental problems that require therapy and medication, and claimed that he was not taking his medication when the commitment offense took place. Although he never intended to physically harm the victim, he acknowledged that he wanted to cause her emotional distress and considered his actions "despicable."
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that his commitment order must be reversed because the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that he represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others by reason of his mental disorder, as contemplated under subdivision (d)(1) of section 2962. We disagree.
In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences from the record to support the judgment. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) We do not weigh the evidence or decide the credibility of the witnesses. (Ibid.)
An MDO commitment is authorized for a prisoner where "'... by reason of his or her severe mental disorder the prisoner represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.'" (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 23; § 2962, subd. (d).) Whether the defendant meets that standard necessarily involves "a prediction of future dangerousness by mental health professionals." (Qawi, at p. 24.)
Dr. Debruin testified that appellant represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others by reason of his mental disorder. In stating that opinion, the doctor noted that appellant's illness causes him to have recurrent delusions in which he desires to commit graphic, sexually violent crimes against the victim of his stalking and children in general. Dr. Debruin also referred to the opinion of appellant's treating psychiatrist, who concluded that appellant's mental disorder was "profound" and that he was "still very dangerous." The record further reflects that less than four months before the BPT hearing, appellant stated that he wanted to stab the victim "in the cunt." The medical professional to whom the statement was made considered it serious enough to warrant a Tarasoff warning to the victim. As a qualified expert, Dr. Debruin's opinion on appellant's dangerousness to others constitutes substantial evidence sufficient to support the trial court's finding. (In re Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 24; People v. Miller (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 913, 917; People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 477, 490.)
In challenging the finding that he represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others by reason of his severe mental disorder, appellant refers to his purportedly "advanced age" at the time of the BPT hearing (64) and notes the lack of evidence that he "has ever engaged in any actual acts of physical, as opposed to emotional or psychological, violence." He also offers that he has apparently made no effort to physically contact the victim, even though he has been aware of her address for several years. He further claims that Dr. Debruin's opinion that he lacks insight or remorse is "belied by appellant's own testimony."
Appellant's arguments in this regard essentially ignore the applicable standard of review. Our task is to determine whether the evidence supports the finding that appellant represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others by reason of his severe mental disorder, and not whether there is evidence from which the court could have made a contrary finding. Moreover, any inferences to be drawn from the evidence must be made in favor of the judgment. (People v. Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1206.) The MDO law makes clear that the determination whether a defendant represents a "'substantial danger of physical harm' does not require proof of a recent overt act." (§ 2962, subd. (f).) Appellant's long history of threatening and harassing his victim, which entailed the violation of five different restraining orders and resulted in numerous criminal convictions, demonstrates an inability to control his behavior without treatment. While in treatment, appellant has continued to express his desire to commit brutal violence against the victim and, more recently, children in general. One such statement was deemed serious and credible enough to warrant a Tarasoff warning. Notwithstanding appellant's self-serving statements to the contrary, the record also supports Dr. Debruin's conclusion that appellant lacks insight into his illness or remorse for the suffering he has caused his victim. In light of this evidence, there is no basis for us to disturb the finding that appellant represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others, as contemplated under the MDO law.
Appellant cites our prior opinion in People v. Gibson (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1425 (Gibson), as support for his assertion that "section 2962 is considered a penal statute subject to applicable state and federal constitutional safeguards." He also relies on Gibson for the proposition that the determination whether a prisoner represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others for purposes of the MDO law is "a separate and independent requirement" that "c[an]not be based on either the existence of the prisoner's mental illness or the role of the illness in the underlying offense." (Emphasis omitted.) Appellant fails to appreciate that Gibson has been abrogated by statute and overruled by case law with regard to its holding that the MDO law is penal in nature. (E.g., People v. Robinson (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 348, 350-352.) The reasoning upon which the latter conclusion is based has also been called into question. (See Griffiths v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 757, 777-779.) In any event, Gibson does not aid appellant on this point because the finding that he is currently dangerous is not based solely on the existence of his mental disorder or its role in his commission of the commitment offense.
The judgment (order of commitment) is affirmed.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., YEGAN, J.