Street encounters initiated by police are governed by the well-established graduated four-level test in which, generally stated, the level of permissible intrusion increases with the level of evidence of criminality ( see People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 498-499; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223; People v Hill, 30 AD3d 687, 687; People v Siler, 288 AD2d 625, 625, lv denied 97 NY2d 709 ). These encounters can be "dynamic situations during which the degree of belief possessed at the point of inception may blossom by virtue of responses or other matters which authorize . . . additional action as the scenario unfolds" ( People v De Bour, 40 NY2d at 225; see People v Clark, 237 AD2d 372, 372, lv denied 90 NY2d 856). Here, evidence credited at the suppression hearing established that police had an objective, credible reason for approaching and speaking to defendant since he and his companions were partially blocking a street.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the information the police had at the beginning of their encounter with him, combined with the information developed during the encounter (see People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210; People v. Clark, 237 A.D.2d 372; People v. Jimenez, 187 A.D.2d 610; People v. Grimsley, 156 A.D.2d 714; People v. Fulmore, 133 A.D.2d 169), provided reasonable suspicion to detain and transport the defendant to the station house to rapidly confirm or dispel their suspicions that he had committed a crime (see People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234; People v. Brewer, 200 A.D.2d 579; People v. Foster, 173 A.D.2d 841; People v. Pinkney, 156 A.D.2d 182; People v. Lyng, 104 A.D.2d 699; cf. People v. Ralfopoulos, 274 A.D.2d 437). Moreover, the fact that the police used handcuffs in transporting the defendant to the station house did not transform the detention into a full-blown arrest (see People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378; People v. Persaud, 244 A.D.2d 577; People v. Carney, 212 A.D.2d 721; People v. Alford, 186 A.D.2d 43). Once at the precinct, the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant for criminal possession of stolen property and subsequently to place him in a lineup. We agree with the Supreme Court that the reason

Here, the hearing record reveals that the arresting officer stopped the defendant because he matched the description of an individual who had been observed walking though the backyards of private homes in a residential neighborhood. The officer thus had an objective credible reason to stop the defendant, ask him his name, and inquire about what he was doing ( see, People v. Reyes, supra; People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181; People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210; People v. Clark, 237 A.D.2d 372). When the defendant gave an apparently untruthful answer to the officer's inquiry about what he was doing when stopped, and inconsistent information about the ownership of a cellular phone which he initially claimed belonged to him, the officer acted reasonably in briefly detaining him while he conducted an investigation to determine the true owner of the phone ( see, People v. Seiden, 199 A.D.2d 437; People v. Alston, 189 A.D.2d 555). Upon learning that the cellular phone was actually owned by a neighborhood resident who lived a short distance away from the spot where the defendant was stopped, the officer had probable cause to arrest him ( see, People v. DeBour, supra).