People v. Circella

8 Citing cases

  1. People v. McBride

    448 N.E.2d 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 18 times

    * * * It is equally well established that a reviewing court retains jurisdiction of the cause until it issues its mandate * * *." ( People v. Baker (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 661, 662, 406 N.E.2d 1152; People v. Circella (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 214, 216, 285 N.E.2d 254 (where the court found that the trial court acted improperly by authorizing the State's motion to withdraw an appeal of an order quashing a search warrant and reinstating the original charges).) The filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional step, and the only actions the trial court may take in the matter subsequent to the notice of appeal being filed are purely ministerial.

  2. People v. Williams

    138 Ill. 2d 377 (Ill. 1990)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that, like res judicata, the Taylor rule applies to all issues that "were or could have been" raised earlier

    ANALYSIS Defendant contends that, because the original judge in his case had entered an order holding his arrest unlawful for lack of probable cause and suppressing evidence derived from his custodial interrogation, and because the State procured dismissal of its appeal from that order (see People v. Taylor (1971), 50 Ill.2d 136, 140; People v. McBride (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 75, 80; People v. Schlemm (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 639, 648; People v. Circella (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 214, 216) and never sought reconsideration of the order (see People v. Heil (1978), 71 Ill.2d 458, 461; People v. Wagner (1981), 100 Ill. App.3d 1051, 1053), the order operated as what defendant terms the law of the case, binding the State and the trial judge. In effect, defendant contends that the suppression order must be presumed to have taken into account the evidence on which the State later relied in support of its eventual attenuation argument and that therefore the trial judge improperly reopened the already decided suppression issue in order to reconsider the attenuation question.

  3. People v. East-West University, Inc.

    637 N.E.2d 594 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 7 times
    Relying on several decisions of the Illinois Appellate Courts

    ( East-West University, Inc., 163 Ill. App.3d at 50.) Generally, the filing of a notice of appeal invokes the jurisdiction of the reviewing court and at the same time divests the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on substantive matters which would be affected by the appeal. ( People v. Circella (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 214, 216, 285 N.E.2d. 254; People v. Benda (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 950, 953, 464 N.E.2d 1268.) However, such is not the case where the appeal is taken from a nonappealable order.

  4. People v. McGee

    245 Ill. App. 3d 703 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 4 times

    Given the nature of the evidence objected to and the possibility that if erroneously admitted it could have prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial, we will consider the issues defendant has raised on appeal. Defendant relies on People v. McBride (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 75, 448 N.E.2d 551, and People v. Circella (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 214, 285 N.E.2d 254, for the proposition that the State's failure to appeal under Rule 604(a) constitutes a bar to further consideration of the propriety of the trial court's ruling by another judge of that court in a later proceeding. McBride and Circella relied on People v. Taylor (1971), 50 Ill.2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878, as authority for this rule.

  5. People v. Dace

    540 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 3 times

    To determine that the State must wait such a length of time to pursue its investigation and evidence gathering is not sound public policy, as time is often of the essence in certain investigatory situations. The trial court was not making any determination regarding the propriety of the first warrant and thus had jurisdiction to issue a new search warrant while Dace I was pending on appeal. The cases of People v. Circella (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 214, 285 N.E.2d 254, McBride ( 114 Ill. App.3d 75, 448 N.E.2d 551), and Verdone ( 136 Ill. App.3d 75, 482 N.E.2d 1134), cited by defendant as support for his position, are factually dissimilar to the present case. Defendant next argues that the trial court committed reversible error in precluding defendant from cross-examining an inmate-witness to an alleged admission by defendant about the conviction and sentence received by the witness' codefendant.

  6. People v. Mitsakopoulos

    524 N.E.2d 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 6 times
    In Mitsakopoulos, the defendant was initially charged with forgery of a check and subsequently was charged with theft by exerting unauthorized control over the proceeds of that same check. The Mitsakopoulos court found that section 3-3(b) barred the separate theft prosecution, because the evidence for both the theft and forgery charges was the same, involved precisely the same conduct, and because the prosecution knew of both offenses prior to the prosecution of either charge.

    However, once the notice of appeal is filed, the trial court only loses jurisdiction as regards those matters which are the subject of the appeal. People v. Circella (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 214, 285 N.E.2d 254. • 3 An examination of the notice of appeal in the case at bar reveals that the appeal was taken only from the dismissal of the two theft counts.

  7. People v. Hoban

    372 N.E.2d 976 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)   Cited 3 times

    • 3 Filing of the notice of appeal within due time causes jurisdiction of this court to attach instanter and deprives the trial court of jurisdiction of the matter. ( City of Chicago v. Myers (1967), 37 Ill.2d 470, 227 N.E.2d 760; People v. Circella (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 214, 285 N.E.2d 254.) In the present case, the trial court allowed defendants' renewed motion to suppress the same testimony that it previously ruled as admissible evidence.

  8. People v. Breen

    366 N.E.2d 379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)

    • 1 Defendant's contention that defendant's sentence was suspended for 28 months thus depriving the trial court of the right to sentence overlooks the fact that the trial court was without jurisdiction of the matter from the time the notice of appeal was filed in 1974 until it received the mandate from the supreme court in 1976. (See People v. Circella (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 214, 285 N.E.2d 254.) Since the ordinary appeal process cannot be considered delay ( People ex rel. Millet v. Woods (1973), 55 Ill.2d 1, 302 N.E.2d 32), the passage of time per se did not deprive the trial court of the right to impose sentence. Our supreme court has stated repeatedly that where a conviction is valid, but the sentence is invalid, the order remanding the cause in no way affects the validity of the judgment against the defendant and the order on remandment is to enter a sentence proper under the law.