Opinion
Argued September 5, 2000.
October 16, 2000.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Sheridan, J.), rendered November 17, 1997, convicting him of rape in the first degree, burglary in the second degree (two counts), criminal contempt in the first degree, criminal contempt in the second degree (nine counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, criminal trespass in the second degree, and harassment in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Deirdre M. Butterfield, Huntington, N.Y., for appellant.
James M. Catterson, Jr., District Attorney, Riverhead, N Y (Michael A. Gajdos of counsel), for respondent.
Before: LAWRENCE J. BRACKEN, J.P., LEO F. McGINITY, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Since the defendant refused to enter the courtroom to be arraigned, his absence was a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to be present (see, CPL 210.15; People v. Epps, 37 N.Y.2d 343, cert denied 423 U.S. 999; People v. Gloster, 175 A.D.2d 258, 261). Furthermore, the defendant subsequently submitted to the court's jurisdiction by his presence at trial (see, People v. Jordan, 20 A.D.2d 583).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621), we find that the defendant's conviction for rape in the first degree was supported by legally sufficient evidence that the defendant broke into the home of his former girlfriend, held her captive for five hours, and subjected her to sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion (see, People v. Szarka, 163 A.D.2d 758; People v. Sullivan, 159 A.D.2d 738). Similarly, his convictions for two counts of burglary in the second degree based on incidents which occurred on the day of the rape and on a previous occasion in violation of an order of protection were also supported by legally sufficient evidence (see, People v. Bonner, 256 A.D.2d 1219; People v. Cowan, 184 A.D.2d 778).
The defendant also contends that the testimony of the complainant was incredible. The resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 87, 94). The jury's determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see, People v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.