Opinion
H024935.
10-10-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM JOSEPH CHRISTOPHER, Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant, William Joseph Christopher (defendant), was found incompetent to stand trial on felony charges of spousal abuse and intimidating a witness and misdemeanor charges of resisting arrest and driving without a license. The court committed defendant to Atascadero State Hospital. On appeal defendant contends substantial evidence does not support the trial courts finding of mental incompetence and that the court violated his procedural due process rights by only appointing one expert to examine him prior to his competency hearing in violation of Penal Code section 1369, subdivision (a).
For the reasons stated below, we shall affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At a preliminary hearing on September 18, 2000, the victim, Noeme G., testified as follows. Noeme G. met defendant in August 1997. They began living together in November 1997. Noeme became pregnant in March 1998, and they were married in June 1998. In April 1998, during an argument, defendant choked her, sat on her chest and slapped her repeatedly in the face with the back of his hand. Her face and lips were swollen, her lips were bleeding and she had black eyes as a result of the attack. Defendant prevented her from calling the police by hiding the phone. He said he would never hurt her again, so she stayed with him. Her baby was born in December 1998. In May 1999, defendant punched Noeme in the nose, causing it to bleed, and kicked her in the lower back. He then made her stay in the bathroom for several days with the baby, only allowing her to come out for 15 or 30 minutes at a time.
On June 9, 1999, defendant again beat Noeme, this time punching her in the back and slapping her in the face. He also told her he would never divorce her and would torture her and kill her. On June 13, 1999, defendant beat Noeme by slapping her face, kicking her in the legs and punching her in the abdomen. She later asked defendant if she could go for a walk. He gave her permission to go, and she walked to a church. She told the pastor and his wife about her problems and then asked the pastor to help her call the police. She reported the incidents to the police.
Defendant was arrested and Noeme initially testified at a preliminary hearing in July 1999. However, defendant convinced Noeme to move to Arizona with him. He told her he would move to Arizona when the criminal case against him was dismissed. After Noeme fled to Arizona with their baby, the case against defendant was dismissed in December 1999. When defendant moved to Arizona, he took Noeme and the baby to the desert, and they camped out over Christmas for 11 days. They then moved back to a house, which Noeme believed belonged to defendant, and lived in a tent in the backyard for three weeks. Defendant again began to abuse Noeme. She eventually sought help and returned to California, where charges were re-filed against defendant.
Defendant was held to answer to four felony counts of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), and one felony count of dissuading a witness from testifying (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (a)(1)). An amended information was filed October 6, 2000. Defendant pleaded not guilty. Defendant was initially represented by a public defender. On November 15, 2000, the public defender was relieved and Ingo Brauer was substituted in as defense counsel. In a separate case (No. CC074680), defendant was charged with misdemeanor offenses of resisting arrest and driving without a license. In that case, defendant represented himself.
On December 4, 2001, the trial court appointed David Echeandia, a clinical and forensic psychologist, pursuant to its authority under Evidence Code section 730, to examine defendant and provide a report to the court. Dr. Echeandias report, dated December 17, 2001, indicated that the purpose of the evaluation was (1) to offer a general assessment of defendants mental status and functioning, and (2) to assist the court in determining whether there was sufficient reason to order a competency evaluation. Dr. Echeandia met with defendant twice, while defendant was in custody at the main jail facility in San Jose. Dr. Echeandia found defendant to be alert, well oriented and cooperative. Defendant appeared to be above average in intelligence and articulate. His memory functions were intact and complex reasoning skills were adequate. He was very clear about the nature of the charges against him and was able to discuss the case in a manner indicating detailed knowledge of court procedures. However, defendant was preoccupied with deeply entrenched beliefs that he was the victim of a far-reaching conspiracy of all parties involved in the legal proceeding, including the victim, attorneys, family court personnel and judges. For example, defendant claimed his initial public defender told him the court was "`an evil system that preys on men and gets money for every domestic violence case prosecuted." Another counselor allegedly told him she had observed lesbian court social workers "`hitting on women in the womens shelter, having sex with them and using it as a recruitment situation." He further claimed that the district attorney had altered testimony from an initial preliminary hearing transcript that would prove his wife had committed perjury. He had witnesses who would testify that his wife was abusing their infant son, but his wifes "lesbian attorney" and a "homosexual judge" had conspired to prevent these witnesses from testifying at a family court hearing. Defendant also believed his own attorney was incompetent and corrupt. He claimed his attorney knew the system was corrupt but would not defend him properly. His attorney was trying to convince him that his mind was playing tricks on him and that he had false memories regarding his wifes child abuse confessions and testimony. Defendant had refused to accept any plea bargains, which would gain his freedom from custody, because he was defending all men in child custody disputes from the corrupt legal system, and that he would expose this corruption to the world.
Evidence Code section 730 provides: "When it appears to the court, at any time before or during the trial of an action, that expert evidence is or may be required by the court or by any party to the action, the court on its own motion ... may appoint one or more experts to investigate, to render a report as may be ordered by the court, and to testify as an expert at the trial of the action relative to the fact or matter as to which the expert evidence is or may be required. . . ."
Dr. Echeandia opined that significant elements in defendants statements indicated his beliefs were of a delusional nature and that he likely suffered from a deeply entrenched paranoid disorder. "The sheer depth and breadth of his sweeping conspiracy theories suggest[ed] significant loss of touch with reality with respect to his ability to accurately perceive and interpret events." Dr. Echeandia concluded: "In summary, on the basis of available information, I am inclined to conclude that [defendant] is exhibiting symptoms of a paranoid delusional disorder; and that there is sufficient reason to believe that this mental disorder substantially impairs his capacity to aid his attorney in conducting his defense in a rational manner."
On December 11, 2001, the trial court further referred defendant to a 72-hour treatment and mental health evaluation pursuant to Penal Code section 4011.6. The trial court referred defendant for assessment because he appeared "to be somewhat paranoid and his attorney report[ed] he [was] depressed and unable to assist in his own defense." Dr. Michael Echols evaluated defendant and submitted a report to the court on December 13, 2001. According to Dr. Echols, his task was to determine whether as a result of mental disorder, defendant was a danger to others or to himself or gravely disabled. Dr. Echols reported defendant was housed in a general population unit in the main jail. He had had six negative write-ups for relatively minor behavioral problems. He was described by custody officers as a "Bible reader," who was rigid in his principles and very critical of other inmates behavior. He had been threatened on at least one occasion. In September 2001, custody officers who observed defendant to be exhibiting paranoid symptoms, pacing on the second tier and having negative interactions with other inmates, referred him for a mental health interview. After his first arrest he received counseling for several months, but he denied any other history of psychiatric treatment, suicide attempts, substance abuse or family history of mental illness. Defendant claimed that the court and the government were biased against him and wanted to cover up the falsification of prior transcripts in his criminal case. Defendants beliefs were based on very convoluted observations, and supportive information for defendants claims could not be substantiated after two attempts to do so. During the interview, defendant was alert and oriented to time, place, person and circumstances. Echols also observed that defendants thought content lacked hallucinations, hopelessness or suicidal or homicidal ideation. However, Dr. Echols reported defendants accounts of his present circumstances and past episodes in his life consisted of "an elaborated web of associations which often seemed farfetched and [had] him as a victim of persecution." Further, "[defendants] beliefs approach the threshold of a nonbizarre delusion." Echols concluded defendant primarily suffered from a personality disorder, which undermined his capacity to cooperate constructively with his attorney. "His account and interpretation of events leading to his arrest are certainly skewed. The same may be said for his perception of the court process. He has a rigid and distorted belief system, which is not, for the most part, amenable to treatment." Although defendant appeared to suffer from a personality disorder, Dr. Echols concluded he was not eligible for an LPS hold and would be seen by mental health staff only at defendants request or upon referral from custody officers.
Penal Code section 4011.6 provides: "In any case in which it appears ... to any judge of a court in the county in which the jail or juvenile detention facility is located, that a person in custody in that jail ... may be mentally disordered, he or she may cause the prisoner to be taken to a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation pursuant to Section 5150 of the Welfare and Institutions code and he or she shall inform the facility in writing, which shall be confidential, of the reasons that the person is being taken to the facility. . . ."
On January 3, 2002, based on the mental health reports described above, the trial court suspended criminal proceedings against defendant and ordered a competency hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1369. The case was referred to department 24 for the appointment of an expert to conduct the mental status evaluation under Penal Code section 1369, subdivision (a). The issue of the need of a competency hearing was submitted on the reports. Defendant objected to a referral to Department 24 on the grounds that he claimed the suspension of criminal proceedings was a pretense for covering up the alleged falsification of a reporters transcript from a July 1999 preliminary hearing.
On January 9, 2002, the trial court appointed Dr. Robert Perez under Penal Code section 1369, and continued the matter to January 30. Defendant again informed the court that he believed the mental competency hearing was an attempt to cover up a falsified transcript in his criminal case.
On January 16, 2002, Dr. Perez attempted to interview defendant at the main jail facility. At his request, correction officers advised defendant of his presence and that he was requesting an interview. Defendant, however, adamantly refused to participate in the mental health evaluation, even after he was informed that his continued refusal would result in a recommendation that the court find him incompetent under Penal Code section 1369. Dr. Perez submitted his report on January 23, 2002, concluding: "It is my understanding that a request for evaluation per section 1369 of the [Penal Code] supposes that some individuals within the trial process have had reason to question the defendants competence. The current evaluation certainly does nothing to reassure the court regarding this point. It seems reasonable to suggest that the defendant is most likely incompetent per section 1369 of the [Penal Code]. Referral for appropriate psychiatric treatment would appear indicated."
On February 13, 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing to set the trial date for the competency hearing. Defendant continued to object to the proceedings as a cover up. Defendants attorney, over defendants objection, waived his right to jury trial on the competency hearing, and the hearing was scheduled for March 21, 2002. The trial court further appointed an attorney from Legal Aide to represent defendant on the misdemeanor charges through the competency proceedings.
The competency hearing was held on April 2, 2002. Defendants attorney on the felony charges, Ingo Brauer, submitted a portion of the defense case on the three mental health reports described above. After conferring with defendant, Melvin Emerich, who was representing defendant on the misdemeanor charges, stated there was no objection to the admission of the reports into evidence. Additional medical records of defendant were admitted into evidence without objection by any party. The trial was continued to June 6, 2002.
On June 6, defendant testified on his own behalf. He initially refused to take the oath based on his religious beliefs, but in answer to questioning from the court he promised to tell the truth under penalty of perjury. He initially testified that he understood that the nature of the present proceeding was a hearing to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. Further, he understood the nature of the two misdemeanor charges against him, driving without a license and resisting arrest, as well as the five felony charges against him, four counts of corporal injury on a spouse and one count of intimidating a witness.
He next testified that he did not believe he could adequately assist in his defense because the district attorney and other court personnel had deleted at least three pages of his wifes testimony from a preliminary hearing transcript dated July of 1999. He claimed his wife described a bloody beating with serious injuries while she was eight months pregnant. Since his wifes medical records showed no such injuries or treatment for injuries, he claimed she was lying. This testimony does not appear in the preliminary hearing transcript; hence, he claimed the transcript had been falsified. He further claimed that his wife had abused their infant son when he was four and five months old. When he threatened to divorce her if she did not stop, he was arrested for spousal abuse. He further testified at length that he was merely trying to protect his infant son from abusive conduct at the hands of his mother, that the family court personnel were lesbians and were engaged in a conspiracy to work against fathers attempting to protect their children, that his employment records subpoenaed from the Alum Rock School District were not complete and also must have been falsified by the prosecutor.
The trial court concluded defendant was mentally incompetent to stand trial. "I have considered the exhibits that were submitted into evidence, as well as the testimony and the manner in which the testimony was given by [defendant]. He is obviously a very intelligent and articulate man. Nevertheless, consistent with the reports written by the examiners in this case, I do find that [defendant] is mentally incompetent as defined by law under Section 1370 of the Penal Code."
An order of commitment, suspending criminal proceedings and committing defendant to Atascadero State Hospital for treatment until such time as provided by law or until further order of the court, was filed July 15, 2002.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF MENTAL INCOMPETENCE
Defendant first contends there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the trial courts conclusion that he was mentally incompetent to stand trial within the meaning of Penal Code section 1367, subdivision (a). We disagree.
As the California Supreme Court recently confirmed, "[a] person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while mentally incompetent. (§ 1367, subd. (a).) A defendant is mentally incompetent if, as a result of a mental disorder or developmental disability, he or she is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner. (Ibid.) When the accused [or another source] presents substantial evidence of incompetence, due process requires that the trial court conduct a full competency hearing. [Citations.]" (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1163-1164.)
"Although it arises in the context of a criminal trial, a competency hearing is a special proceeding, governed generally by the rules applicable to civil proceedings. [Citation.] . . . A defendant is presumed competent unless the contrary is proven by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citations.] On appeal, the reviewing court determines whether substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports the trial courts finding. [Citation.] `Evidence is substantial if it is reasonable, credible and of solid value." (People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 131; People v. Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860, 865-867.)
Based on the expert witness reports submitted to the trial court and defendants testimony, substantial evidence clearly supports the courts finding that defendant was mentally incompetent to stand trial. Although the expert witnesses all observed that defendant was intelligent and articulate, it was unanimously concluded that defendant had deeply entrenched paranoid and delusional beliefs concerning the court system that prevented him from assisting his counsel in the conduct of his defense in a rational manner. As noted by Dr. Echeandia, "[t]he sheer depth and breadth of his sweeping conspiracy theories suggest[ed] significant loss of touch with reality with respect to his ability to accurately perceive and interpret events." In the present case, there was credible evidence describing defendants mental disorder and its debilitating effect on his ability to assist or cooperate with his attorney in a rational manner. ( Contra, People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 285 .)
People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th 102, relied upon by defendant, does not dictate a contrary result. In Lawley the defendant was convicted of murder, conspiracy to commit murder and solicitation to commit murder. During the proceedings, the trial court declared a doubt as to defendants competency and appointed two psychologists to examine defendant. One psychologist concluded defendant was not schizophrenic, but somewhat delusional, was intelligent, understood the proceedings and could cooperate in his own defense. The second psychologist diagnosed defendant as paranoid schizophrenic and concluded he was incompetent to stand trial. The trial court found defendant competent to stand trial. The Supreme Court initially held that no due process was violated when defendants competency hearing was based on two expert witness reports submitted to the court and argument of the prosecutor and the defense counsel. It was not necessary to obtain a third tie-breaking report or have the experts testify in person. (Id. at pp. 131-132.) The Supreme Court also rejected defendants claim that the trial courts finding of competence was not supported by substantial evidence. One of the two reports clearly found defendant competent to stand trial, although defendant exhibited very intense "paranoid" beliefs concerning gay persons who might be on any potential jury in his criminal trial. While the second report concluded defendant was not competent and could not rationally assist in his defense, the trial courts finding of competence was clearly supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at pp. 125-135.)
As the pertinent question on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the trial courts finding of mental incompetence, we note that each case must be determined by its own facts. Hence, the fact that defendant in our case displays a similar mental disorder as that of the Lawley defendant is irrelevant. In the present case, unlike Lawley, both expert witnesses concluded that defendant had deep-seated paranoid beliefs that, in fact, interfered with his ability to assist his attorney in a rational manner. We are compelled to conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial courts finding based on the record before us.
APPOINTMENT OF ONE EXPERT TO EVALUATE COMPETENCY
Defendant next contends the trial court committed reversible error in only appointing one expert, Dr. Robert Perez, to evaluate his competency prior to his competency hearing. He argues the courts failure to do so is jurisdictional and requires per se reversal.
Penal Code section 1369 provides, in pertinent part: "A trial by court or jury of the question of mental competence shall proceed in the following order: [¶] (a) The court shall appoint a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist, and any other expert the court may deem appropriate, to examine the defendant. In any case where the defendant or the defendants counsel informs the court that the defendant is not seeking a finding of mental incompetence, the court shall appoint two psychiatrists, licensed psychologists, or a combination thereof. . . ."
After determining that there was substantial evidence of defendants incompetence, the trial court suspended criminal proceedings and transferred the matter to department 24 for the competency hearing. Neither defendant nor his attorney expressly told the court that defendant was not seeking a finding of mental incompetence, although defendant asserted that he objected to the proceeding as a pretense to cover up the falsification of a document by the government. The trial court, in department 24, appointed Dr. Robert Perez to examine defendant. Defendant continued to voice his objection to the proceedings as a conspiracy to cover up government malfeasance. As stated above, when Dr. Perez attempted to interview defendant in the main jail facility, defendant refused to speak to him. No other psychiatrist or psychologist was appointed to evaluate defendant. The reports of Dr. Echeandia, Dr. Echols and Dr. Perez were submitted to the trial court at the competency hearing without objection by defendant or his attorneys.
Assuming defendants objection to the proceedings as a cover up was tantamount to informing the court that he was not seeking a finding of mental incompetence, defendant may not take advantage of the failure of the court to appoint a second psychiatrist or psychologist prior to the competency hearing. First, defendant made no objection to the issue of his competence being submitted to the court based on the previous mental health reports along with his own testimony. Further, he adamantly refused to be interviewed by the one psychologist appointed by the court to examine him. Appointing a second psychologist or psychiatrist would have been a futile act. Any alleged violation of procedures specified in Penal Code section 1369 were invited by defendant and clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
"[T]he doctrine of invited error operates to estop a party from asserting an error when the partys own conduct has induced its commission [citation], and from claiming to have been denied a fair trial by circumstances of the partys own making [citation]." (People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1031-1032; see also People v. Grieg (1939) 14 Cal.2d 548, 558-560 [failure to follow statutory rules regarding order of proof under Penal Code section 1369 harmless error].)
People v. Castro (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1402 is factually distinguishable and not controlling in this case. In Castro, the defendant was developmentally disabled. Despite her attorneys request to appoint the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled to examine defendant prior to her competency trial pursuant to the directives of Penal Code, section 1369, subdivision (a), the trial court refused. Although defendant therein was examined by several other psychologists, the Castro court held the failure of the court to appoint the director and consider the directors report affected the fundamental integrity of the court proceedings and the courts determination that defendant was competent was reversible per se. (Id. at pp. 1418-1419.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: PREMO, ACTING P.J. and ELIA, J.