Opinion
C097898
04-19-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEPHANIE ANN CHITWOOD, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CRF2200505
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
A jury found defendant Stephanie Ann Chitwood guilty of eight counts of animal cruelty. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the law in denying her motion in limine to limit expert testimony; and (2) the trial court erred in denying her request to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant lived on an approximately 2.45-acre property, which she intended to be an animal sanctuary and small farm. When she moved to the property she owned a couple of cows, a ram, a sheep, and horses, and she continued to take in "animal[s] . . . if [they were] going to be sent off to slaughter."
During a welfare check of the property, in response to a report of animal neglect, an animal care services manager from the Yuba County Sheriff's Department, Animal Care Services Division observed a dead horse in the rear of the property; three cows, a ram, a horse, and chickens in the front yard; trash strewn about the front yard; and an odor of feces and urine emitting from the front yard. The property was flooded, with mud in the front yard and standing water on the west side of the property. In speaking with the animal care services manager, defendant claimed she had special permission from code enforcement to have all the animals on the property. Defendant also reported that there were no food sources on the property because she was waiting on her stimulus check to buy hay to feed the animals. Defendant refused an offer made by animal care services to surrender the animals. Based on the animals' living conditions on the property, the lack of any nutritional food source for the animals, and the dead horse on the property, the animal care services manager contacted the Yuba County Sheriff's Department to report her findings.
Two days later, a warrant was executed on defendant's property. Officers found dogs, a duck, two cats, a goat, cows, pigs, chickens, three sheep, a ram, and horses (one dead) in various locations throughout defendant's property. Officers found loose pigs, cats, and a dog inside defendant's home, which was cluttered, full of trash, and smelled of urine and feces. Underneath the piles of debris in defendant's home, officers found dogs and rabbits in cages filled with large amounts of feces. No animal had food or water in its cage, and deputies found only one small bag of dog food on the property.
At the time of the warrant execution, the county was under a state of emergency related to substantial rain and flooding affecting 19 counties in total. There was approximately six to 12 inches of mud and standing water in defendant's backyard, with no drainage points, sandbags, or shavings to prevent or reduce the flooding. The surrounding properties did not have comparable flooding. Defendant reported there had been a parvovirus infestation on the property and she was concerned that it may come back due the flooding. Nevertheless, there was no outdoor shelter in the backyard to protect the animals. Nor was there any food or drinkable water in the backyard for the approximately 24 to 25 animals found there. In all, animal care services seized 61 animals and one dead horse from the property.
Parvovirus is an infectious virus that is highly contagious and can cause severe illness or death in dogs. It is spread by contact with contaminated feces and can survive in wet conditions. (Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2003) p. 904, col. 2.)
After removal of the animals from defendant's property, the prosecution charged defendant with 11 counts of animal cruelty (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (b)).
After the seizure, veterinarians Dr. Alana Colleen McQuarry and Dr. Leonard Wayne Wulf examined all the animals seized from defendant's property and testified at trial about their observations and opinions based on their respective examinations. Multiple animals were underweight and some were exposed to parasites and had dermatitis as a result. Of the 12 dogs removed from the property, Dr. McQuarry found at least half were dangerously underweight and at risk of dying. Dr. McQuarry testified it could take a minimum of a couple "weeks and more likely months and sometimes even years" for dogs to exhibit the type of general muscle wasting she encountered during the examinations. One dog had painful masses in her mammary glands that would lead to death if not removed. Animal care services euthanized another dog suffering from intestinal lymphoma, which could have been treated if the dog had been taken to regular veterinarian visits.
Dr. McQuarry testified the cats, goat, cows, pigs, and duck were too thin and that the duck had a broken humerus bone that required amputation. The sheep were underweight and had to have their tails amputated due to infections from improper care, which could have been prevented with daily care. One rabbit had a malocclusion that caused one incisor to puncture into the rabbit's tongue, which can cause chronic pain and malnutrition. Dr. McQuarry testified that a rabbit with that condition should be seen regularly by a veterinarian.
The living horse was approximately 150 to 200 pounds underweight and starving, a condition that usually takes three weeks to occur. Dr. Wulf ruled out any diseases or infections that would have caused the thinness. Excluding the dog that animal care services euthanized and the dead horse, each animal's condition improved after being provided basic food, shelter, cleaning, and care.
At trial, both experts specifically testified on the issue of animal abuse. The prosecution asked Dr. Wulf the following:
"Q. Okay. You've talked about some possible causes of this thinness on crossexamination. Is it also consistent with abuse based on your training and experience?
"A. Abuse in what way?
"Q. In not being fed?
"A. That is how most of our starvation cases occur. They don't get enough feed." On cross-examination defense counsel asked Dr. McQuarry about the rabbit's condition, as follows:
"Q. So it is not necessarily something that is the result of neglect, it can be a birth defect?
"A. Well, the neglect part is that these teeth were markedly overgrown and actually causing lesions to her tongue. And so certainly, even if the insighting [sic] problem, which is my teeth are growing abnormally, was not a result of neglect or abuse, it is something that needs to be taken care of and needs to be addressed regularly.
"Q. So I guess what you are referring to is the failure to remedy the situation?
"A. Certainly."
A jury found defendant guilty of eight counts. The trial court dismissed two counts on its own motion and granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss a third count. It then sentenced defendant to four years eight months; imposing a split sentence of 60 days to be served in local confinement with the remainder of the sentence to be served on mandatory supervision.
DISCUSSION
I
Expert Testimony
Defendant moved in limine to exclude expert opinion testimony "regarding whether or not [defendant] [was] guilty of animal abuse," on the basis that such testimony would be highly prejudicial and have little probative value pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. She contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion in limine to preclude this expert testimony. Defendant claims, as a result of the trial court's ruling, the veterinarians' testimony embraced the ultimate issue in the case, which unduly prejudiced defendant. We conclude the trial court did not err in permitting the expert testimony.
We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1449.) Although a trial court has broad discretion when ruling on an in limine motion to exclude evidence, a trial court abuses its discretion if it bases its ruling on a misinterpretation of applicable law. (Katiuzhinsky v. Perry (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1294.)
A trial court has discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to "exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." (Evid. Code, § 352.)" 'Expert opinion testimony is admissible only if it is "[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact." '" (People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 425-426, quoting People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 692; Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) The pertinent question in allowing expert opinion testimony is whether, even if the jurors have some knowledge of the subject matter, the testimony would assist them. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 45; accord, People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1222; People v. Tran (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 171, 186.) "A consistent line of authority in California as well as other jurisdictions holds a witness cannot express an opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of the defendant.... [T]he reason for employing this rule is not because guilt is the 'ultimate issue of fact' to be decided by the jury. Opinion testimony often goes to the ultimate issue in the case. [Citation.] Rather, opinions on guilt or innocence are inadmissible because they are of no assistance to the trier of fact. To put it another way, the trier of fact is as competent as the witness to weigh the evidence and draw a conclusion on the issue of guilt." (People v. Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37, 46-47.)
The trial court initially ruled that it would "preclude experts from being asked the question: Is this abuse?" and granted defendant's motion. Prior to trial, however, relying on People v. Mendibles (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1277, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229 and In re Cheryl H. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 1098, abrogated on other grounds in People v. Brown (1994) 8 Cal.4th 746, the trial court reversed its decision and denied the motion. It relied on Cheryl H. for the proposition that a psychiatrist can testify that a child has been abused based on the doctor's observations of the child during play therapy. (Cheryl H., at pp. 1116-1117.) The trial court also stated Mendibles held that "a doctor can provide a medical opinion that a child has been abused" based on the observation of the victim's physical injuries. (See Mendibles, at p. 1292; Simons, Cal. Evidence Manual (2024) § 4:13.) It expounded that an expert may provide an opinion on the ultimate issue of a case, as long as it does not invade the province of the jury. The trial court found that Mendibles and Cheryl H. are "controlling on the issue of whether or not the doctor's opinion can include the word 'abuse'" because "the doctor's opinion would not depriv[e] the jury of deciding all the elements of the crime charged."
Defense counsel argued that the two cases could be distinguished from the present case because those cases dealt with child sexual abuse and not animal abuse. Counsel further argued that behavioral and physical observations in the cases cited by the trial court could only indicate abuse, whereas the animals could have exhibited signs of starvation as a result of something other than abuse, such as illness.
Defendant mischaracterizes both Mendibles and Cheryl H., claiming the trial court abused its discretion because it misinterpreted these cases. Defendant contends that Mendibles does not apply because the issue in that case related to whether to allow an expert to testify based on a new examination technique. We disagree with defendant's limited interpretation of Mendibles. In Mendibles, the trial court allowed a medical expert to offer opinion testimony based on information gathered when the expert conducted a physical examination of the victim. (People v. Mendibles, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1295-1298.) The court in Cheryl H. also held that expert opinion testimony about whether a child has been sexually abused is similar to "battered child syndrome" testimony, which was based on the observation of a victim's physical injuries. (In re Cheryl H., supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 1116.)
Expert opinion testimony in a child sexual abuse case, based on an examination of the victim's physical injuries, is analogous to a veterinarian's examination of an animal's physical injuries in an animal cruelty case.
Both experts personally examined the animals and provided opinion testimony regarding the nature of the physical injuries to the animals. This testimony was based on their respective experience and examination of the animals. Dr. Wulf concluded the horse's thinness was consistent with abuse due to neglect. Dr. McQuarry concluded that the failure to provide a rabbit with regular dental care to remedy overgrown teeth can be a form of neglect.
Neither expert said that defendant was guilty of animal cruelty. Rather, they testified that the nature of the physical injuries observed in certain animals was consistent with abuse or neglect. This evidence did not invade the province of the jury and was relevant to assist the jury in determining whether defendant was guilty of animal cruelty. (People v. Torres, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 46-47; People v. Lowe (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 678, 684.) The trial court properly applied Mendibles and Cheryl H., which are part of a" 'long line of California decisions' that an expert medical witness is qualified 'to give an opinion of the cause of a particular injury on the basis of the expert's deduction from the appearance of the injury itself.'" (People v. Mendibles, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at p. 1293; accord, In re Cheryl H., supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 1116.)
Defendant also argues that unlike child sexual abuse, there is no specialized knowledge required to determine whether an animal is abused. Again, we disagree. The experts' testimony as to the animals' physical conditions, potential causes of those conditions, and the time necessary for those conditions to develop was based on their training and experience that was sufficiently beyond common experience to assist the jury in understanding the nature of the various animals' injuries. (Evid. Code, § 801.)
Contrary to defendant's claim, the probative value of this testimony outweighed any prejudicial effect. Expert opinion testimony regarding the nature of an animal's injury in an animal cruelty case is highly probative because it addresses the ultimate issue in the case. Evidence is not unduly prejudicial only because it tends to inculpate defendant or cast her in a bad light. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 50.) Although both experts offered testimony that embraced the ultimate issue in the case, neither expert expressed any opinion regarding defendant's guilt. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion in limine.
II
Defense of Necessity
Defendant also claims the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity. Defendant contends the flooding on her property constituted an emergency that necessitated her bringing the dogs into her house to prevent them from being further exposed to parvovirus. She also claims that she had no other legal alternative to care for the animals and in good faith believed her actions were objectively reasonable.
After completion of both cases-in-chief, defense counsel requested that the trial court give a jury instruction on the defense of necessity. In support of the request, counsel argued that defendant presented evidence of flooding on her property and the existence of an emergency order from the Governor of California related to precipitation and flooding in several counties to demonstrate that the flooding on defendant's property created an emergency. Counsel asserted that defendant was unaware of the lack of drainage on her property and her lack of notice contributed to the flooding on the property, which created an emergency. Defendant also argued that because of the problem with parvovirus present in the ground, she had no choice but to put the dogs inside.
The prosecutor argued it was not reasonable that the parvovirus issue justified a jury instruction on the defense of necessity because defendant brought four more dogs to the property after one dog had already died from parvovirus.
The trial court denied defendant's request, finding there was not substantial evidence to support a necessity instruction. It found that several of the problems on the property were brought about by defendant's conduct, defendant did not mitigate the parvovirus issue on the property, and she continued to take in animals. The trial court also found that flooding on defendant's property did not constitute an emergency. It noted that despite the standing water and flooding on defendant's property, officers were able to drive up to defendant's property, walk on the property, had no problem removing the animals, and no other neighboring properties suffered flooding despite the county being under a state of emergency.
We review defendant's claims of instructional error de novo to determine whether substantial evidence to support the defense existed. (People v. Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978, 990; People v. Shelmire (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1054.) A trial court is required to give a requested jury instruction concerning a defense only if there is substantial evidence to support the defense. (Shelmire, at p. 1054.) In determining whether there is substantial evidence to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of the defendant's evidence, but only whether there was sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt, if accepted by the jury. (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982.)
"To justify an instruction on the defense of necessity, there must be evidence sufficient to establish that defendant violated the law (1) to prevent a significant evil, (2) with no adequate alternative, (3) without creating a greater danger than the one avoided, (4) with a good faith belief in the necessity, (5) with such belief being objectively reasonable, and (6) under circumstances in which he or [she] did not substantially contribute to the emergency." (People v. Pepper (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1035; see also CALCRIM No. 3403.) "[D]efendant has the burden of establishing the defense of necessity by a preponderance of the evidence." (People v. Waters (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 935, 937; CALCRIM No. 3403.)
Defendant's argument is fatal for at least the lack of evidence establishing the objective reasonableness element. Even if there was an emergency on defendant's property, and she had a good faith belief in the necessity to act in the manner she did, the belief must have been objectively reasonable. Defendant asserts on this point: "A reasonable person with animals on a flooded property that could not be moved would have taken the same actions [defendant] had taken." But this is unsupported supposition. Defendant points to no evidence in the record supporting this assertion, nor are we able to locate any in our own review. There was no evidence, for example, that another animal owner with similar flooding would have believed it necessary to treat the animals in the abject manner defendant did. And it was defendant's burden to provide sufficient evidence to justify this affirmative defense.
Instead, there was evidence countering her claim of objective reasonableness. The various medical conditions suffered by the animals-i.e., generalized muscle wasting and other medical conditions-developed over significant periods of time that predated both the flooding isolated to defendant's property and the effective date of the state of emergency.
Defendant also had several legal alternatives at her disposal to care for the animals. Defendant refused an opportunity to surrender the animals to animal care services. She could have taken the animals to a veterinarian or had a veterinarian come out to her property to care for the animals. Defendant could have washed the feces-covered animals regularly, put out sandbags or shavings to dry out the land, provided the animals with antiflea medicine, or provided an outdoor shelter space for the animals. Defendant instead deprived her animals of food, water, and outdoor shelter and left the animals to live in their own feces.
With the lack of evidence supporting objective reasonableness, and contrary evidence establishing unreasonableness, no jury could conclude defendant's actions were objectively reasonable. Accordingly, there was not sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on the defense of necessity.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur DUARTE, J., KRAUSE, J.