Opinion
July 13, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aiello, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We reject the defendant's contention that because of his low level of intelligence, he was unable to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights before giving the statements that were introduced into evidence. The defendant's own expert testified that he was able to understand the immediate meaning of the warnings (see, People v. Williams, 62 N.Y.2d 285, 287; People v. Avilez, 121 A.D.2d 391, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 767; People v. Dorsey, 118 A.D.2d 653, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 1052). Nor was any evidence adduced at the suppression hearing to support the defendant's contention that his statements were the product of coercion or the promise of leniency in exchange for cooperation (cf., People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35; People v Urowsky, 89 A.D.2d 520). Moreover, the defendant was not arrested in his home and the evidence presented only indicated that the defendant was arrested at the apartment of an acquaintance where he may have slept on the night preceding his arrest. This evidence, without more, was insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy (see, People v. Scott, 124 A.D.2d 684, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 833; People v. De Moss, 106 A.D.2d 395, 398). There is no merit to the defendant's contention that the marital privilege (CPLR 4502 [b]) should have attached to communications made to his girlfriend prior to their marriage. Finally, the sentence imposed was not unduly harsh or excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Niehoff, J.P., Lawrence, Weinstein, and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.