Green, 42 Ill.2d at 556. Other cases relied upon by defendant include: People v. Childress, 276 Ill. App.3d 402, 657 N.E.2d 1180 (1995); People v. Young, 207 Ill. App.3d 130, 565 N.E.2d 309 (1990); People v. Washington, 195 Ill. App.3d 520, 552 N.E.2d 1067 (1990); and People v. Koss, 52 Ill. App.3d 605, 367 N.E.2d 1040 (1977). Our examination of Childress, Young, Washington, and Koss indicates that these cases are relevant and instructive.
In Illinois, the constitutional right to counsel includes the right to be represented by retained counsel of one's choice, but that right is not absolute. See People v. Childress, 276 Ill. A pp. 3d 402, 410, 657 N.E.2d 1180, 1186 (1st Dist. 1995); People v. Little, 207 Ill. A pp. 3d 720, 723, 566 N.E.2d 365, 367 (1st Dist. 1990). Instead, the court must balance the right of a defendant to choose his or her counsel against the public need for efficient and effective administration of justice.
Specifically, defendant claims he unequivocally stated he did not want Harmon to represent him, and nothing indicated defendant sought a continuance in an attempt to manipulate the court system. In support of his contention the trial court should have granted his motion to continue, defendant cites People v. Bingham, 364 Ill.App.3d 642, 301 Ill.Dec. 893, 847 N.E.2d 903 (2006), People v. Childress, 276 Ill.App.3d 402, 212 Ill.Dec. 835, 657 N.E.2d 1180 (1995), and People v. Little, 207 Ill.App.3d 720, 152 Ill.Dec. 678, 566 N.E.2d 365 (1990). ¶ 48 A criminal defendant's right to counsel of choice is constitutionally protected.
Therefore, the trial court may consider the defendant's reasons for seeking new counsel, whether the request is merely a guise to thwart effective prosecution, whether the defendant has cooperated with current counsel, and the length of time the defendant has been represented by current counsel. Id.; see also People v. Childress, 276 Ill.App.3d 402, 411, 212 Ill.Dec. 835, 657 N.E.2d 1180 (1995). A trial court's decision on a motion to substitute is subject to review for an abuse of discretion.
Under these circumstances, the court did not act arbitrarily in denying the defendant's request for a continuance so that he could attempt to hire Williams. ¶ 17 Although the defendant contends that his argument is a due process claim that is subject to de novo review, he cites in support of his argument several cases in which circuit courts were found to have abused their discretion in denying continuances to newly-hired attorneys to give them time to prepare (People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 39; People v. Childress, 276 Ill.App.3d 402, 410 (1995)) and to a defendant whose newly-hired attorney was not in court (People v. Little, 207 Ill.App.3d 720, 727-28 (1990)). These cases all occurred at the trial level rather than in postconviction proceedings and involved the sixth amendment right to counsel rather than the due process right to obtain privately-retained counsel.
That is what occurred here. ¶ 22 The facts support reversal more strongly than the facts in People v. Childress , 276 Ill. App. 3d 402, 212 Ill.Dec. 835, 657 N.E.2d 1180 (1995). There, a private defense attorney appeared on the day of trial and sought leave to file an appearance.
Therefore, the inquiry is whether petitioner was prevented from being represented by counsel of his own choosing, and not the quality of representation he actually received at trial. See People v. Childress, 276 Ill.App.3d 402, 413, 212 Ill.Dec. 835, 657 N.E.2d 1180 (1995) (holding that a showing of prejudice is not necessary to establish a violation of the right to counsel of choice). ¶ 33 Petitioner argues he made a substantial showing he was denied his sixth amendment right to counsel of choice when the State and his defense counsel, Mr. Howard, misinformed him on the first day of trial about the extent of Mr. Howard's pending disciplinary problems.
The right to choice of counsel is limited when abused, such as through " ‘ attempts to thwart, delay, or embarrass the effective administration of justice,’ " or " ‘ when a conflict of interest might arise.’ " People v. Childress, 276 Ill.App.3d 402, 410, 212 Ill.Dec. 835, 657 N.E.2d 1180 (1995), quoting People v. Young, 207 Ill.App.3d 130, 133-34, 152 Ill.Dec. 67, 565 N.E.2d 309 (1990). But the trial court must specifically make such a finding.
We have described a defendant's right to counsel of choice as "an absolute right" and explained that the right is only to be limited "when abused," such as to thwart or delay the administration of justice. People v. Childress, 276 Ill.App.3d 402, 410 (1995) (quoting People v. Young, 207 Ill.App.3d 130, 133-34 (1990)).
A trial court's decision to grant or deny the continuance will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion (People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 245 (2000)), which occurs only when the decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or so unreasonable that no reasonable person could agree with it (People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 434 (2001)). ¶ 35 Factors that a reviewing court considers in evaluating a trial court's judgment regarding substitute counsel include: (1) whether the defendant's request is a guise to delay the 17 proceedings; (2) whether the defendant articulated an "acceptable reason" for wanting new counsel; (3) the length of current counsel's representation; and (4) whether substitute counsel is ready, willing, and able to begin representing the defendant. People v. Childress, 276 Ill. App. 3d 402, 411 (1995). A trial court generally does not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance when substitute counsel is either not willing or not ready to represent the defendant without delay.