Opinion
2004-1437 N CR.
Decided January 6, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Edward Maron, J.), rendered September 8, 2004. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of driving while intoxicated, speeding and disorderly conduct.
Judgment of conviction unanimously affirmed.
PRESENT: RUDOLPH, P.J., ANGIOLILLO and McCABE, JJ
Except for those rare instances where the recitation of facts cast a significant doubt upon a defendant's guilt of the crime in issue, or call into question the voluntariness of the plea, it is incumbent upon defendant, in order to challenge the sufficiency of a plea allocution, to bring either a motion to withdraw the plea (CPL 220.60; 340.20 [1]) or a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction in accordance with CPL 440.10 ( see People v. Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 665; see also People v. Marin, NYLJ, May 7, 2001 [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists]). In the case at bar, defendant did not make any statements during the recitation of the facts which would have either cast a significant doubt upon his guilt or call into question the voluntariness of the plea ( see People v. Lopez, 71 NY2d at 666). In fact, the record contains an affirmative showing that the plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered ( Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US 238; see also People v. MacLeay, 233 AD2d 529, lv denied 89 NY2d 987). In view of the foregoing, the plea satisfied the standard of representing "a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to the defendant" ( North Carolina v. Alford, 400 US 25, 31; see also People v. Harris, 61 NY2d 9). In addition, defendant was represented by counsel and entered into a negotiated plea agreement.