Opinion
C078368
06-29-2021
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SOPHA CHEA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 14F4559
MURRAY, ACTING P. J.
Defendant was convicted, upon his guilty plea, of infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant with a prior conviction for the same offense. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subds. (a) and (f).) As part of the negotiated disposition, the parties agreed that, at sentencing, the trial court would determine whether defendant's prior conviction of grand theft firearm, section 487, subdivision (d)(2), continued to be a strike (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 1192.7, subd. (c)(26)) after the enactment of Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47). Under the agreement, regardless of the trial court's determination, the court would sentence defendant to an aggregate term of five years. At the subsequent proceeding, the trial court granted defendant's request pursuant to Proposition 47 to redesignate his prior conviction of grand theft firearm as misdemeanor petty theft, but ruled that, although it had redesignated the conviction a misdemeanor, it remained a qualifying prior strike conviction for purposes of the Three Strikes law. Consistent with the negotiated agreement, the court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of five years in state prison.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code in effect at the time of the charged offenses.
On November 8, 2016, the voters approved of Proposition 63, the Safety for All Act of 2016, in which the voters made grand theft firearm a felony offense once again. Among other things, Proposition 63 added subdivision (c) to section 490.2. That subdivision reads: “This section shall not apply to theft of a firearm.” Thus, once the voters approved Proposition 63, theft of a firearm again became a felony regardless of the value of the firearm. (§§ 487, subd. (d)(2), 489, subd. (a).) However, this provision was not in effect at the times relevant here.
On appeal, defendant's sole contention is that the trial court erred in concluding his prior conviction constituted a strike conviction after it was redesignated a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47.
While this appeal was pending, defendant was released from prison and, according to his attorney's representations, he is no longer serving any form of postrelease supervision. Defendant's attorney further avers that any remaining fines, other than restitution fines, “are no longer considered collectable or owed, ” and “any excess custody credits may not be used to reduce or satisfy his restitution fines.” Because a ruling here would have no practical effect and could not provide defendant with any form of effective relief, we shall dismiss the appeal as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Our summary of the facts is derived from the preliminary hearing transcript.
On May 9, 2014, defendant entered his estranged wife's home without her permission. When she later returned with the couple's children, defendant grabbed her face and throat, forced her to the ground and, while on top of her, forcefully rubbed her face on the kitchen floor. The children screamed and cried for defendant to stop hurting their mother. Defendant eventually stopped assaulting her, took her cell phone, and left. Defendant had sustained a prior domestic violence conviction in May 2011.
By consolidated information, defendant was charged with infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant with a prior domestic violence conviction (§ 273.5, subds. (a) and (f); count 1); robbery in the second degree (§ 211; count 2); two counts of child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (b); counts 3 & 4); battery (§ 242; count 5); and first degree residential burglary (§ 459; count 6). The information further alleged defendant was previously convicted of grand theft firearm (§ 487, subd. (d)(2)), a prior strike conviction within the meaning of section 1170.12, and a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Additionally, the information alleged defendant had served three prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
After the jury trial began, defendant agreed to plead guilty to count 1, infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant with a prior domestic violence conviction (§ 273.5, subds. (a), (f)), and admitted to having served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the remaining counts and allegations would be dismissed with the exception of the strike allegation. Defendant waived jury trial on the strike allegation and agreed with the prosecution to present arguments in writing as to whether his prior conviction of grand theft firearm qualified for redesignation as a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47 for all purposes and whether it therefore could no longer be considered a strike conviction. Defendant and the prosecution also stipulated to a prison sentence of five years, regardless how the court ruled on the viability of his prior strike conviction.
At the next hearing, defendant appeared before the trial court for three matters: trial on whether he had sustained a prior strike conviction, a hearing and decision on defendant's application to redesignate the prior grand theft firearm conviction a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, and judgment and sentencing on the instant case. First, the trial court granted defendant's request, pursuant to Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18, subds. (f), (g)), to redesignate the prior grand theft firearm conviction (§ 487, subd. (d)(2)) as misdemeanor petty theft (§ 490.2). Next, the trial court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant had sustained that prior conviction. The trial court then denied defendant's motion to dismiss the strike allegation, rejecting defendant's contention that, because the prior conviction had been redesignated a misdemeanor, it no longer qualified as a strike conviction.
The trial court sentenced defendant to the agreed-upon term of five years, calculated as follows: the lower term of two years for his conviction of infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant with a prior conviction for the same offense (§ 273.5, subds. (a), (f)), doubled pursuant to section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1), based on the prior strike conviction, plus a one-year enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), for a prior prison term. Although the trial court selected the low term, it stated that, in the event its determination that defendant's prior conviction remained a strike was reversed on appeal, on remand, it would impose the midterm of four years, plus a consecutive one-year sentence for the prior prison term enhancement, so the aggregate sentence would remain five years.
DISCUSSION
While this appeal was pending, defendant was released from prison. On March 4, 2019, citing section 2900.5, defendant requested that, if we were to rule in his favor, “any additional credits he should have received, as a result of the striking of this enhancement, which striking would have allowed him additional good time credits, be applied to reduce any period of parole or other community supervision, if he has any remaining, and to satisfy any fines that were ordered in the case.” Subsequently, we requested supplemental briefing from the parties addressing whether, in light of defendant's release from prison, and taking into consideration his status with regard to parole or any form of community supervision, there was any reason defendant's appeal should not be dismissed as moot. In supplemental briefing, counsel for defendant advised that defendant was actually released from all supervision on February 25, 2019. Both parties agreed the appeal may properly be dismissed as moot.
“ ‘As a general rule, an appellate court only decides actual controversies. It is not the function of the appellate court to render opinions “ ‘ “ ‘upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or... declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.' ”' ” [Citation.] “[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.”' ” (People v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306, 321, quoting People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1380.)
As noted, both parties agree this matter can be dismissed as moot. We agree.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur: DUARTE, J., RENNER, J.