Opinion
G062568
01-29-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SANTIAGO CHAVEZ CHAVIRA, Defendant and Appellant.
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, and A. Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 22CF3771 Michael A. Leversen, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, and A. Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
A jury convicted appellant Santiago Chavez Chavira of several offenses, including misdemeanor aggravated trespass of a dwelling under Penal Code section 602.5, subdivision (b) and felony vandalism under section 594, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). The trial court placed him on formal probation for three years. On appeal, he argues the length of his probation term should be reduced from three to two years because the maximum probation term for his felony vandalism conviction is only two years. To support his argument, appellant points to Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (AB No. 1950), which limited the maximum probation term to two years for most felonies and one year for most misdemeanors. But AB No. 1950 also provides for certain exceptions, one of which applies here. Specifically, appellant does not address the fact that he also was convicted of misdemeanor aggravated trespass, which expressly allows for a probation term up to three years. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 8, 2023, the district attorney filed an amended, consolidated information that charged appellant with 10 counts. As the only issue on this appeal involves the length of appellant's probation term, this opinion does not detail the underlying facts, which relate to appellant trespassing on his sister's property and committing vandalism.
Following trial, a jury convicted appellant on count one for felony vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a) &(b)(1)) and count three for misdemeanor aggravated trespass of a dwelling (§ 602.5, subd. (b)). The jury determined appellant not guilty on counts two and four, but found him guilty of the lesser included offenses for misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health &Saf. Code, § 11377) and misdemeanor aggravated trespass of a dwelling (§ 602.5, subd. (b)). The jury found appellant not guilty on counts six through ten, and the court dismissed count five after the jury was not able to reach a verdict on it.
The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on formal probation for three years. Among other conditions, the trial court ordered him to serve 360 days in county jail and awarded credit for time served. When defense counsel inquired about the length of the probation term, the trial court cited how section 602.5, subdivision (b) calls for up to three years of probation. It denied defense counsel's request for a two-year term instead.
DISCUSSION
This appeal raises a single issue: whether appellant's three-year probation term should have been limited to two years because that is the maximum probation term for his felony vandalism conviction. Effective January 1, 2021, AB No. 1950 amended sections 1203.1 and 1203a to limit the length of probation terms for most felonies and misdemeanors. (People v. Kite (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 986, 992.) Section 1203.1 now provides the length of felony probation is generally limited to two years, and section 1203a now provides the length of misdemeanor probation is generally limited to one year. (§§ 1203.1, 1203a.) But there are certain statutory exceptions permitting longer probation terms. "Whether [appellant's] case falls within one of these exemptions presents an issue of statutory interpretation for our independent review." (People v. Saxton (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 428, 431 (Saxton).) Relevant here, both section 1203.1 and section 1203a state their respective two- and one-year maximum probation terms do not apply to an "offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions." (§§ 1203.1, subd. (1)(1), 1203a, subd. (b).)
According to appellant, his felony vandalism conviction under section 594, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), does not fall within one of the exceptions to the two-year maximum probation term in section 1203.1, and thus, his maximum probation term should be two years. The Attorney General does not dispute that the probation term for appellant's felony vandalism conviction generally would be limited to two years. But that does not end the inquiry because appellant also was convicted of misdemeanor aggravated trespass under section 602.5, subdivision (b), which the Attorney General contends permits the trial court to impose a three-year probation term.
As noted above, section 1203a contains an exception providing the one-year maximum probation term for misdemeanors does not apply for an "offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions." (§ 1203a, subd. (b).) Here, appellant was convicted for misdemeanor aggravated trespass under section 602.5, subdivision (b), and importantly, section 602.5, subdivision (c), expressly provides, "[i]f the court grants probation, it may order a person convicted of a misdemeanor under subdivision (b) up to three years of supervised probation." Thus, the trial court did not err in placing appellant on probation for three years because appellant's conviction for misdemeanor aggravated trespass falls within the exception of an offense that included specific probation lengths within its provisions.
Appellant relies on People v. Faial (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 738, review granted May 18, 2022, S273840, which is inapposite. That case addressed whether AB No. 1950 applied retroactively to the defendant's circumstances, not whether there was a misdemeanor conviction that included specific probation lengths within its provisions. (Id. at pp. 742-747.) Saxton, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 428, is more helpful. There, the defendant was convicted of both a felony that was not exempt from the two-year limit and a misdemeanor that was exempt from the one-year limit. (Id. at p. 432.) Saxton held the trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant to three years of formal probation as required by the misdemeanor at issue there. (Ibid.) As Saxton reasoned, "a defendant who is convicted of both a misdemeanor exempt from Assembly Bill 1950's probation term limits and a nonexempt felony can be ordered to serve a term of formal probation equal to the length of time specified by the exempt misdemeanor." (Id. at p. 431.) That reasoning applies here. Appellant was convicted of an exempt misdemeanor and a nonexempt felony, and thus, the trial court did not err in sentencing appellant to a probation term permitted under the exempt misdemeanor here - i.e., three years.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: MOTOIKE, J. DELANEY, J.