Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Ventura, Super. Ct. No. 2008011699, Bruce A. Clark, Judge
Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GILBERT, P.J.
The sole question here is whether a juvenile adjudication can constitute a "strike" within the meaning of the three strikes law. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) Our Supreme Court recently held in People v. Nguyen (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1007 that a juvenile adjudication can constitute a strike. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
Michael Anthony Chavez pled no contest to making a criminal threat in violation of Penal Code section 422. He demurred to the allegation that a prior juvenile adjudication for robbery constitutes a strike within the meaning of the three strikes law. The trial court overruled the demurrer and found the prior strike allegation to be true. The court imposed a two-year prison term for the criminal threat, doubled to four years for the prior strike.
DISCUSSION
Chavez contends the use of his prior juvenile adjudication to enhance his sentence violates his due process rights and his right to a jury trial.
Chavez points out he was not entitled to a jury trial in the juvenile court proceedings in which he was adjudged to have committed robbery. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702.) He also points out that under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, except for the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that allows enhancement of an adult defendant's punishment for the current offense beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury. Chavez claims that Apprendi's exception to the jury trial rule for prior convictions applies only where the facts of the defendant's prior criminal behavior were found true in a proceeding that included the right to a jury trial. Thus, he believes, the prior conviction exception does not apply to juvenile adjudications.
After Chavez filed his opening brief, our Supreme Court decided Nguyen. There the court rejected the argument that under Apprendi for a prior conviction to be used as a strike, the right to a jury trial on the facts of the prior conviction must attach at some point in the proceedings. (People v. Nguyen, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1019.) The court noted that juvenile proceedings have every substantial safeguard required in an adult criminal trial except the right to a jury. (Ibid.) The court also rejected the notion that a jury is a more fair and reliable finder of fact than a juvenile court judge. (Id. at p. 1020.) Thus, here the trial court did not err in using Chavez's prior juvenile adjudication as a strike.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: COFFEE, J., PERREN, J.