Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. FWV801321. Douglas M. Elwell, Judge. Affirmed.
Thien Huong Tran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST, Acting P. J.
Defendant and appellant Rodolfo Chavez was charged with vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (b), count 1), driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code, § 3153, subd. (a), count 2), and driving with.08 percent blood alcohol level causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b), count 3). With respect to counts 2 and 3, it was alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury and death, within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a), which caused the offenses to become serious felonies within the meaning of section 1192.7, subd. (c)(8). Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to count 2 and admitted the attendant serious felony allegation. The trial court sentenced him to the midterm of two years in state prison on count 2 and stayed the three-year term for the enhancement.{rt 16-17} The court denied defendant’s request to qualify for worktime credit at 50 percent, ruling that section 2933.1 limited his worktime credit to 15 percent.
All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal “based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea.” We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant stipulated to the factual basis when he pled guilty. The following facts are taken from the probation report: Defendant was driving a car with a passenger, after they had consumed beer. Defendant lost control of the car, and it rolled over several times. The passenger died at the scene. Defendant was taken to the hospital by police. His blood was tested and showed.13 percent blood alcohol content, as well as the presence of marijuana.
DISCUSSION
Dependant appealed, and upon his request this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of the case and two potential arguable issues, including: 1) whether defendant’s postsentence credits were limited by section 2933.1; and 2) whether defendant was properly advised of his constitutional rights and consequences of his guilty plea. Counsel has also requested this court to undertake a review of the entire record.
We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which he has done. He submitted two separate handwritten letters. The first letter requested this court to grant him 50 percent credit on his sentence rather than 15 percent. In support of his request, he asserted that: 1) he considered himself to be a helpful member of society; 2) the road he was driving on when the accident occurred was in poor condition, in that there were no street lights and the street signs had graffiti; and 3) the prison systems are overcrowded and the state is in a budget crisis. He admitted that he drank alcohol and drove on the night of the incident but claimed that his blood alcohol level was not over the legal limit. In the second letter, defendant informed this court that he found a case “exactly like [his],” where the defendant received 50 percent custody time. He cited that case as “Jacuinde, Jesus F86577, Case #F07901044, Fresno, CA.”
We reject defendant’s argument. “‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) Here, defendant fails to make any legal argument or cite to any intelligible authority in support of his claim. Thus, his contention is waived. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s claim, the record showed that his blood alcohol level was well over.08 percent. Finally, section 2933.1, subdivision (a) provides that “any person who is convicted of a felony offense listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 shall accrue no more than 15 percent of worktime credit.” The admission of the great bodily injury enhancement “served to recharacterize the substantive offense as a violent felony under section 667.5, subdivision (c)(8). [Citation.]” (In re Pacheco (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1444 (Pacheco).) Section 667.5, subdivision (c)(8) defines “[a]ny felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice which has been charged and proved as provided for in Section 12022.7” as a “violent felony.” Although the court here stayed the three-year term for the great bodily injury enhancement, “[i]t is the conviction, and not the punishment, that is determinative.” (Pacheco, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1444-1445.) Therefore, defendant was only eligible to earn credits at a maximum of 15 percent in accordance with section 2933.1. (Pacheco, supra, at p. 1445.)
We have now concluded our independent review of the record and found no arguable issues.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MCKINSTER, J., RICHLI, J.