Opinion
A149474
07-16-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHARLES CHATMAN III, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCR300690)
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Charles Chatman appeals from a judgment of conviction following a jury verdict finding him guilty of unlawful possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1) and possession of methamphetamine and heroin with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)).
On appeal, Chatman argues that, at his jury trial, the trial court erred in admitting a loaded handgun that supplied the only basis for the prosecution's claim that he was armed and in possession of ammunition. He contends the chain of custody proved up by the prosecution provided an inadequate foundation for admission of the gun. Seeing no merit in this claim of evidentiary error, we affirm.
II. FACTS
On June 18, 2013, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Fairfield Police Officers Steven Garcia and Troy Oliver and Sergeant Becky Belt went to room number 123 at the Fairfield Motel 6. After knocking on the door and announcing their presence, a woman answered the door.
The officers entered the room; Chatman came out of the bathroom. Officer Garcia heard water running in the bathroom. Once in the bathroom, the officer determined the sound was coming from the toilet. He opened the tank cover and found a firearm resting against the interior wall of the toilet tank. A jacket in the room contained clear bags of narcotics.
Fairfield Police Officer William Shaffer, an expert in firearm functioning, went to the Motel 6 and examined the recovered firearm. There were six live .38-caliber shells in the gun: four lead round nose and two hollow point shells. The firearm's serial number was partially obliterated.
III. DISCUSSION
Chatman contends that the trial court erroneously permitted the gun from the Motel 6 room occupied by Chatman to be introduced into evidence. We disagree. The evidentiary link between the gun in the toilet and the gun transported and inspected by Officer Shaffer sufficed to permit the trial court to place it into evidence.
Officer Garcia testified that he observed a gun, a black revolver, in the toilet tank. He identified the gun from a photograph taken of the toilet tank with the gun in it. Officer Garcia "directed Officer Oliver to what [Garcia] had located."
Officer Shaffer, an expert in the functioning of firearms, went to the Fairfield Motel 6 at approximately 12:15 p.m. He met with Officer Oliver who had recovered a firearm he wanted Officer Shaffer to inspect. Officer Shaffer took out the bullets and placed the gun in an evidence envelope.
The defense objected that sufficient chain of custody had not been established. The trial court expressed some concerns regarding the absence of Officer Oliver but determined that there was sufficient evidence to support an adequate chain of custody so as to admit the evidence: "[T]here's a couple of things that I think are significant. First of all, there was testimony that this search began at 11:02. That's the time when the officers were at the door, and there is further testimony that Officer Shaffer arrived at 12:15 about an hour thirteen minutes later in the parking lot of the motel and spoke then with Officer Oliver. [¶] . . . [¶] THE COURT: Well, there was also testimony from Officer Shaffer that came in without objection that he was called there to assist and pick up a firearm that was seized—or, had been seized by Officer Oliver. Um, what I'm indicating here is that after reviewing this testimony, I am rethinking my ruling on disallowing the firearm, Ms. Johnson. I think after reviewing all of this testimony as it is relating specifically to the firearm, I think, um—I don't think it's particularly strong, but I think there probably is sufficient evidence in the record as a foundation for allowing the firearm into evidence."
When physical evidence is offered, the foundation is laid by establishing its chain of custody. The chain of custody is the chain of possession of the evidence to ensure that it has not been tampered with or altered. (People v. Caitlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 134.) When a chain of custody objection is made, " ' "[t]he burden on the party offering the evidence is to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty with which the particular evidence could have been altered, it is reasonably certain that there was no alteration. [¶] The requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when some vital link in the chain of possession is not accounted for, because then it is as likely as not that the evidence analyzed was not the evidence originally received." ' " (Ibid.)
Left to such speculation the court must exclude the evidence. Conversely, when it is the barest speculation that there was tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to its weight. The trial court's exercise of discretion in admitting the evidence is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. (People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 134; see also People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 285 ["any minor defects in the chain of custody go to its weight"].) Not every link in the chain of custody must be established. (Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, 311 fn. 1.) Generally, gaps in the chain of custody go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. (Ibid.) So long as the trial court can be reasonably certain there was no alteration, the evidence is admissible. (People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 580-581, overruled on other grounds in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 651.) Discretion is abused when the trial court's determination is arbitrary or capricious or is not " 'grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.' " (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.)
In this case, the trial court properly admitted the gun over defense counsel's objection because there was no reason to fear it had been tampered with and the trial court could confidently conclude that the gun presented at trial was the same as the one recovered at the crime scene. The gun was recovered at the Fairfield Motel 6 and examined by Officer Shaffer who was summoned to the scene within 75 minutes of the initial police entry into the motel room. A photograph was taken in the motel room of a gun in a toilet tank; Office Garcia directed Officer Oliver to retrieve it; Officer Shaffer then responded to the scene because he had been informed of, among other things, the recovery of a gun by Officer Oliver; and Officer Shaffer proceeded to inspect a gun handed to him by Officer Oliver. There is nothing in the record to suggest or hint at any possibility—beyond sheer speculation—that these officers planted a gun or switched the gun that was found to the one given to Officer Shaffer.
Chatman's reliance on People v. Jimenez (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 75 is misplaced. In Jimenez, a criminalist compared the DNA evidence gathered from the handlebars of a getaway bicycle to the defendant's DNA obtained pursuant to a previous conviction. (Id. at p. 79.) The technician who obtained the sample for the prior conviction did not testify; no one testified as to the processing of the sample, or how it arrived at the Department of Justice laboratory. (Id. at pp. 79-80.) The Court of Appeal found that these omissions required the trier of fact to speculate as to the source of the prior conviction DNA, which obviously called into question the conclusion that the DNA belonged to the defendant. (Id. at p. 80.) The court found the chain of custody to be "woefully inadequate" because "the chain of custody amount[ed] to nothing more than a link here, a link there, with little more than speculation to connect the links into a chain" and "[s]erious questions ar[o]se about what, if anything, the reference sample ha[d] to do with [the defendant]." (Id., at p. 81.) Here, there was no similar need to speculate about the source of the gun. The potential for intermingling of nanoscopic DNA—and the commensurate need for precise handling of samples of it in a laboratory—is worlds away from what it takes to switch a couple of handguns or make one suddenly appear out of nowhere.
In an effort to get around the deference we owe the trial court's assessment of the factual foundation for admission of the gun, Chatman insists the trial court used the wrong legal standard. The trial court evaluated the gaps in time and the two officers' testimony before determining that the prosecution had presented sufficient foundational evidence to permit admission of the gun. We are not convinced that what appears to be some loose phrasing in the court's explanation of factual inferences it drew from the circumstances here betrays some misunderstanding of the applicable law. Appellate courts presume that the superior court is " ' "aware of and followed the applicable law." ' " (See In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499; see also People v. Nance (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1456 [trial court is presumed to have known and applied the correct statutory and case law in the exercise of its official duties]; People v. Castaneda (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 334, 342 ["The trial court is presumed to know and follow the law"].)
Finally, Chatman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that the gun in evidence was the same gun in Chatman's motel room. The trial court's exercise of discretion is based on substantial evidence linking the gun in evidence to the gun in the motel room. Chatman points to the court's initial assessment of the gun's admissibility to support his claim. The trial court expressed dismay at the absence of the investigating officer and did ask the prosecutor, "I mean isn't it reasonable that he might have had another firearm in there." But the court's question here did not constitute a factual finding. In the end, the trial court plainly decided that the prosecution's failure to present Officer Oliver for trial was not so suspicious that it undermined the court's confidence that the gun Officer Shaffer inspected was the same gun that Officer Oliver recovered from the toilet tank. We see no abuse of discretion in its conclusion on that point. Because there was no evidence of tampering or multiple weapons recovered at from the motel room, much less any evidence that any of the officers involved had a history of dishonesty in handling evidence or a motive to frame Chatman, his chain-of-custody objection boiled down to nothing more than conjecture.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
/s/_________
Streeter, Acting P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Reardon, J. /s/_________
Smith, J.
Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. --------