After receiving Miranda warnings, and agreeing to provide a statement to the police, defendant made statements that omitted significant exculpatory matter that he included in his trial testimony. Under the circumstances, this was an unnatural omission, and a permissible basis for impeachment ( see People v. Savage, 50 N.Y.2d 673, 431 N.Y.S.2d 382, 409 N.E.2d 858 [1980], cert. denied449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 577, 66 L.Ed.2d 475 [1980]; People v. Hightower, 237 A.D.2d 166, 654 N.Y.S.2d 759 [1st Dept.1997], lv. denied89 N.Y.2d 1094, 660 N.Y.S.2d 388, 682 N.E.2d 989 [1997]; People v. Foy, 220 A.D.2d 220, 631 N.Y.S.2d 693 [1st Dept.1995], lv. denied87 N.Y.2d 901, 641 N.Y.S.2d 231, 663 N.E.2d 1261 [1995] ).

After receiving Miranda warnings, and agreeing to provide a statement to the police, defendant made statements that omitted significant exculpatory matter that he included in his trial testimony. Under the circumstances, this was an unnatural omission, and a permissible basis for impeachment (see People v Savage , 50 NY2d 673 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1016 [1980]; People v Hightower , 237 AD2d 166 [1st Dept 1997], lv denied 89 NY2d 1094 [1997]; People v Foy , 220 AD2d 220 [1st Dept 1995], lv denied 87 NY2d 901 [1995]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

The People normally would not have been able to elicit testimony indicating that defendant refused to supply a written statement after his mother had invoked his right to remain silent ( see People v Von Werne, 41 NY2d 584, 587-588). By questioning a detective regarding the police department's policy on recording statements, however, defendant opened the door to the prosecution rehabilitating the witness by letting him explain the department's policy to allow a defendant to provide a written statement, that the policy was followed here by offering defendant such an opportunity and that defendant declined ( see People v Hightower, 237 AD2d 166, 166, lv denied 89 NY2d 1094; People v Wolcott, 111 AD2d 513, 514-515). County Court gave prompt and appropriate limiting instructions that defendant had a constitutional right to refuse to give a statement and the testimony was to be used only in evaluating the department's policy, curing any prejudice to defendant ( compare People v Knowles, 42 AD3d 662, 665).

t "defendant, in selling narcotics, was acting `solely on behalf of the buyer such as to be a mere extension or instrumentality of the buyer'" ( People v Magee, 263 AD2d 763, 765, quoting People v Ortiz, 76 NY2d 446, 449, remittitur amended 11 NY2d 821 [1990]; see People v Wilkins, 26 AD3d 754; cf. People v Coleman, 284 AD2d 915). Indeed, defendant lacked any prior relationship with the undercover officer posing as the buyer ( see Wilkins, 26 AD3d at 755, citing People v Herring, 83 NY2d 780, 782-783). Assuming, arguendo, that the defense of temporary innocent possession is applicable to cases involving possession of a controlled substance ( see generally Public Health Law § 3305; People v P.C., 195 Misc 2d 680, 683-686), we conclude that there is no reasonable view of the evidence that supports the inference that defendant's possession of the cocaine was innocent ( see People v Banks, 76 NY2d 799, 801; People v Snyder, 73 NY2d 900, 901-902; People v Williams, 50 NY2d 1043, 1044-1045; People v Hightower, 237 AD2d 166, lv denied 89 NY2d 1094). "[D]espite defense counsel's comments at sentencing, defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel" ( People v McQuiller, 19 AD3d 1043, 1045, lv denied 5 NY3d 808; see People v Purnell, 22 AD3d 871; People v Rodriguez, 18 AD3d 239, 240, lv denied 5 NY3d 793; cf. People v Lawrence, 27 AD3d 1091).

Before: Nardelli, J.P., Ellerin, Wallach, Andrias, Saxe, JJ. The People's reference in summation to defendant's failure to mention, in his voluntary post-arrest statements to the police, an alleged incident in which the complainant assaulted defendant prior to the commission of the crime charged, which alleged incident purportedly supported defendant's claim to have acted in self-defense, was proper (see, People v. Savage, 50 N.Y.2d 673, 676,cert denied 449 U.S. 1016; People v. Hightower_, 237 A.D.2d 166, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1094; People v. Hock, 183 A.D.2d 497, 498, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 904). The People also properly used, in cross-examination and in summation, defendant's failure to report, prior to the occurrence of the charged crime, the alleged assault by the complainant, since that alleged assault constituted an incident separate and distinct from the charged crime that defendant had affirmatively placed in issue as part of his direct case. Defendant's objections to the People's cross-examination of defendant and summation comments concerning his economic status and his dependence on others, including the victim, to pay his living expenses, are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice.