¶ 16 A claim of self-defense puts a defendant's intent directly in issue. See, e.g., People v.Charles, 238 Ill.App.3d 752, 762 (1992) (claiming self-defense made intent "the critical issue" of the case (internal quotation marks omitted)). Intent is among the permissible purposes for admitting other-acts evidence.
The defendant is correct in his assertion that, relying upon Batson and Harris, our colleagues in the First District held that the failure of the State to recall the specific reason that it exercised a peremptory challenge against even one potential juror requires reversal and remand for a new trial, even in situations where the State did provide race-neutral explanations for its peremptory challenges against other potential jurors. People v. Charles, 238 Ill.App.3d 752, 757-58 (1992). As the Charles court noted, various other courts interpreting Batson have agreed, ruling that, inter alia, (1) "not knowing" why a strike was exercised is not the functional equivalent of providing a race-neutral explanation, (2) lack of recollection on the part of the State means that, as a matter of law, the State has failed to rebut the prima facie showing, and (3) only in pre-Batson cases has the Illinois Supreme Court allowed the State to use lack of recollection as an excuse to explain a peremptory challenge, presumably because prior to Batson, the State was not on notice that such an explanation would no longer be acceptable.
The relevance of such evidence derives from the logic that it is far less likely that the defendant in this case was an innocent victim acting out of a belief that his safety was endangered if he was the aggressor in a prior incident under peculiarly similar circumstances.People v. Charles, 238 Ill. App.3d 752, 763, 606 N.E.2d 603 (1992). The fact that evidence of prior acts of misconduct may be relevant to prove something other than propensity does not mean that such evidence should be admitted as a matter of course.
The State cannot rebut defendant's prima facie case without offering the specific reasons why the challenge was exercised. ( People v. Charles (1992), 238 Ill. App.3d 752, 758-59, 606 N.E.2d 603, 607-08.) Additionally, it is unclear whether the trial judge did more than simply determine that the prosecutor's proffered explanation was race-neutral.
While an innocent state of mind might be present in one instance, the more often it occurs with similar results, the less likely that it was without criminal intent. See People v. Charles, 238 Ill. App. 3d 752, 761, 606 N.E.2d 603, 610 (1992) (affirming admission of evidence that the defendant shot someone with a shotgun 15 minutes earlier to negate the defendant's assertion of self-defense). In this case, the trial court found the other-crimes evidence should be admitted because defendant was asserting that the stabbing was an accident.
The evidence relating to defendant's attempts to shoot Linus and Tomiesene was relevant to show defendant's intent to commit murder. People v. Charles, 238 Ill. App. 3d 752, 761-63 (1992). In Charles, the defendant's intent to commit murder could be derived from the fact that he intentionally fired a shotgun into one person's abdomen 15 minutes before he fired the same shotgun into the victim's abdomen.
A defendant's intent to commit murder can be derived from the fact that he intentionally fired a shotgun into one person's abdomen fifteen minutes before he fired the same shotgun into [the victim's] abdomen. People v. Charles, 238 Ill. App.3d 752, 606 N.E.2d 603 (1992). In Charles, the defendant's intent to deliberately fire at a person in a certain way in each instance was similar, to say the least.
Finally, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether evidence of other crimes is relevant to a material issue in the case. People v. Charles, 238 Ill. App.3d 752, 760-61, 606 N.E.2d 603 (1992).
The holdings in both Wright v. State, 832 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), and Brooks v. State, 802 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991), comport with the disposition of similar factual circumstances in a majority of jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 713 F. Supp. 165 (M.D.N.C. 1988); People v. Charles, 606 N.E.2d 603 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992); Tolbert v. State, 553 A.2d 228 (Md. 1988); People v. Blunt, 574 N.Y.S.2d 812 (N.Y.App. Div. 1991); State v. Brock, 675 N.E.2d 18 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).See Rousseau v. State, 824 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), and Brooks v. State, 802 S.W.2d 692, two cases where this procedure was followed.
However, time and place proximity, without more, is an insufficient basis for admission of other crimes evidence. People v. Charles, 238 Ill. App.3d 752, 762, 606 N.E.2d 603 (1992). The State argues that the gang affiliation is relevant in that the location of the crime was within the territory of defendant's gang and explained his presence in the area.