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People v. Chandler

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento
Sep 12, 2008
No. C056039 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GREGORY ALLEN CHANDLER, Defendant and Appellant. C056039 California Court of Appeal, Third District, Sacramento September 12, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Super. Ct. No. 06F05471

ROBIE, J.

A jury found defendant Gregory Allen Chandler guilty of making criminal threats to D. H. and pimping involving M. S. The jury acquitted him of numerous other counts involving both victims, including a charge of making criminal threats to M. S. In bifurcated proceedings, the court found three strike priors to be true.

Sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of 50 years to life, defendant appeals, contending he was denied a fair and impartial jury trial because the trial court instructed the jury during voir dire that there might be evidence of his affiliation with a prison gang but such evidence was later excluded. Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied defense counsel’s request for a new jury panel or, in the alternative, that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

M. S. started dating defendant in February 2005. Defendant later moved into her home. She worked as a prostitute and paid the bills. She also gave defendant money. He would not let her quit being a prostitute, complaining there would be no money for them to live. She was listed on the Internet as an escort and had never had a pimp before defendant. Defendant moved out in November 2005.

In October 2005, D. H. met defendant. He moved in with her the next month. In June 2006, defendant left numerous messages on D. H.’s phone which were played for the jury. He threatened to assault and kill D. H. D. H. feared that he would.

On the first day of trial, defense counsel filed a motion in limine seeking, among other things, to exclude any evidence of defendant’s alleged membership or affiliation with a prison gang. Defense counsel argued that neither victim had seen defendant with a member of the gang. Although conceding that defendant had gang tattoos suggesting he might have been affiliated with a prison gang, defense counsel noted that defendant was 39 years of age, he had not been convicted of a crime for 10 years, gang members “tend to be youthful,” and there was no evidence defendant was still affiliated with the gang. Noting that the evidence might be relevant, defense counsel argued the prejudicial affect outweighed any probative value.

The prosecutor explained that he did not intend to introduce evidence that defendant was a “validated” gang member but argued defendant’s statements to both victims about his membership in a prison gang were relevant to prove the victims’ state of mind for purposes of the charges of making criminal threats. The prosecutor asserted that both of the victims claimed that early on in their relationships with defendant, he told them of his membership in the prison gang to show them how dangerous he could be and to control them.

Defense counsel disputed that defendant was currently or recently affiliated with a prison gang, claiming the records of the Department of Corrections referred to information in 1996. Defense counsel doubted that the prosecutor could present evidence from the victims that defendant had told them anything about the gang.

Although noting that reference to prison gangs would be prejudicial, the trial court tentatively ruled that the evidence of the effect of defendant’s membership in a prison gang on the victims would be admitted for a limited purpose and the jury would be instructed that it was not offered to show defendant was a person of bad character. Because defense counsel asserted it was not defendant who informed the victims about the prison gang, the court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for the next morning for the victims to testify. The court then finished ruling on the in limine motions and proceeded with jury selection.

After defense counsel introduced herself and defendant, the trial court informed prospective jurors during voir dire about possible evidence of defendant’s affiliation with a prison gang. Specifically, the trial court stated:

“[THE COURT:] I want to bring this to your attention because it’s kind of important. It may or may not come into evidence but there has -- there may be representations that [defendant] may well have some affiliation with a prison gang . . . . If that does come into issue then, of course, I would give you a special instruction that that information can only be used in a limited way. [¶] That is to say, it cannot be used to show that he is a person of bad character or that it would make him show that he has a tendency to commit criminal behavior or that he is a bad person simply because he’s a member of, if he is, a member of that organization. [¶] But, rather, it would come in to show the effect on one of the elements of the charges and I would show you that, in terms of the effect it may have on a person [who] is aware of that type of information. And it’s not coming in for the truth of the matter. [¶] Now, I know that sounds like a lot of legal maybe mumbo jumbo and I may well have hurt you more than I helped you, but the bottom idea is that you can’t consider it, if it comes in, to show he has a propensity to commit crimes or he’s a bad character. [¶] It cannot come in for the truth that he is in fact a member, but it will come [in] to show some effect if a listener believes that the effect in terms of a certain mental state it would have on the listener. [¶] Did I do any better? [¶] Does everyone kind of understand and get the drift? [¶] Now after saying all that, is there some prospective jurors [who] feel it’s just too overpowering and they can’t follow basically what I just told you? Anyone feel that? Anything more I need to say at this time?” Both attorneys responded negatively.

Later the same day, the trial court informed a second venire about the same possible evidence:

“THE COURT: [T]here is some indication and I don’t know how it may play out, that [defendant] may have some affiliation with a . . . prison gang . . . . And if in fact that comes out you will be instructed you may only consider that for a limited purpose. You may not consider that in terms of that he’s a bad person or that he has a propensity to commit criminal offenses. [¶] It would come in to show the effect that it would have on maybe one of the people who -- alleged victims in terms of their state of mind. And that’s the only way it may be used. [¶] Now, despite me telling you that, [are] there some of you who feel you cannot follow my instruction and would be automatically prejudiced against [defendant]? Any of you? Okay.”

The following morning, outside the presence of the jurors, D. H. and M. S. testified at an evidentiary hearing. Both testified concerning their fear of defendant and his relationship with a prison gang. M. S. testified that defendant told her that he was a member of a prison gang, showed her the tattoo on his arm, and claimed he went to member meetings. M. S. knew about the prison gang because her “illegal husband” had been a member. M. S. claimed defendant would tap his tattoo whenever she argued with him. His membership in the prison gang kept her “in line” and made her more careful, knowing that even if he could not harm her, he had gang members who could. M. S. was afraid that defendant would learn she had contacted the police and he had contacted one of his gang members to harm her.

D. H. entered the courtroom in glasses and a hood, fearing that defendant might have someone watching her. She testified that defendant told her he was a member of a prison gang, explaining that when one of the members called him “to take care of somebody else” he would “hurt that person.” D. H. had no knowledge of the prison gang prior to being with defendant. She claimed that he talked about the prison gang every time he left for a “meeting.” She stayed in the relationship with him because she was afraid, knowing what he was capable of, the “kind of gang” he was in and that he could send someone over “to get [her].”

With respect to M. S., the court precluded the prosecution from offering evidence relating to the prison gang because “the probative value would be substantially outweighed by the prejudice.” With respect to D. H., the court precluded the prosecutor from offering “the prejudicial language of the [prison gang]” because the prosecutor could sufficiently show D. H.’s fear without the gang evidence.

Defense counsel then made a motion for a new panel of prospective jurors because the court had informed the jury of the possible prison gang evidence. The trial court queried: “Did you wish me not to mention it and then it comes out during the course of the trial?” Defense counsel responded that she wished it had not been “mentioned until we knew whether or not it was going to be admitted.” The trial court denied the motion for a new panel, noting that when it had informed the prospective jurors of such evidence, the court indicated it “may or may not” be introduced and defense counsel voiced no objection. Defense counsel commented that “once it’s been said objecting to it doesn’tunring the bell.”

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends he was denied a fair and impartial jury when the trial court refused to grant his request for a new jury after the trial court informed the prospective jurors there might be evidence of defendant’s affiliation with a prison gang, but then determined the gang evidence would not come in. We find no error.

The trial court has “broad discretion to determine whether or not possible bias or prejudice against the defendant has contaminated the entire venire to such an extreme that its discharge is required.” (People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 889 (Medina).) The trial court’s ruling will be reversed on appeal only for clear abuse of discretion. (People v. Martinez (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1456, 1466-1467.) “[D]ischarging the entire venire is a remedy that should be reserved for the most serious occasions of demonstrated bias or prejudice . . . .” (Medina, at p. 889.)

In Medina, a couple of prospective jurors informed the trial court that other prospective jurors made the following comments: “‘even [the defendant’s] own lawyers think he’s guilty,’” “‘they ought to have [sic] him and get it over with,’” and “‘in frontier justice style’ the authorities should ‘bring the guilty S.O.B. in, we’ll give him a trial, and then hang him.’” (Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 888.) The defendant moved to dismiss the entire panel. The trial court denied the motion without prejudice. (Id. at pp. 888-889.) The defendant did not question the prospective jurors further because he claimed it would antagonize the jurors and cause additional bias against the defendant. None of the prospective jurors who made the offending comments sat on the jury. (Id. at p. 889.)

Medina found no error in denying the motion to dismiss the entire panel, stating: “Defendant cites no case, and we have found none, indicating that such a drastic remedy is appropriate as a matter of course merely because a few prospective jurors have made inflammatory remarks.” (Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 889.)

Here, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defense counsel’s motion for a new panel. In instructing the prospective jurors, the court stated that evidence of defendant’s affiliation with a prison gang, if any existed, might or might not be introduced at trial. The trial court further instructed the prospective jurors that any such evidence would be admitted only to show its effect on the state of mind of the alleged victims and that the evidence could not be used to show defendant was a bad person or had a propensity to commit crimes. Even though the trial court’s comments involved potentially inflammatory gang evidence, those comments were calculated to prevent any possible bias or prejudice that might flow from the mention of the possibility that such evidence would be admitted. Under these circumstances, the trial court acted well within its discretion in implicitly determining that the jury panel was not contaminated and in denying the motion for a panel.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J., NICHOLSON, J.


Summaries of

People v. Chandler

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento
Sep 12, 2008
No. C056039 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Chandler

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GREGORY ALLEN CHANDLER, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento

Date published: Sep 12, 2008

Citations

No. C056039 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2008)