Opinion
C088080
03-16-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DENNIS CARL CHANDLER, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 17F2189)
After defendant Dennis Carl Chandler pleaded no contest to second degree robbery and admitted a firearm enhancement, the trial court imposed the minimum $300 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4), a $40 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8), and a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). Relying on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 at pages 1168, 1172 (Dueñas), defendant argues these fines and fees should be stayed until the trial court holds an ability to pay hearing. We disagree with Dueñas and its reasoning. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
The substantive facts underlying this appeal are not contained in the record, and are not relevant to the issue raised on appeal, and therefore not recounted. --------
Defendant pleaded no contest to second degree robbery (§ 211) and admitted a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53) in exchange for a stipulated sentence of 15 years in prison. The trial court sentenced him in accordance with the plea agreement, and imposed a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4), a $40 court operations fee (§ 1465.8), and a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373).
DISCUSSION
Defendant claims that pursuant to the holding in Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pages 1168 and 1172, the portion of the trial court order directing defendant to pay a $300 restitution fine, a $40 court operations assessment, and a $30 criminal conviction assessment should be vacated or stayed pending a hearing on his ability to pay.
In Dueñas, after numerous citations and convictions related to driving without a license resulted in significant fines and fees the defendant, Dueñas, could not pay, she requested a hearing to determine her ability to pay those costs. (Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1160-1163.) Following the statutory language, the trial court ruled the assessments were mandatory and Dueñas had not shown the " 'compelling and extraordinary reasons' " required to waive the restitution fine. (Id. at p. 1163.)
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding due process prohibits a trial court from imposing court assessments under section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373, and requires the trial court to stay execution of any restitution fines unless it conducts an ability to pay hearing and ascertains the defendant's ability to pay those assessments and fines. (Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1164.) To support this conclusion, Dueñas relied on two lines of due process precedent. First, it cited authorities addressing access to courts and waiving court costs for indigent civil litigants. Second, it relied on due process and equal protection authorities that prohibit incarceration based on a defendant's indigence and inability to pay a fine or fee. (Id. at pp. 1165-1166, 1168.) The court also concluded that imposing costs on indigent defendants "blamelessly" unable to pay them transformed a "funding mechanism for the courts into additional punishment." (Id. at p. 1168.)
People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 320, review granted November 26, 2019, S258946 (Hicks) rejected Dueñas's reasoning, under both lines of due process authority. First, Hicks observed imposition of fees after a determination of guilt does not deny criminal defendants access to the courts and does not interfere with defendant's right to present a defense or challenge a trial court's rulings on appeal. (Id. at p. 326.) Second, Hicks noted imposition of fees, without more, does not result in incarceration for nonpayment of fines and fees due to indigence; thus, it does not infringe on that fundamental liberty interest. (Ibid.)
Hicks went on to conclude that the Dueñas court's expansion of these due process "foundational pillars" was an incorrect interpretation of due process foundations because it was inconsistent with the principles announced by our Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, that imposition of fines and assessments on indigent defendants is not prohibited because the State has a fundamental interest in punishing those who violate the criminal law, and not conferring immunity for such punishment on indigent defendants. (Hicks, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 327.) In addition, the Dueñas court's holding was inconsistent with the purposes and operation of probation because it relieved indigent defendants of any duty to make an effort to repay their debt to society. (Ibid.)
We find the reasoning in Hicks, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th 320 more persuasive than Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157. Accordingly, we conclude the imposition of fines, fees, and assessments on an indigent defendant without consideration of ability to pay does not violate due process and there is no constitutional requirement for the trialcourt to conduct an ability to pay hearing prior to imposing these fines, fees, and assessments.
We also agree with Hicks that the fundamental policy question presented by Dueñas is difficult: the challenges of trying to balance the concerns about potential debt traps laid by court-imposed fees and punitive fines against the interests of funding the courts and providing restitution to crime victims. (Hicks, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 329.) These policy challenges have yet to be resolved. (See Governor's veto message to Sen. on Assem. Bill No. 927 (Oct. 9, 2019) (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) <http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB927> [as of Mar. 12, 2020], archived at <https://perma.cc/B79M-EBCV>.) While the legislative and executive branches consider the policy questions raised by Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, we will not grant remand to require a hearing that is not currently mandated by law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment affirmed.
/s/_________
HOCH, J.
We concur:
/s/_________
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
/s/_________
DUARTE, J.