Opinion
C097078
11-15-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANDREW CHAMP, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 21FE017137
DUARTE, J.
The trial court found defendant incompetent to stand trial based on three psychological evaluations conducted by two psychologists and committed him to the Department of State Hospitals for a maximum of three years. On appeal, defendant challenges the court's incompetence finding, arguing the court failed to appoint two experts to evaluate his competency consistent with Penal Code section 1369 and insufficient evidence supports the court's ultimate finding. Defendant further argues the maximum available term is two years, rather than three years. We will correct the maximum possible term, but otherwise affirm the trial court's order.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
The prosecution charged defendant with one count of stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (b)) and two misdemeanor counts of contempt of court (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)).
At a discovery hearing in October 2021, defendant's appointed counsel declared a doubt as to defendant's competency to stand trial. Counsel explained a doubt had been declared in a misdemeanor case defendant had pending and that a psychologist, Janice Nakagawa, Ph.D., had evaluated him for that case in July 2020. The court appointed Dr. Nakagawa to re-evaluate defendant in the current case.
At the November 2021 competency hearing, the trial court received Dr. Nakagawa's report, which concluded defendant was incompetent, and the parties submitted on the report. The court found defendant incompetent.
Defendant was not present for the hearing.
Defendant retained new counsel, who appeared at a hearing in March 2022 to apply for mental health diversion. In August 2022, the parties had an unreported discussion and the court set a new competency trial.
In September 2022, the parties appeared for a competency hearing. The trial court catalogued the psychological evaluations in the case, including the July 2020 and November 2021 Dr. Nakagawa evaluations and a new evaluation from June 2022 by Dr. Borbon. The parties agreed to waive a jury trial and submit the matter on the reports, as well as argument from counsel. Defendant moved the reports into evidence.
In the July 2020 psychological evaluation, Dr. Nakagawa explained she conducted an interview of defendant, reviewed his mental health records, and spoke with the public defender representing him in his misdemeanor case. During the interview, defendant claimed he was working with the district attorney, the FBI, ICE, and Homeland Security on human trafficking issues. He said his wife, daughters, and he were victims of human trafficking. He was able to interpret various proverbs and was aware of the pending charges against him, but Dr. Nakagawa opined his ability to apply that knowledge was limited because of his delusions. Dr. Nakagawa diagnosed defendant with unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders. She concluded he would not be able to assist counsel in a rational matter and was thus incompetent to stand trial.
In the November 2021 evaluation, Dr. Nakagawa conducted another interview with defendant and reviewed his records, including her previous report. He understood he was being evaluated for legal competence purposes, and explained it was because his wife--who was not a named victim in the current case--was being human trafficked and was lying. He said the pending case against him would be dismissed and referenced the district attorney, the FBI, and Homeland Security. He said he had no mental health problems and did not need medication. Dr. Nakagawa concluded that although defendant had an intellectual understanding of the criminal proceedings, he would not be able to use that understanding to assist counsel because of his delusions. She confirmed her prior diagnosis and concluded defendant was incompetent to stand trial.
In Dr. Borbon's June 2022 report, the doctor explained she conducted an interview of defendant, reviewed some of his case documents, and used several diagnostic tools to evaluate him. Defendant said he had never had any psychiatric symptoms but told Dr. Borbon his wife and daughters were involved with human traffickers and "that's where these restraining orders are coming from." According to statements in a police report Dr. Borbon reviewed, defendant's ex-wife reported he had become obsessive and stalked women in the past and had a history of delusions. During Dr. Borbon's interview, defendant had "periods of tangentiality and illogical statements that made it difficult to understand his narrative." He had knowledge of the legal system, legal procedures, and the charges against him.
Defendant said he had been arrested by the chief of police and referenced Donald Trump, Sacramento County Sheriff Scott Jones, and District Attorney Anne Marie Schubert. He believed the case was happening because he made Facebook posts that "set off politicians." He also asserted federal prosecutors were talking to the prosecutor in his pending case so that the case could be dropped.
Defendant had disagreed with his appointed public defender and obtained private counsel because he wanted help proving he was competent to stand trial. He understood that if he was dissatisfied with his attorney, he could file a complaint with the state bar, as he had done with his previous attorney. He insisted he was innocent and said he wanted to testify to share his story. Dr. Borbon concluded defendant had schizophrenia, unspecified with current symptoms of paranoid and erotomaniac delusions. He had an adequate factual understanding of the proceedings against him, but his narrative was illogical and incoherent. His delusions also "impaired his ability to understand the potential consequences of the instant offenses." He was convinced there was no evidence against him, the victim would testify to his version of events, and the charges would be dismissed. He also believed numerous politicians were involved in the case and that the victim's husband was sex trafficking defendant's daughters. As such, Dr. Borbon believed defendant did not have a rational understanding of the case because his delusions would affect his actions preparing for trial and prevent him from making good decisions. She agreed medication would help restore him to competence.
Defense counsel argued he disagreed with the psychological evaluations, saying, "I have spent now I believe at least six months with [defendant] as his attorney of record in this case. And reading the reports, the reports indicate that he is delusional to the point where he cannot aid his defense attorney. I disagree with those opinions. If the Court were to ask him what's the role of the judge, what's the role of his defense attorney, what's the role of the district attorney, he is more than capable of answering all those questions."
Defense counsel stated defendant wanted to enter a no contest plea in the case so that he could be placed on probation. Defense counsel believed defendant could do so knowingly and intelligently and could be supervised adequately on probation. Defendant could be placed on a path "of keeping him out of violating the law and also protecting the alleged victim." The court noted defendant had repeatedly violated restraining orders in the past and defense counsel responded he was "not here as a defense attorney to tell you he is never going to commit another crime, but I'm arguing to the Court that he is competent."
The parties submitted the matter and the court found defendant incompetent, saying although defendant did seem "to be an intelligent person" who could understand "what the court system is about," all three of the reports indicated "defendant is highly delusional concerning things like that he has a close relationship with Anne Marie S[c]hubert, the district attorney, and she was going to be intervening on his behalf and calling judges to tell them to let him go. He seems to firmly believe that his wife and daughters are victims of human trafficking. He seems to firmly believe that [the victim] is also a victim of human trafficking. He says he's working with the FBI and Homeland Security and ICE.
"These seem to be strongly held delusions, and even though you are indicating that you think he could assist you as his counsel, he can assist you in trial, and that you -- I understand that you can have somebody -- a client who has overwhelming evidence against them and that they maybe don't make the most rational choices as to whether or not they should resolve their case or go to trial, this is different. He can't tell you anything that's grounded -- concerning the case anyway, that's well grounded in reality. And so if he's telling you that he works for the FBI and that the victims in this case are victims of human trafficking when there's simply no rational evidence to support that, I think the Court would have to conclude that he suffers from a delusion and is incapable of being able to assist his counsel when it comes to trial."
The trial court committed defendant to the Department of State Hospitals for a maximum term of three years.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Appointment Procedure
Defendant argues the trial court erred at the September 2022 hearing because it failed to appoint two psychologists after defendant said he was not seeking a finding of mental incompetence, consistent with section 1369, subdivision (a)(1).
Defendant briefly argues the trial court also erred in the November 2021 competency hearing when it ruled without defendant present, but acknowledges the error was cured by the September 2022 hearing. As such, we do not consider the issue.
"The constitutional guarantee of due process forbids a court from trying or convicting a criminal defendant who is mentally incompetent to stand trial. [Citations.] Section 1367 of the Penal Code, incorporating the applicable constitutional standard, specifies that a person is incompetent to stand trial 'if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.'" (People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 230.)
Section 1368 requires that criminal proceedings be suspended and competency proceedings be commenced if "a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant." Our Supreme Court "has construed that provision, in conformity with the requirements of federal constitutional law, as meaning that an accused has the right 'to a hearing on present sanity if he comes forward with substantial evidence that he is incapable, because of mental illness, of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him or of assisting in his defense.'" (People v. Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 231.) "When a doubt exists as to the defendant's mental competence, the court must appoint an expert or experts to examine the defendant. The issue is then tried to the court or a jury under the procedures set out in Penal Code section 1369." (Ibid.) The parties may stipulate to a trial that is based on written expert reports. (People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1168-1169, disapproved on other grounds by Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1106.)
Under section 1369, subdivision (a)(1), "[i]f the defendant or the defendant's counsel informs the court that the defendant is not seeking a finding of mental incompetence, the court shall appoint two psychiatrists, licensed psychologists, or a combination thereof."" 'The appointment of two experts in such circumstances provides a minimum protection for the defendant against being incorrectly found incompetent to stand trial.'" (People v. Leelu (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1023, 1030.)
As a threshold matter, the People contend defendant forfeited his claim because he submitted the matter on the three existing expert reports and never requested the appointment of additional experts. Alternatively, the People argue defendant never expressly informed the trial court he was not seeking a finding of incompetence, and thus never triggered the requirements under section 1369. Even assuming defendant preserved the issue and properly informed the court, we conclude any error was harmless.
"[T]he statutory scheme of section 1368 et seq. 'implements the due process guarantee not to be tried while mentally incompetent,'" but "[o]ther elements of section 1369 reflect statutory rather than constitutional rights." (People v. Leelu, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031.) For example, "section 1369(a)'s requirement that the trial court appoint a second mental health evaluator when the defendant contests competency is a function of state law -- not federal constitutional command." (Ibid.) Thus, to show prejudicial error, a defendant must" 'demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error he or she would have obtained a more favorable result.'" (Id. at pp. 1031-1032.)
The record does not support defendant's assertion that the appointment of additional mental health experts would have affected the trial court's finding defendant was not competent to stand trial. Two different psychologists assessed defendant's mental competency on three different occasions and observed identical behavior each time. In all the evaluations, defendant understood parts of the criminal justice system, such as the roles of parties and various procedures, but lacked the ability to apply that knowledge because of his delusions. He believed the district attorney and various federal agencies were working with him on human trafficking issues--involving the victim's exhusband trafficking defendant's wife and the victim--and would be assisting him with his case. He also believed, among other things, that he was friends with the victim, he had not sent her "bad text messages," and the restraining order she had against him was invalid because she had not signed it.
The delusions affected his opinions about case strategy; he told Dr. Borbon he believed the victim would testify consistent with his delusions and Dr. Nakagawa that he thought the case would get dismissed. He had difficulty understanding the potential consequences of the offenses. The delusions also impaired his ability to assist or cooperate with his attorneys. He told Dr. Nakagawa that one of his former attorneys was involved in the human trafficking conspiracy, and had difficulty discussing the case with another of his former attorneys because he would ramble about human trafficking conspiracies. Both psychologists observed similar rambling, tangential conversations when evaluating defendant, corroborating his former attorney's experience. All three evaluations concluded defendant would have difficulty assisting counsel.
None of the statements made by defense counsel at the September 2022 hearing contravened these conclusions. Counsel believed defendant could assist him because defendant was "more than capable of answering" questions about the respective roles of the people in the courtroom. But both experts acknowledged defendant understood these basic facts and still concluded he was not competent. Defense counsel's argument, which defendant now urges us to treat as evidence of his competence, did not dispute defendant's delusions or explain how defendant could otherwise assist counsel even while suffering from the delusions. Given the lack of contradictory evidence, we reject defendant's argument that the "potential staleness" of the evaluations made it more likely defendant suffered prejudice from any error. The trial court considered three psychological evaluations of defendant conducted over an extended period of time--all of which came to the same conclusion on similar facts--and defense counsel's observations of defendant did not contradict the factual basis for those conclusions. We thus do not consider it reasonably probable that the appointment of additional experts would have resulted in a more favorable result for defendant.
II
Insufficient Evidence
Defendant asserts insufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding that defendant was incompetent to stand trial because the psychological evaluations were too dated to adequately reflect defendant's capabilities. We disagree.
To review a finding at a competency trial, we apply "a deferential substantial evidence standard of review." (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 871.) "When the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict is challenged, our review is limited to the evidence presented at the competency trial." (Id. at pp. 871-872.) We "view the record in the light most favorable to the verdict and uphold the verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Evidence is substantial if it is reasonable, credible, and of solid value." (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 31.)" 'We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts' . . . A reversal for insufficient evidence 'is unwarranted unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support" '" the factual finding. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
"A defendant is deemed incompetent to stand trial if he lacks '" 'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . [or] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'" '" (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 690.)
Adequate evidence supported the trial court's conclusion defendant was not able to assist his attorney. As noted above, both Drs. Nakagawa and Borbon agreed defendant would have difficulty applying his knowledge of the criminal justice system because of his persistent delusions, many of which impacted his ability to accurately assess consequences in his case or even provide information. The psychologists' opinions were supported by factual bases; both psychologists conducted interviews with defendant and supported their opinions with specific facts from the interviews. As one example, Dr. Nakagawa detailed a portion of her interview in which defendant talked in "an increasingly agitated manner" about his human trafficking delusions, noting he rambled and perseverated for some time before she ended the interview. Similarly, Dr. Borbon recounted difficulty discussing possible sentences with defendant after he repeatedly derailed the conversation.
As explained above, none of defense counsel's statements at the hearing contradicted the basis for the psychologists' findings. Both psychologists acknowledged defendant's understanding of basic facts about the criminal justice system but found he would be unable to apply that understanding because of his delusions. Nor do we find persuasive defendant's argument that only defense counsel's statements should be credited because they are the only evidence that spoke to defendant's "present" ability to assist counsel. While the court was free to consider the age of the various reports when it weighed the evidence, nothing about substantial evidence review requires us to disregard all but the most recent evidence. (See People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 889-890, disapproved on another ground by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390 [considering psychological evaluations over three-year period before competency trial].) Similarly, we reject defendant's argument that Dr. Borbon's report could not constitute substantial evidence because section 1369 requires the appointment of two experts. That the section requires the appointment of two experts is not the same as saying two experts must agree to find a defendant incompetent; indeed, section 1369 findings explicitly require only a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1369, subd. (f).)
Finally, defendant argues the trial court misapplied the required standard under section 1369 because it focused on defendant's potential danger to the community instead of his competence. In context, however, it is clear that the court's statements at the hearing came only after defense counsel proposed the court find defendant competent so he could enter a plea and be placed on probation; counsel argued this path would keep defendant "out of violating the law and also protect[] the alleged victim in this case by having a no contact order, and he would be supervised by formal probation." The court then questioned whether this was possible, given defendant's repeated violations of restraining orders. Counsel then backtracked, claiming he was only arguing defendant was competent, not that defendant "is never going to commit another crime." The court's statement of its decision does not mention defendant's potential danger to the community at all. We thus reject defendant's argument that the court misunderstood the required elements and conclude substantial evidence supports the court's findings.
We similarly reject defendant's summary argument that the trial court erred when it admitted the expert reports because it was not defendant's burden to produce evidence of incompetence. Defense counsel explicitly asked to admit the reports and they were admitted without objection at the hearing.
III
Term of Commitment
Defendant argues the trial court erred when it committed defendant to a maximum term of three years in treatment because section 1370 only permits a maximum commitment of two years for competency restoration. The People concede the issue, and we agree with the parties.
Section 1370, subdivision (c)(1), which previously allowed a maximum commitment term of three years, was amended effective January 1, 2019, and now provides that "[a]t the end of two years from the date of commitment or a period of commitment equal to the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law . . . whichever is shorter, but no later than 90 days prior to the expiration of the defendant's term of commitment, a defendant who has not recovered mental competence shall be returned to the committing court. . ." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1008, § 2, p. 14.)
The trial court committed defendant to the Department of State Hospitals for a maximum term of three years, rather than two. Accordingly, we will direct the court to amend its order to reflect the correct maximum term.
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to amend defendant's commitment order to reflect a commitment to the Department of State Hospitals for a period not to exceed a maximum term of two years. In all other respects, the court's order is affirmed.
We concur: Hull, Acting P. J., Keithley, J. [*]
[*]Judge of the Butte County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.