Opinion
H049332
02-28-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LANDRUM KEITH CHAMBERS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 20CR007870
Wilson, J.
Defendant Landrum Keith Chambers was convicted by jury trial of alcohol-related driving offenses and child endangerment. At a bifurcated trial, the trial court found that Chambers had three prior DUI convictions. The trial court placed Chambers on probation.
On appeal, Chambers argues that reversal of his convictions is required because the jury heard a recording of a phone call without the redactions that the court had previously ordered. He also argues that his trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to ensure that the recording was properly redacted. The Attorney General concedes that the admission of the unredacted recording was error but contends that under Watson there was no prejudicial error and there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. The Charges
On May 4, 2021, the Monterey County District Attorney's Office filed a first amended information charging Chambers with driving under the influence of alcohol (count 1; Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher (count 2; § 23152, subd. (b)), and child endangerment likely to result in great bodily injury or death (count 3; Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)). The information also alleged, with respect to counts 1 and 2, that Chambers had a blood alcohol level of 0.15 percent or more (§ 23578), that he willfully refused a peace officer's request to submit to a chemical test (§ 23577, subd. (a)), and that he drove under the influence of alcohol within 10 years of three prior DUI convictions (§ 23550, subd. (a)).
Unspecified statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
B. The Trial
1. Prosecution's Case
On August 3, 2020, courier Edward Cain was driving through California State University, Monterey Bay's (CSUMB) campus, when he saw a small child standing next to a car that had crashed into a ditch in an empty parking lot. Cain parked, approached the vehicle, and found Chambers on the ground next to the car. The child was unharmed and in good spirits. Lying on the ground with his right leg still in the car, Chambers was "basically incoherent." Cain asked him several questions, but Chambers did not respond. Cain tried to get Chambers's attention for about five minutes, with no success.
Other individuals arrived while Cain was trying to assess the situation, and someone called the police. Cain put the crashed vehicle in park, removed the keys, and waited for police to arrive.
Heather Murphy, a detective with the CSUMB police department, responded to the reported traffic collision. When Murphy approached the scene, she found Chambers's silver Audi "high centered or high pointed on a curb" with part of the car in a culvert. Murphy spoke briefly with Chambers's son, who said he was four years old.
Upon arriving, Murphy found Chambers lying on the ground next to the driver's side door. Chambers was unable to sit up and responded incoherently to questions. Murphy smelled a strong odor of alcohol, noted that his eyes were watery and glassy, and that his speech was heavily slurred. When emergency personnel arrived, Murphy and other officers "assisted [Chambers] in getting into a seated position" because he was unable to do so on his own.
The jury viewed an approximately two-minute portion of Murphy's body worn camera footage and received a transcript of the same, reflecting Murphy's initial interactions with Chambers. The jury also viewed multiple photographs of the crash site, the vehicle, and its location on a satellite map.
After Chambers was "medically cleared," officers tried to get him to participate in a field sobriety test but he was unable to stand without the assistance of Murphy and another officer. After being helped to his feet, Chambers was asked to face the officer conducting the field sobriety test. However, before the test could begin, Chambers began to sway. Murphy and the other officer reached for him to make sure he did not fall over. Chambers then began to look over toward his son. Murphy informed Chambers that "[his son] was safe and just hanging out." When Chambers moved to walk towards his son, Murphy and her partner "grabbed his arm and said, 'Hey, stay here.'" Chambers tensed up and pulled away. Murphy advised him again that his son was" 'okay'" and that he needed to remain with them so that they could finish the field sobriety test. Chambers continued to pull away. Because of Chambers's lack of compliance and his inability to stand, he was placed into handcuffs and put in the police car.
Murphy advised Chambers that he was obligated to take a chemical blood test. Chambers stated that he would take a breath test. After an officer retrieved the breath test device, Chambers refused. Chambers also refused to have his blood drawn. Chambers was transported to the CSUMB police station where he remained for approximately two hours. When he was at the station, his balance improved, he was able to walk around without assistance, and his speech became more coherent and less slurred. Officers sought and obtained a search warrant to collect a blood sample and transported Chambers to Natividad Medical Center, which was approximately 20 to 25 minutes away. On the drive, his speech further improved. Chambers asked several times "what was going on" and why he was under arrest, which officers explained. His speech was "understandable," "[h]e was coherent, [and he] appeared less intoxicated." After waiting for a little over an hour, a blood sample was taken, which was found to have a blood alcohol concentration of 0.221 percent.
The prosecution played an audio recording of an approximately five-minute phone call that Chambers made to his mother while in jail. Chambers states several times during the call that he needs his mother to cosign his bail bond. During part of the call, Chambers states, "I made a mistake." His mother then asks him, "What did you do?" Chambers responds, "I got a DUI. Okay, please. I just need to bail out. Okay, I just got another DUI."
2. Defense Case
Chambers testified that on August 2, 2020, he had taken his son on a daytrip to Monterey to celebrate his son's upcoming birthday. The next morning, he checked out of the hotel at 11:00 a.m. and began driving back to the Bay Area. Before driving back, he intended to visit Marina State Beach. At some point, Chambers exited the freeway and pulled into a parking lot on the CSUMB campus to "get . . . gas" and "get situated." At approximately 12:30 p.m., while attempting to make a turn, Chambers accidentally drove his car over a median and into a ditch, and the car became inoperable. Chambers indicated that he had not had any alcohol to drink prior to this incident. Chambers testified that he suffered a panic attack during the accident because he was "going through some things at the time." He explained that his father, who was incarcerated, had contracted Covid, and that his older child and that child's mother were also in quarantine due to Covid.
Chambers got out of the car to assess the situation and estimated he had caused $4,000 worth of damage to the car. He called roadside assistance and was told he was outside of his coverage area, and that it would cost him approximately $400 to $500 to have his car towed. In addition, the accident caused Chambers considerable stress because it meant he would miss the planned drop-off of his son to the son's mother. Chambers "really didn't know what to do at that point" because it "was kind of . . . a tough situation," so at approximately 12:45 p.m. he had a drink of unmixed gin to help himself calm down. Chambers became intoxicated "very quickly," as he explained, because it was a "strong alcohol" and he had not had anything to eat that day. Chambers acknowledged drinking "two bottles" of gin in total.
Chambers stated unequivocally "100 percent" that he only consumed alcohol after the accident. He explained that he loved his son "a lot" and "would never put him in a situation" of driving while intoxicated. He did not recall refusing a breath test. Chambers recalled being booked into jail and asking the correctional officer what he was charged with because he "had no idea that [he] had a DUI."
While in jail, Chambers called his mother because he needed her to cosign his bail bond. Chambers explained that he "freaked out" during the phone call and became very upset when discussing the charges and the amount of money he needed for bail. He acknowledged stating he "had a DUI," but asserted that it was not an admission, "[i]t was more me just letting someone know what I was charged with so that they would be able to assist me to obtain bail." Chambers explained that when he said to his mother, "I made a mistake," the mistake to which he was referring was that he "made a mistake being charged with that crime."
C. The Verdict and Sentencing
Following trial, the jury found Chambers guilty on all counts and found true the allegations that Chambers had a blood alcohol level of 0.15 percent or more and that he willfully refused a peace officer's request to submit to a chemical test (§ 23577, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated court trial, the trial court found true the allegation that Chambers had three prior DUI convictions. The trial court suspended imposition of a four-year prison term and placed Chambers on five years of formal probation, which included 240 days in county jail and 60 days of credit for time served.
II. Discussion
A. Admission of the Unredacted Recording
Chambers argues that the jury's receipt of the unredacted jail call constituted prejudicial error warranting reversal of the judgment. He contends that the recording revealed his history of DUIs to the jury and thereby damaged his credibility. The Attorney General concedes that the admission of the recording violated the trial court's in limine ruling and thus constituted error, but argues that the error likely went unnoticed by the jury and even if it was noticed, it was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of Chambers's guilt.
1. Background
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved in limine to exclude any reference to Chambers's past record of criminal convictions, specifically, his prior DUI convictions. The trial court granted the request. Defense counsel also moved to exclude the audio recording of the phone call from jail that Chambers made to his mother because "[a] lot of this call is confusing. It's misleading. It's hard to make any sense of what's going on." The prosecution argued that the recording demonstrated Chambers's "consciousness of guilt" when he "said that he made a mistake. He admitted that he got a DUI."
The trial court ruled that the recording was admissible under Evidence Code sections 1220 and 1221, and that the probative weight was not outweighed by any prejudicial effect. Defense counsel later added that he was also concerned about the recording because Chambers referred to having" 'another'" DUI, and objected to its admission on that basis. The court responded that this was "a good catch," and agreed that the word" 'another,'" if it comes before a DUI, "certainly . . . should be redacted." The court later clarified: "The Court's ruling is subject to the limitation that any reference to another DUI will need to be redacted from both the transcript as well as the recording. So that will be the ruling."
At trial, the prosecutor asked to and received permission to publish the audio recording of the jail call to the jury. After about a minute of the call, in which Chambers can be heard crying and assuring his mother that his son was safe, Chambers tells his mother he "made a mistake" and needs to be bailed out. Then the following exchange occurs:
Prior to publishing, the trial court granted defense counsel's request that the jury not receive the transcript of the phone call until after the recording had been played. However, the prosecutor then realized he had inadvertently given the transcript to the jury earlier in the day as it was attached to another transcript. After the jury had been excused and the transcripts collected, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. Following argument, the trial court denied the motion.
"[Chambers's Mother]: What did you do? What happened?
"[Chambers]: I got a DUI. Okay, please. I just need to bail out. Okay, I just got another DUI. [Additional statements unclear.]
"[Chambers's Mother]: Wow."
Chambers's remaining statements become difficult to discern, as he again breaks down crying. Chambers eventually states, "I need help, mom. I need help," and, "I can't do this no more." Chambers's mother responds, "wow," several times. Chambers elaborates to his mother that his son was in the car when he got the DUI and eventually reiterates that he needs a co-signer for the bail bond.
After the audio recording was played in open court, the prosecutor distributed the corresponding transcript of the call to the jury. In contrast to the audio recording, the transcript was redacted to omit reference to "another DUI," as follows (with italics showing the altered phrase and asterisks from the original transcript):
"[Chambers's Mother]: What did you do? What happened?
"[Chambers]: I got a DUI okay, please, I just need to bail out. Okay? ****I got a DUI . . . ***why I'm fuckin' ****
"[Chambers's Mother]: Wow." (Italics added.)
Prior to distribution of the transcript, the trial court admonished the jury that "you are the finders of facts. So in other words, if there is a question in your minds when you are deliberating about what was said, the fact that something is written on the transcript is not evidence. The evidence is the call itself. And so the transcript is simply provided as a guide or an assist. But ultimately, the evidence is the call. And you ultimately determine what was said on the call if there is a question that arises about that."
2. Chambers was not prejudiced by the error
The California Supreme Court has described the mistaken receipt of items not in evidence as ordinary error," 'such as . . . an incorrect evidentiary ruling.'" (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 836 (Cooper).) Thus, Watson error review applies and "prejudice must be shown and reversal is not required unless there is a reasonable probability that an outcome more favorable to the defendant would have resulted." (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 668 (Clair); see also Cooper, at p. 836.)
In Clair, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and burglary, and was sentenced to death. (Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 645.) Prior to trial, the court found an audio recording involving the defendant "generally admissible" (id. at p. 665) because he "made a number of statements bearing on" the subject offenses. (Id. at p. 647.) The trial court, however, ordered portions of the recording redacted as "irrelevant and unduly prejudicial" (id. at p. 665) because the defendant "made what were apparently admissions" concerning two uncharged offenses. (Id. at p. 647.) During trial, the clerk inadvertently sent an unredacted audio recording and transcript into the jury room for examination on the mistaken belief that they had been received into evidence. The recording and transcript contained references to two other crimes allegedly committed by the defendant. (Id. at p. 665.) The clerk discovered the mistake later and informed the trial court. (Ibid.) The defendant moved for a new trial. (Ibid.) After examining the jurors, the trial court discovered that some of the jurors had noticed the unredacted recording and transcript; a few had recognized that the unredacted transcript differed from the redacted transcript; and none had noted the precise references to the two other crimes. (Id. at p. 666.) The trial court denied the new trial motion. (Id. at p. 667.)
The Clair court determined that the error did not constitute reversible error. (Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 669.) First, there was no indication that the jurors had noted the reference to the other alleged offenses. (Id. at p. 668.) "Second and dispositive," the court found that the references "must be deemed insignificant. That conclusion follows even when the references are viewed in isolation: they are brief and unemphatic. It is virtually compelled when they are considered in context: they are overshadowed by the statements about the [instant] burglary and murder." (Ibid.) The court also recognized that while the trial court correctly determined that the references were "unduly prejudicial," that determination "was simply an assessment that any benefit promised was not worth the cost threatened. It was not a decision that any harm would necessarily arise." (Id. at p. 669.)
Here, the jury's receipt of the unredacted audio recording, which we have carefully reviewed, violated the trial court's in limine ruling. However, as in Clair, prejudice has not been shown, nor is there a reasonable probability that an outcome more favorable to Chambers would have resulted absent the error. First, there is no indication that the jury heard Chambers reference to "another" DUI considering that the statement was made quickly and unemphatically in the context of an at-times-emotional five-minute recording. Indeed, the fact that the unredacted audio recording was played in open court and the mistake went unnoticed by defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the court suggests that the utterance was also unlikely detected by the jurors.
Notably, defense counsel described the audio recording as "confusing" and largely difficult to "make any sense of what's going on."
Second, prejudice is not reasonably probable considering the overwhelming evidence of Chambers's guilt. Confirmed in part by the body worn camera footage worn by Murphy, Chambers was found at the scene of the accident to be unresponsive, incoherent, and smelling of alcohol. His son, who had been in the backseat, was standing near the car. The accident appeared to have occurred with no traffic in the area and was not apparently near the beach or a gas station. Chambers was unable to complete a field sobriety test. He refused a breath test and eventually, after being compelled by court order, took a chemical blood test several hours later that reflected a blood alcohol level of 0.221 percent. In the audio recording presented to the jury, a very emotional Chambers told his mother that he had "made a mistake" and that he "got a DUI," which the jury could have reasonably interpreted as admissions of guilt in the context of the entire phone call. Even assuming the absence of error, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have returned a verdict more favorable to Chambers.
Chambers asserts that "the more stringent standard from Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 . . . applies because this error violated the federal [C]onstitution." We disagree. Chambers offers no authority supporting this position, and courts have consistently applied the Watson standard in these circumstances. (See Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 668; Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 836; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1213-1214.) In any case, even under the Chapman standard, we would still conclude "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)
Chambers argues that the prosecutor highlighted the jail call during closing argument, thereby increasing the prejudice. Not so. During the prosecutor's closing argument, he referenced the jail call and told the jury, "you have that audio in evidence" and "you can review it." However, in highlighting the call, the prosecutor focused on Chambers's statement, "I made a mistake." He argued that this demonstrated Chambers's "consciousness of guilt" because Chambers did not assert that the DUI charge was baseless, but rather Chambers "ma[de] an emotional statement admitting that he got a DUI; that he made a mistake; that he had his child inside the car with him while he got the DUI." Thus, the prosecutor's argument focused on aspects of the recording that had been deemed admissible; it did not increase the prejudice.
Chambers also contends that: the subject matter of the erroneously admitted evidence, a statement about a prior similar offense, increased the prejudice; the admission damaged his credibility when he testified; the jury did not receive any limiting instructions; and the absence of the offending phrase from the transcript does not mitigate the prejudice. As we discussed, however, it is unlikely the jury even heard the reference to "another DUI," especially given the error was apparently missed by the trial court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor. The fact that the transcript varied from the audio recording only reinforced the uncertainty about what was said. Beyond that, even assuming it was heard, the evidence of guilt was considerable and the evidence supporting Chambers's defense of drinking after the crash was lacking. Given all of this, the lack of a limiting instruction was hardly prejudicial. Accordingly, Chambers has not demonstrated that there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of error.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Chambers argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to ensure that the audio recording was properly redacted.
1. Legal Framework
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must establish both that his or her counsel's performance was deficient and that he or she suffered prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) The deficient performance component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a showing that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. (Id. at p. 688.) Regarding prejudice, a "defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability"-meaning "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome"-"that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." (Id. at p. 694.)
2. Chambers has not shown that trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective
The Attorney General contends that trial counsel's performance was not deficient "because he reasonably assumed the trial court's in limine ruling would have been followed and that the jail call introduced at trial would have been properly redacted." In this case, we need not determine whether trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Even assuming that Chambers could establish that trial counsel's performance was deficient here, Chambers cannot demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome.
As we discussed at length above, even though the admission of the unredacted audio recording was error, Chambers failed to show, absent the error, a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome. (See Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 668.) Applying that same analysis to the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, we must also conclude that even if trial counsel was deficient, Chambers has not shown a reasonable probability of a different outcome. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694; People v. Ocegueda (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1407, fn. 4 [noting "the Watson standard . . . is substantially the same as the prejudice prong of [Strickland]"].) Accordingly, because Chambers was not prejudiced by any assumed error on counsel's part, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel necessarily fails.
III. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., Danner, J.