Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Monterey County Super. Ct. No.SS053436
OPINION
McAdams, J.
Defendant Michael Chambers was charged by complaint with unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. (Veh. Code § 10851, subd. (a).) On November 7, 2006, the date set for preliminary hearing, the prosecution orally amended the complaint to charge receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code § 496, subd. (a).) Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant entered a plea of guilty to receiving stolen property. In exchange for his plea, defendant was promised, at most, felony probation with a maximum county jail term of one year, but that reduction to a misdemeanor was also a possibility. Before accepting defendant’s plea, the court advised defendant of his constitutional rights and the consequences of his plea. Defendant indicated his understanding and affirmed his wish to plead guilty. The court found there was a factual basis for the plea, based on defendant’s personal admission that the charge was true. Defendant was released on his own recognizance and referred to probation for a report. At sentencing, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for three years on various terms and conditions, including 365 days in the county jail with credit for 104 days of credit for time served. Defendant was informed that upon completion of his jail sentence and one year from the date of release, the charge could be reduced to a misdemeanor. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal and an amended notice of appeal citing sentencing error.
These included the requirement that defendant maintain gainful employment, unless disabled, and the payment of probation costs consisting of $644 for the report and $41 per month for supervision, or some portion thereof, depending on defendant’s ability to pay. The qualification that defendant maintain gainful employment unless disabled was added at defense counsel’s specific request. In our view, such a requirement is reasonably related to a stolen property crime, and not unconstitutionally overbroad. In addition, Penal Code section 1203.1b, subdivision (a), provides that a defendant may be ordered to pay “all or a portion of the reasonable cost of any probation supervision,” depending upon the defendant’s ability to pay. (Italics added.) In our view, the costs proposed by the probation department appear reasonable.
Because defendant entered a plea of guilty prior to the preliminary hearing, our factual summary is drawn from the probation officer’s report.
Defendant rented a van from Budget Rent-a-Car on September 2, 2005. When he failed to return the van as promised, Budget filed a stolen vehicle report with the police.
On January 17, 2006, police arrested one Yolanda Munoz as she exited the van. She told police that the van had been parked in front of her house for nine months and was occupied by a person named “Mike” and another man.
On September 26, 2006, defendant was arrested after he was seen riding a bike without front and rear lamps. A record check revealed the outstanding warrant for the vehicle theft.
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent defendant in this court. On April 25, 2007, appointed counsel filed an opening brief which states the case and the facts but raises no specific issues. That same day we sent a letter notifying defendant of his right to submit written argument in his own behalf within 30 days. To date, defendant has not submitted any writing to this court.
However, in his first, pro per notice of appeal, defendant hand wrote: “Upon sentencing his [i.e., the judge’s] biased opinion of me calling me ‘a drug addict’ saying I’ll be shooting up drugs the moment I am freed from custody. For God sake, this is a receiving stolen prop [sic] case!”
The probation report reveals that defendant, age 53, admitted to the probation officer that he had a long history of abusing drugs, including alcohol, methamphetamine, and marijuana, some of which history dated back to his teenage years. He said that he had been clean and sober since 2002, until his recent relapse: he began using “crack” again under the stress of his mother’s recent death. The probation report also revealed that defendant’s criminal history included several drug related offenses, as well as several felony convictions, a prior state prison term, and several probation and parole violations.
Although defendant had been released on his own recognizance after entering his plea, he was in custody at sentencing due to “the fact that Mr. Chambers did pick up a new drug case while he was released.” Nevertheless, defendant personally asked to be re-released for 30 days before being sentenced “to get me [sic] health issues taken care of….” Before sentencing defendant, the court addressed defendant’s request, saying: “I can’t let you out by the way right now for any reason. You’re either not going to show up or you’re going to shoot up or something. I can’t take that risk. [¶] The Sheriff’s department is responsible for your health. So if you need medical treatment, they have the power and the authority to take you to the hospital for that treatment.” Given defendant’s history of drug problems and the recent violation of his own recognizance release, the judge’s comments reflect a reasonable assessment of defendant’s risk of reoffense or absconding if he were to be re-released on his own recognizance before sentencing.
Nor does it appear that the court’s decision to impose a one-year county jail sentence was influenced by defendant’s violation of his own recognizance release or pending drug case. The probation report recommended a year in the county jail “[a]s a motivation to discourage any further criminal behavior.” In light of defendant’s lengthy criminal record, no bias or abuse of discretion appears.
Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we have reviewed the entire record and have concluded that there is no arguable issue on appeal. (See also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 124.)
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., Duffy, J.