Opinion
A147185
08-24-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM CHAMBERLIN, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 140174)
William Chamberlin appeals following jury verdicts convicting him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (id., § 246), and finding him legally sane at the time of the crimes. His sole challenge on appeal asserts instructional error in the sanity phase. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
We recite only those background facts relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
A. Guilt Phase
Appellant lived next door to the victim, Samuel Morales. On October 13, 2013, appellant and others were sitting outside a nearby home. Morales approached and appellant reacted angrily. When Morales drove away, appellant followed in his car. Appellant sped to catch up with Morales, and fatally shot him.
Appellant testified in his own defense. Prior to the shooting, appellant believed Morales had threatened to shoot appellant, had an affair with appellant's girlfriend, looked in appellant's window when he was "intimate" with women, brought people to watch appellant use drugs, was trying to "defame" appellant to get his job, and was stalking appellant. On October 13, Morales told appellant he knew where his wife and children lived—reciting the correct address—and said he was going to kill appellant's children. Appellant heard a metal object in Morales's backpack and thought it was a gun. Morales then drove away. Appellant believed Morales was on his way to kill appellant's family and decided he had no choice but to kill Morales "to eliminate the threat." He followed and killed him. B. Sanity Phase
On cross-examination, appellant testified that his wife and children lived approximately an hour and forty minutes drive away.
The parties' experts agreed that appellant was delusional when he killed Morales, but disagreed about whether the delusions were caused by a mental disorder or by past methamphetamine use. They further disagreed about whether he was incapable of understanding that his act was legally and morally wrong. Two defense experts testified appellant told them he believed killing Morales was legally and morally right because it was necessary to save his children's lives. The prosecution expert testified there was no evidence appellant did not understand that killing Morales was both legally and morally wrong.
The jury was instructed, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3450, that appellant was legally insane if he had "a mental disease or defect" when he committed the crimes and, "because of that disease or defect he . . . was incapable of knowing or understanding that his act was morally or legally wrong." Over defense objection, the jury was further instructed with the following pinpoint instruction requested by the prosecutor: "The issue of moral wrong is to be judged by society's generally accepted standards of moral obligations." The trial court rejected defense counsel's request to modify the pinpoint instruction to add that "if a qualifying mental illness causes delusions, or contributes to delusions, that lead to the crime, the moral wrong would be applied as if the defendant's understanding of the facts were true," noting counsel "can argue that." The jury found appellant legally sane.
In closing arguments, defense counsel conceded there was no evidence to support an alternative basis, that appellant was "incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act." --------
DISCUSSION
Appellant concedes the pinpoint instruction was a correct statement of law, but argues it "was incomplete and misleading because it suggested the jury could ignore the reality presented by a defendant's delusions in deciding whether he knew his act was morally wrong." " 'A defendant challenging an instruction as being subject to erroneous interpretation by the jury must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in the way asserted by the defendant. [Citations.]' [Citation.] ' "[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction." ' " (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 822.)
The legal standard is not in dispute. " '[M]oral obligation in the context of the insanity defense means generally accepted moral standards and not those standards peculiar to the accused.' " (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 608, overruled on another ground by Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069 & fn. 13.) However, when a defendant suffers from delusions, the generally accepted moral standards are applied to the facts believed by the defendant. In other words, the defendant " 'must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if under the influence of his delusion he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes in self-defense, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment.' " (People v. Rittger (1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 732; see also People v. Leeds (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 822, 832 [the defendant "was legally insane if, because of a mental disease or defect that he had when he committed the crimes, he actually believed that he was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury and that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against the danger"].) Thus, appellant argues: "If the jury believed appellant had a delusion that Morales was going to kill appellant's wife and children, it could have concluded his decision to kill Morales was consistent with society's generally accepted moral standards."
We find no reasonable likelihood that the jury construed the pinpoint instruction to direct the consideration of moral wrong be based on the actual facts, regardless of appellant's delusions. First, the pinpoint instruction solely addressed the governing standard of morality, and was completely silent about the facts or perceived facts. Second, the jury was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3450 that it must determine whether, because of "a mental disease or defect," appellant "was incapable of knowing or understanding that his act was morally or legally wrong." Assuming the jury found appellant suffered from a mental disease or defect, the only relevant symptom or effect of that mental disease was delusions, so CALCRIM No. 3450 effectively instructed the jury to determine whether the delusions rendered appellant incapable of knowing his act was morally or legally wrong. Third, it was indisputable that Morales's killing, considered without regard to appellant's delusions, was morally wrong. Yet the prosecutor's closing statement did not so argue.
Indeed, the parties' closing arguments bolster our conclusion that there is no reasonable likelihood the jury understood the pinpoint instruction in the manner appellant suggests. Defense counsel argued appellant thought the killing "was legally right, because he was acting in defense of others. And he thought it was morally right because he was keeping this man from killing his children." His delusions, she continued, "made him incapable of realizing that Mr. Morales was just his next door neighbor who was minding his own business." In rebuttal, defense counsel reiterated the argument: "Because of the delusion he thinks that the victim is going to kill his children if he doesn't stop him. That's what he thinks. And that made him incapable of knowing that his actions were wrong" because "it's well within the range of normal moral standards that if you have to kill to protect your children you will." In light of defense counsel's express argument that the jury consider the facts as presented by appellant's delusions, it is not reasonably likely the jury understood the pinpoint instruction to preclude such consideration.
In addition, the prosecutor did not argue the jury was so precluded. Instead, she argued: "Nowhere in that instruction [CALCRIM No. 3450] will it tell you that if you're engaging in vigilante justice does that mean that you think killing is moral"; "[appellant] knows killing generally is wrong, despite the delusions"; "the defendant is not not guilty by reason of insanity because everybody knows murder is wrong. Having a motive to kill, based on a delusion, doesn't cut it." The prosecutor's argument was that it is not morally right to kill someone who states a future intent to kill your children, and appellant knew this. Appellant points to the prosecutor's statement that the pinpoint instruction is "the most important jury instruction." The prosecutor's emphasis on the pinpoint instruction was in service of her argument that the killing, even accepting the facts of appellant's delusions, was not morally right: "Criminals don't get to decide, Well, I felt justified because my boss screwed me over, or my ex-wife cheated on me, or this man sexually abused my daughter, or so I felt morally justified in killing that person. That's not the way it works. It's society's moral standards
In sum, we find no reasonable likelihood that the jury construed the pinpoint instruction to preclude them from considering the facts presented by appellant's delusions when evaluating whether appellant was incapable of understanding his act was morally wrong.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
SIMONS, J. We concur. /s/_________
JONES, P.J. /s/_________
NEEDHAM, J.