People v. Chalmars

11 Citing cases

  1. Chalmers v. Mitchell

    73 F.3d 1262 (2d Cir. 1996)   Cited 115 times
    Holding that although prosecutor misstated the law and the court did not sustain the objections by defense, it was "not reasonably likely that the jury applied the incorrect standard" because of the court's proper instructions

    Appellant was charged with and convicted of criminal possession and sale of narcotics and criminal possession of a weapon after a jury trial in New York Supreme Court in Kings County. After an unsuccessful journey through the state appellate courts, People v. Chalmers, 176 A.D.2d 239, 574 N.Y.S.2d 205 (2d Dep't 1991), leave to appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d 854, 580 N.Y.S.2d 726, 588 N.E.2d 761 (1992), where he claimed that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the drug-related convictions and that the jury instructions were so flawed regarding the definition of reasonable doubt as to constitute a due process violation, appellant filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court. Chalmers contends that his conviction violated his federal due process rights in two ways.

  2. People v. Lassiter

    2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 6846 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)

    The defendant's factual allocution to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree was sufficient (see Penal Law § 265.03; People v Chalmars, 176 AD2d 239, 240). The defendant's contention that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel is based, in part, on matter appearing on the record and, in part, on matter outside the record, and, thus, constitutes a "mixed claim" of ineffective assistance (People v Maxwell, 89 AD3d 1108, 1109; see People v Rosado, 134 AD3d 1133). It is not evident from the matter appearing on the record that the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel (see People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705; People v Love, 57 NY2d 998; People v Hernandez, 125 AD3d 885, 886-887; People v Maxwell, 89 AD3d at 1109).

  3. People v. Coleman

    26 A.D.3d 773 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 13 times

    The officers recovered crack cocaine, money and packaging materials in the kitchen, and in a nearby bedroom they found four prescription receipts in defendant's name that listed the apartment as defendant's address. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, as we must ( see People v. Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the inference that defendant was acting in concert with his codefendants who sold the cocaine from the apartment ( see People v. Chalmars, 176 AD2d 239, lvdenied 79 NY2d 854). Likewise, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fourth degrees because, "[w]hen narcotics are found in open view in a room on private premises, every person `in close proximity' to the drugs at the time of discovery is presumed by statute [i.e., Penal Law § 220.25 (2)] to have knowingly possessed them" ( People v. Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 630-631). We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit.

  4. People v. King

    264 A.D.2d 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 4 times

    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the circumstances, the only logical inference that could flow from the evidence was that the defendant was in constructive possession of the contraband by exercising dominion and control over the area where it was located ( see, Penal Law § 10.00; People v. Chalmars, 176 A.D.2d 239) and that the defendant possessed the cocaine with intent to sell ( see, Penal Law § 220.16; People v. Monroe, 186 A.D.2d 93; People v. Vailes, 150 A.D.2d 406). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15).

  5. People v. King

    (N.Y. App. Div. Aug. 9, 1999)

    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the circumstances, the only logical inference that could flow from the evidence was that the defendant was in constructive possession of the contraband by exercising dominion and control over the area where it was located ( see, Penal Law § 10.00; People v. Chalmars, 176 A.D.2d 239) and that the defendant possessed the cocaine with intent to sell ( see, Penal Law § 220.16; People v. Monroe, 186 A.D.2d 93; People v. Vailes, 150 A.D.2d 406). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15).

  6. People v. Bundy

    235 A.D.2d 334 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)   Cited 7 times

    This photograph demonstrated that defendant was not a casual visitor but had been present in the apartment on a previous occasion, as the prosecutor argued in his summation. Thus, the evidence was legally sufficient to prove defendant constructively possessed all the contraband, and the jury's verdict was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, People v Chalmars, 176 AD2d 239, 240, lv denied 79 NY2d 854). The jury reached the only reasonable conclusion based on the evidence, i.e., that defendant constructively possessed the contraband found inside and just outside the apartment as one of the participants in the activities in the narcotics factory in the apartment. Defendant's claim that her sentence for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree was unconstitutional because it constitutes "cruel and unusual" punishment is unpreserved for review, since defendant moved at sentencing only to have the conviction on this count vacated, not on this ground but in the interests of justice.

  7. In re Hui H.

    232 A.D.2d 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)   Cited 4 times

    Appellant's Dunaway claim is unpreserved since it was not made before the suppression court, and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. Were we to consider it, we would find reasonable suspicion for the initial stop ( cf., People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 590, cert denied 449 US 1023), and would find that a confirmatory identification provided a valid ground for the arrest ( see, People v Ocasio, 216 AD2d 157, lv denied 86 NY2d 845). Since a Dunaway motion would not have had merit, it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for the third assigned counsel not to have made such application as part of the Family Court proceedings ( see, Matter of Jermaine B., 180 AD2d 607), and the representation, in its totality, was meaningful ( see, People v Flores, 84 NY2d 184, 186-187; People v Whyte, 228 AD2d 395). Appellant's constructive possession of the firearm used by the cohort in the perpetration of the abduction was sufficiently proven ( see, People v Chalmars, 176 AD2d 239, 240, lv denied 79 NY2d 854).

  8. People v. Ross

    209 A.D.2d 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)   Cited 2 times

    The defendant's claim that he has automatic standing to contest the lawfulness of the search of the apartment and the seizure of the narcotics and sawed-off rifle is raised for the first time on appeal and thus is not preserved for appellate review (see, People v. Cofresi, 60 N.Y.2d 728, 730). "Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom" (People v. Giuliano, 65 N.Y.2d 766, 768), we find that the circumstantial evidence adduced at the trial was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v. Chalmars, 176 A.D.2d 239). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15). The trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in closing the courtroom during the undercover officer's testimony (see, People v. Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d 436, 443; People v Reece, 204 A.D.2d 495).

  9. People v. Guerra

    199 A.D.2d 412 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)   Cited 6 times

    05; People v Salas, 192 A.D.2d 627). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom (see, People v Giuliano, 65 N.Y.2d 766, 768), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Chalmars, 176 A.D.2d 239). Under the circumstances herein, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant, acting in concert with his accomplice, burglarized the complainant's home. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we find that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).

  10. People v. Boston

    179 A.D.2d 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)

    Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15; People v Chalmars, 176 A.D.2d 239). We find that the sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 83-84).