Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIF138104, Bernard Schwartz, Judge.
Stephen S. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Gil Gonzalez, Andrew Mestman, and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
McKinster, J.
On August 27, 2007, the Riverside County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant and appellant Kim Ray Chaisson with (1) failing to register as a sex offender within five working days of changing his residence, in violation of former Penal Code section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A) (count 1); failing to register, as a sex offender, all residence addresses, in violation of former section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(B) (count 2); and (3) misdemeanor providing false information on registrations forms, in violation of former section 290, subdivision (g)(9) (count 3). The information also alleged that defendant had suffered one prior strike conviction under sections 667, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1), and 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1).
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. Although section 290 was repealed and replaced by the Sex Offender Registration Act, effective October 13, 2007 (Stats. 2007, ch. 579, § 8, p. 3741), in this opinion we refer to the version of section 290 in effect at the time of defendant was charged with the offenses at issue in this appeal.
Following a jury trial, on November 14, 2007, the jury found defendant guilty on counts 2 and 3, as charged, and not guilty on count 1. In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted the prior strike allegation. On January 18, 2008, defendant was sentenced to two years eight months in state prison. The sentence comprised of the low term of 16 months doubled under the three strikes law.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury with a definition of “residence.” For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was convicted of a felony sex offense that required him to register as a convicted sex offender under former section 290.
Tamina Duncan, a sex offender registration clerk for the City of Riverside testified that former section 290 required all sex offender registrants to register all residences annually within five days of their birthday. All sex offender registrants must also register or re-register within five days of changing his or her residence. Moreover, former section 290 required that, if a sex offender registrant has more than one residence at which they regularly reside, regardless of the number of days or nights they spend at each address, they must register all of the addresses.
On August 7, 2006, defendant registered his address with the Riverside Police Department. He indicated his permanent address was 4357 Monroe Street in Riverside, California. He had been registered solely at that address since December of 2002. Defendant also initialed the requirement that he must register each residence at which he regularly resides regardless of the number of days or nights he spends at each address.
On June 26, 2007, Riverside County Deputy Probation Officer Greg St. Claire conducted a compliance check to verify that defendant was living at the Monroe Street address. He returned on July 19, 2007, and spoke with the owner of the property, James Daniels. Daniels told Officer St. Claire that Daniels and defendant were friends and that defendant had lived at that address eight to 10 years ago. Daniels stated that defendant continued to receive “junk mail” at the address, which defendant would pick up “[o]nce every couple of weeks.” Daniels also told Officer St. Claire that Daniels last saw defendant one week prior; Daniels thought that defendant may be living with Sandra, the mother of his child in Perris, or with his current girlfriend in Rialto.
On August 3, 2007, defendant was arrested at his place of employment. Following defendant’s arrest, Officer St. Claire interviewed Daniels again, which was recorded. The recorded interview was played for the jury. At this interview, Daniels told the officer that defendant “never really lived” at the Monroe Street residence, but stayed for a month in a trailer “at least 10 years ago.” Daniels also stated that defendant comes by the house once every two weeks. Daniels reiterated that defendant “never” spent the night at the house. Daniels was unaware that defendant was using Daniels’s address to register as a sex offender.
At trial, Daniels testified that he has lived at the Monroe Street house since 1971. Defendant, a family friend, lived in a trailer on the driveway of the house approximately four or five years prior. Daniels also testified that in July, defendant was “not really” living with Daniels, but would sometimes sleep on Daniels’s couch a couple nights. Additionally, Daniels confirmed that defendant came by the house to get mail every two weeks. Daniels further testified that when he told Officer St. Claire that defendant had not lived at the Monroe Street house in almost 10 years, he was telling the truth.
Daniels’s girlfriend, Angela Rachal, also lived at the Monroe Street house. She testified that defendant lived in a trailer on the property about eight years earlier. Up until about four or five months prior, defendant would occasionally spend the night at the house on the couch. According to Rachal, defendant sometimes slept in his car on the driveway of the Monroe Street house. In the previous four months, defendant had spent the night at the house on one occasion.
Defendant’s girlfriend, Denise Miles, testified that she currently resided at a home on West Rialto Avenue in San Bernardino. During the six months previous to his arrest, defendant would spend the night at her apartment two nights a week, and would spend “maybe three” days per week with her. Defendant also had received certified mail at her apartment, for which defendant signed. Moreover, defendant kept clothing at her apartment in a drawer and closet.
Defendant had not registered any addresses in the City of San Bernardino.
Defense investigator Elia Joseph testified at trial. Joseph testified that she spoke to Daniels and Rachal in October. Daniels told the investigator that defendant lived at the house approximately three weeks out of the month, sleeping on the couch or in his car. Joseph testified that Rachal stated defendant lived in the house “off and on” and kept several changes of clothing there.
II
DISCUSSION
The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury with a definition of “residence.” We disagree.
A. Background
In count 2, defendant was charged with failing to register as a sex offender at all residence addresses at which he regularly resided, regardless of the number of days or nights spent there, in violation of former section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(B).
At the time of trial, former section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(B), stated:
While discussing the jury instructions, defense counsel, citing People v. Horn (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 408, 414 (Horn), and People v. Annin (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 725 (Annin), requested that the court provide the jury with an instruction defining “residence” as follows: “As used in this instruction the term residence means a temporary or permanent dwelling place, which one keeps and to which one intends to return, as opposed to a place where one rests or shelters during a trip or a transient visit.”
Annin was modified and reprinted at 117 Cal.App.4th 591.
The trial court, relying on People v. McCleod (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1205 (McCleod), denied defendant’s request. The court noted that it would provide the instruction if the jury asked for a definition of “residence.” The court, however, indicated that it believed the term was sufficiently defined with the instructions provided.
The trial court instructed the jury, with regard to count 2, as follows:
“The defendant is accused in Count 2 of having violated Penal Code section 290(a)(1)(B), a felony. [¶] In order to prove this crime, each of the following elements must be proved: [¶]... [¶] 4. The defendant willfully failed to register at all residence addresses at which he regularly resided, regardless of the number of days or nights spent there....”
On November 14, 2007, the jury found defendant guilty on count 2. The jury had no questions for the court during deliberations.
B. Analysis
The trial court is required to instruct the jury on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 715.) The court has an additional obligation to give, on the defendant’s request, a “pinpoint” instruction relating to particular elements of the charged crime or highlighting the focus of the defendant’s case. (People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 648; People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 337.)
The law, however, “is settled that when terms have no technical meaning peculiar to the law, but are commonly understood by those familiar with the English language, instructions as to their meaning are not required.” (People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 639.) In other words, “[c]ommonly understood terms need not be defined for the jury.” (McCleod, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216.)
In McCleod, the court determined the word “residence” in former section 290 is a “commonly understood” term and no further definition was required. There, the defendant argued that the trial court had misinstructed the jury on the elements of former section 290 because the court failed to provide the jury with a definition of “residence.” (McCleod, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216.) The jury had requested such a definition, but before one was prepared, the jurors returned a verdict of guilty. On appeal, the defendant claimed it was error for the trial court to allow the jury to continue deliberating pending receipt of the requested information. (Id. at pp. 1214-1215.) The appellate court found no error because the term “residence,” as used in former section 290, subdivision (f), is “so easily understood by a person of common intelligence... that further definition is not required.” (McCleod, at pp. 1218-1219.)
Notwithstanding, defendant claims that a pinpoint instruction on the definition of “residence” was required, citing Horn, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 408, and Annin, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 591. Neither case supports defendant’s contention.
In Horn, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 408, the issue was whether a defendant could have more than one “residence” within the meaning of former section 290, and therefore whether the trial court’s jury instruction to that effect was correct. (Horn, at pp. 413-420.) Here, there is no dispute that defendant could have more than one residence under former section 290. Because the court in Horn did not require that a pinpoint instruction be given on the definition of a residence, the case does not support defendant’s contention.
In Annin, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 591, 600, the issue was whether there was substantial evidence to support a finding that the defendant violated former section 290, subdivision (f)(1). In holding that there was substantial evidence, the court noted that “[t]he jury was given an instruction that defined ‘residence’ as ‘a temporary or permanent dwelling place, which one keeps and to which one intends to return, as opposed to a place where one rests or shelters during a trip, or a transient visit.’ If anything, this definition, derived from People v. Horn (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 408, 414 (Horn), was arguably slightly more restrictive than the statute requires because it approximates the more exclusive concept of ‘domicile.’” (Annin, at p. 601, fn. 6.) Again, the court did not require that a pinpoint instruction be given on the definition of “residence.”
Based on the above, we hold that the trial court properly recognized that, because the term “residence” is a commonly understood term, no further definition was required.
Assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury with defendant’s proposed instruction, we find the error to be harmless because there is not a reasonable probability that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had the instruction been given. (People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1144, citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see also People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1111-1112 [trial court’s denial of defendant’s pinpoint instruction harmless under Watson].)
In this case, defendant’s girlfriend, Denise Miles, testified that she lived on West Rialto Avenue in the City of San Bernardino. Six months prior to his arrest, defendant spent the night at her apartment at least two nights a week, and spent “maybe three” days per week with her. Defendant also received mail and kept clothing at her apartment. Moreover, Daniels and his girlfriend, Rachal, who resided on Monroe Street in Riverside, testified that defendant came by the house every couple of weeks and picked up mail there. Defendant, however, did not reside there on a regular basis. Based on this evidence, there was more than ample evidence that defendant regularly resided at Miles’s apartment in San Bernardino, but failed to register that address.
Defendant, however, argues that because defendant was acquitted on count 1, the evidence on defendant’s conviction on count 2 cannot be substantial or overwhelming. We reject this argument. In acquitting defendant on count 1, the jury in essence found that defendant still resided at the Monroe Street address. This finding does not negate a finding that defendant also resided at his girlfriend’s apartment. As provided above, under former section 290, defendant had a duty to register all residence addresses at which he regularly resided. Hence, under former section 290, a defendant could have more than one residence—Daniels’s home on Monroe Street and Miles’s apartment on West Rialto Avenue.
In sum, we hold that the trial court properly instructed the jury in that no definition of “residence” was required. And, even if the court erred in failing to provide this instruction, any such error was harmless.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ramirez, P.J., Richli, J.
“If the person who is registering has more than one residence address at which he or she regularly resides, he or she shall register in accordance with subparagraph (A) in each of the jurisdictions in which he or she regularly resides, regardless of the number of days or nights spent there. If all of the addresses are within the same jurisdiction, the person shall provide the registering authority with all of the addresses where he or she regularly resides.”