Opinion
A153933
01-27-2020
In re C.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.F., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. J39049)
In a nonpublished decision filed April 2, 2019, we affirmed the juvenile court's dispositional order that placed minor C.F. on probation subject to various terms and conditions, including a condition that he submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices. (In re C.F. (Apr. 2, 2019, A153933) [nonpub. opn.] at pp. 12, 13, review granted June 19, 2019, S255731.) Specifically, this condition requires C.F. to " '[c]onsent to a search by a Probation Officer, with or without a warrant, of all electronic devices within your control at any time of day or night. Electronic devices includes computers, laptops, tablets, notepads, and cell phones/smart phones. Provide the Probation Officer any passwords, logins, access codes or other information necessary to access the electronic device and the following electronic accounts: e-mail, voicemail, text messaging, and social media accounts including Facebook, My Space, MocoSpace, Instagram, Snapchat, etc." (hereinafter, electronics search condition). (Id. at p. 4.)
In our previous decision, we modified another condition of C.F.'s probation that related to his possession or use of weapons. (In re C.F., supra, A153933, at pp. 12-13, rev.gr.) C.F. does not challenge this modification.
Rejecting C.F.'s challenge to this probation condition, we held in relevant part that: (1) the condition did not run afoul of the standard for reasonableness set forth in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent); (2) the juvenile court reasonably understood that, given the widespread use by young persons in general and by C.F.'s associates in particular of social media and electronic devices like smart phones, a broad electronics search condition was needed to ensure C.F.'s rehabilitation and to deter his involvement in future criminal activity; and (3) the record reasonably supported the juvenile court's decision that, given C.F.'s significant involvement in serious criminal activity that was both instigated and facilitated by use of electronic devices and social media, the broad electronics search condition inclusive of all of his electronic devices, electronic communications, voicemail and social media accounts was constitutionally permissible and reasonably necessary for his rehabilitation and for public safety. (In re C.F., supra, A153933, at pp. 10-12, rev.gr.)
In Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at page 486, the California Supreme Court held that a probation condition should be stricken as invalid where the condition: " '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .' " (Italics added.)
The California Supreme Court thereafter granted C.F.'s petition for review. On October 16, 2019, the court transferred this case back to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider his challenge in light of In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.), decided on August 15, 2019. Neither party filed supplemental briefing with respect to the court's directions.
In Ricardo P., the California Supreme Court struck down a probation condition permitting searches of a juvenile's electronic devices with or without a warrant, imposed after the juvenile admitted two felony burglary counts. The majority reasoned that "the record here, which contains no indication that Ricardo had used or will use electronic devices in connection with drugs or any illegal activity, is insufficient to justify the substantial burdens imposed by this electronics search condition. The probation condition is not reasonably related to future criminality and is therefore invalid under Lent." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1116-1117.)
Justice Liu wrote the majority opinion, with Justices Cuéllar, Kruger and Groban concurring, holding that the electronics search condition failed to meet the Lent test for reasonableness. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1115, 1128-1129.) Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye wrote a separate dissent/concurrence, with Justices Chin and Corrigan concurring, in which she opined the challenged probation met the Lent test given the juvenile court's "particularly broad latitude in crafting appropriate conditions of probation," while also agreeing with the majority that the condition must be stricken because, as drafted, it was constitutionally overbroad. (Id. at pp. 1129-1131, 1140 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.) --------
After revisiting this case with the insight provided by the California Supreme Court, we now remand it to the juvenile court with instructions to strike the current electronics search condition and, if appropriate, to recraft such condition more narrowly in a manner consistent with Ricardo P.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following is a brief recitation of the relevant facts that are set forth more fully in our previous opinion. (In re C.F., supra, A153933, at pp. 1-4, rev.gr.) The operative juvenile wardship petition was filed in January 2018, alleging C.F., age 16, committed carjacking (count 1), second degree robbery (count 2), and conspiracy to commit robbery (count 3). It was further alleged each count was a felony within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) and that C.F. was armed with a firearm when committing each. C.F. subsequently admitted committing second degree robbery (count 2) while armed with a firearm and was placed on probation subject to various terms and conditions, including the aforementioned electronics search condition. The remaining counts and allegations were dismissed.
The probation report filed in connection with this matter included the following information. On January 20, 2018, Anthony Guzman, age 19, contacted M.M. (the victim) through Snapchat, a social media application, and arranged to meet him in a park to buy marijuana from him and smoke it with him. Unknown to the victim, Guzman had earlier contacted C.F. and C.F.'s cousin about "doing a 'lick' " on someone at the park.
Guzman then drove C.F., his cousin, and two other youths to the park. During the drive, Guzman told everyone his plan for them to rob the victim before handing out masks and various weapons, including a tire jack and semiautomatic handgun. Guzman instructed C.F. to use the handgun to steal the victim's phone and car keys and to search his car. Although C.F. told Guzman that he did not want to do it, he felt he had no choice.
Once at the park, Guzman and the victim conducted the marijuana sale, after which the other individuals (including C.F.) approached wearing masks and wielding weapons. One of them ordered the victim to hand over his car keys, and when the victim asked whether they were joking, minor pointed the gun at him, pulled and released the slide as if chambering a round, and responded, "Does this look like a joke?" Scared, the victim handed over his keys. C.F. and his cohorts took the victim's keys and Guzman's backpack and went to the victim's car to search it for money and drugs. After they left, the victim began to suspect he had been set up and confronted Guzman, who denied involvement and left to (he said) find the suspects. Minutes later, the victim tried to contact Guzman on Snapchat but discovered he had been blocked.
The victim then called a friend, who came to pick him up in his car. While the victim was sitting in his friend's car, he saw the suspects return to his car and unsuccessfully attempt to enter it. The suspects fled in Guzman's car as the victim and his friend pursued them. The suspects managed to get away but returned to the scene later, at which point one of them was able to enter and steal the victim's car. The victim and his friend pulled up in the friend's car to confront those suspects (including C.F.) still sitting in Guzman's car. C.F., masked and seated in the backseat, rolled down his window and pointed his gun at them as Guzman's car drove away. Ultimately, the victim reported the theft of his car to the police, who were able to locate it abandoned on the side of a road. C.F. and his cohorts were detained a short time later at a nearby Burger King.
Following a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court declared wardship over C.F., placed him on probation subject to various terms and conditions, and committed him to juvenile hall, to be followed by juvenile camp. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
C.F. petitioned the California Supreme Court for review of the following three issues: (1) whether this court misapplied the Lent reasonableness test when rejecting his challenge to the electronics search condition; (2) whether juveniles are subject to more intrusive electronics search conditions than adults; and (3) whether a probation condition permitting unlimited warrantless searches of electronic devices in a minor's control is constitutionally overbroad and vague where the minor did not use any such devices in the commission of the offense. In granting the petition, the California Supreme Court has instructed that we reconsider his challenge in light of Ricardo P.
As explained in our previous decision (In re C.F., supra, A153933, at p. 5, rev.gr.), juvenile courts have broad discretion to impose appropriate probation conditions in a particular case based on the circumstances of the juvenile's crime, as well as his or her entire social history. (In re Binh L. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194, 203; see In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 753-754; In re R. V. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239, 246; see also Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1131 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.) [noting the juvenile court's "particularly broad latitude in crafting appropriate conditions of probation"].) "A condition of probation which is [legally] impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court." (In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 19.) This circumstance reflects the unique role the juvenile court serves in both rehabilitating juvenile delinquents and protecting public safety. (In re Carlos J. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1, 5-6.)
A "condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality . . . ." (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Under the Lent test, "[a] condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .' " (Ibid.) This test is conjunctive such that " 'all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. [Citations.] As such, even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality.' [Citation.]" (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403.)
We previously held the electronics search condition was valid because the third prong of the Lent test was not satisfied on this record. (In re C.F., supra, A153933 at p. 9, rev.gr.) In Ricardo P., the California Supreme Court held that a probation condition was not reasonably related to a minor's future criminality—and thus invalid under Lent's third prong—where the record "contains no indication that [the minor] had used or will use electronic devices in connection with . . . any illegal activity . . . ." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1116.) Specifically, the record in Ricardo P. reflected that the juvenile court imposed the electronics search condition solely to enable probation officers to monitor whether the juvenile was communicating about drugs or with people associated with drugs even though "there [wa]s no suggestion in the record or by the Attorney General that Ricardo ha[d] ever used electronic devices to commit, plan, discuss, or even consider unlawful use or possession of drugs or any other criminal activity." (Id. at p. 1119.) Under these circumstances, the electronics search condition imposed a burden on the juvenile's privacy that was "substantially disproportionate to the condition's goal of monitoring and deterring drug use" and was therefore not reasonably related to preventing future criminality. (Id. at pp. 1119-1121 ["Lent's third prong requires more than just an abstract or hypothetical relationship between the probation condition and preventing future criminality"].)
After concluding the electronics search condition was invalid, the Ricardo P. court did not simply strike it. Rather, the court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, stating: "We do not decide whether there is sufficient basis in the present record to support the Court of Appeal's suggestion that the juvenile court, on remand, may restrict the condition to search of 'electronic information that is reasonably likely to reveal whether Ricardo is boasting about his drug use or activity, such as text and voicemail messages, photographs, e-mails, and social-media accounts.' Nor do we address how the parameters of such a condition might be delineated." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1124, 1129.) The court explained that its holding did not categorically invalidate electronics search conditions because, "[i]n certain cases, the probationer's offense or personal history may provide the juvenile court with a sufficient factual basis from which it can determine that an electronics search condition is a proportional means of deterring the probationer from future criminality." (Id. at pp. 1128-1129.)
Applying the Court's analysis and holding to our case, we first note that, unlike in Ricardo P., our record does contain facts indicating C.F. could use electronics devices in connection with future illegal activity. As we previously explained: "The record reflects minor's partner-in-crime, Guzman, instigated the criminal activity in this case by contacting the victim to set up the robbery through a social media application, Snapchat. Messaging the victim via this application, Guzman lured him to a park, ostensibly to sell and smoke marijuana. And it was there minor first involved himself in the robbery, pulling out a semiautomatic weapon, releasing the slide back and pointing it at the victim after ordering him to empty his pockets and to get on the ground. Later, after minor and his criminal partners fled the scene, the victim attempted to reach out to Guzman via Snapchat, suspecting that he, too, was involved in the robbery; however, he discovered Guzman had blocked him from contact on this application.
"Also evidencing the role of electronic devices in this case, another participant, Manuel (minor's cousin), reported to police that Guzman telephoned him on the day in question to set up a ' "lick" ' on someone. Guzman then instructed Manuel and the others (including minor) to come to the park, which they did, finding Guzman with the victim and following through with the robbery.
"Viewing this record in a light favorable to the juvenile court order, even were we to agree with minor that the nexus between his crime and the electronics search condition is somewhat attenuated given the lack of evidence that minor, as opposed to his coparticipants, used electronic devices during the robbery, the fact remains the crime committed by minor was set in motion by use of such a device, as well as by social media. And there is no doubt whatsoever that minor was an active participant in all that followed Guzman's arrangement to meet up with the others to set up a ' "lick" ' on someone via phone, and his arrangement to meet the victim via Snapchat. Under these circumstances and the deferential standard of review required by Lent, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding that electronic devices and social media played a significant role in this case." (In re C.F., supra, A153933, at pp. 9-10, rev.gr.; see People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 [upholding an electronics search condition as reasonable where the defendant lured the victim using social media or some form of computer software].)
At the same time, however, we are not convinced the electronics search condition as drafted is " ' "reasonably related to [C.F.'s] future criminality." ' " (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1116, quoting Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) While the juvenile court was appropriately focused on the fact that C.F. and his coresponsibles used electronic devices and social media in planning and carrying out their crimes, the condition imposes substantially greater burdens on C.F. than the circumstances warrant and is therefore not reasonable under Lent. In particular, the electronics search condition contains no temporal restrictions and provides the probation department unrestricted access to all of C.F.'s electronic devices, passwords, logins, access codes and other information necessary to access his devices, electronic accounts and social media accounts " 'at any time day or night.' " (In re C.F., supra, A153933, at p. 4, rev.gr.; see Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1127-1128 [noting the electronics search condition lacked any temporal limitations and was expansive in scope, permitting law enforcement to remotely access the minor's electronic communications and social media accounts at any time, thereby " 'sweep[ing] too broadly relative to its rationale' "].) Accordingly, we conclude the electronics search condition must be stricken as unreasonable under Lent. (See Ricardo P., supra, at pp. 1128-1129).
We leave for the juvenile court the decisions of whether to craft an alternative electronics search condition more narrowly tailored to its specific concerns regarding C.F.'s involvement in future criminal activity, and what the parameters of such a condition might look like. (See Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1116-1117, 1124.) For example, if the People so request, the court could impose an electronics search condition limited to C.F.'s electronic communications with the individuals who assisted him in perpetrating the crimes in this case, or limited to such communications that would be reasonably likely to reveal his commission, planning or involvement in criminal activity. (Id. at p. 1122 ["courts may properly base probation conditions upon information in a probation report that raises concerns about future criminality unrelated to a prior offense"]; see In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 168 [instructing the juvenile court with respect to any new electronics search condition that "[t]he burden on [the juvenile's] privacy must be substantially proportionate to the probation department's legitimate interest in preventing him from communicating with his coresponsibles or other identified peers who might draw him in to criminal conduct"].) We need not set forth all possible iterations of such a condition for purposes of this appeal.
Accordingly, we strike the electronics search condition and remand the matter to the juvenile court to permit the People, if they so choose, to request a modified electronics search condition. It will then be for the juvenile court to determine in the first instance whether an electronics search condition can be imposed that meets the requirements of Ricardo P.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's dispositional order is affirmed with the exception of the condition of C.F.'s probation requiring him to submit to searches of his electronic devices and communication, which is stricken. The case is remanded to permit the People, if they so choose, to request another electronics search condition, which would then be considered by the juvenile court in light of Ricardo P.
/s/_________
Jackson, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Fujisaki, Acting P. J. /s/_________
Petrou, J.